Eliminating Prudential Reasons

Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 8:236-257 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I argue, contrary to the consensus of most contemporary work in ethics, that there are no (fundamentally, distinctively) prudential reasons for action. That is to say: there is no class of reasons for action that is distinctively and fundamentally about the promotion of the agent’s own well-being. Considerations to do with the agent’s well-being can supply the agent with reasons only in virtue of her well-being mattering morally or in virtue of her caring about her own well-being. In both of these cases, the way that such prudential considerations supply reasons for action is a way that the well-being of others can supply reasons for action too.

Author's Profile

Alex Worsnip
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Analytics

Added to PP
2018-01-12

Downloads
964 (#17,190)

6 months
148 (#32,438)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?