Truth is not (Very) Intrinsically Valuable

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):108-128 (2017)
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Abstract
We might suppose it is not only instrumentally valuable for beliefs to be true, but that it is intrinsically valuable – truth makes a non-derivative, positive contribution to a belief's overall value. Some intrinsic goods are better than others, though, and this article considers the question of how good truth is, compared to other intrinsic goods. I argue that truth is the worst of all intrinsic goods; every other intrinsic good is better than it. I also suggest the best explanation for truth's inferiority is that it is not really an intrinsic good at all. It is intrinsically neutral.
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2017
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Archival date: 2017-11-01
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2015-10-25

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