Domains, plural truth, and mixed atomic propositions

Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):225-236 (2013)
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Abstract
In this paper, I discuss two concerns for pluralist truth theories: a concern about a key detail of these theories and a concern about their viability. The detailed-related concern is that pluralists have relied heavily upon the notion of a domain, but it is not transparent what they take domains to be. Since the notion of a domain has been present in philosophy for some time, it is important for many theorists, not only truth pluralists, to be clear on what domains are and what work they can do. The viability-related concern is that it’s not clear how a pluralist truth theory could explain the truth-conditions of mixed atomic propositions. To address this concern, truth pluralists should recognize something to which they have not been sufficiently attentive: that some atomic propositions belong to more than one domain. But, recognizing this requires rethinking the relationships between the nature of propositions, their membership in domains, and their truth. I address these issues and propose an understanding of them that is preferable to the best existing account of them, that offered by Michael Lynch
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Archival date: 2015-11-21
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Truth and Objectivity.Wright, Crispin
Truth.Horwich, Paul
Truth.Horwich, Paul
Truth.Burgess, Alexis G. & Burgess, John P.

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2012-12-22

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