View topic on PhilPapers for more information
Related categories

50 found
Order:
More results on PhilPapers
  1. Formalizing the Logical (Self-Reference) Error of the Liar Paradox.Pete Olcott - manuscript
    This paper decomposes the Liar Paradox into its semantic atoms using Meaning Postulates (1952) provided by Rudolf Carnap. Formalizing truth values of propositions as Boolean properties of these propositions is a key new insight. This new insight divides the translation of a declarative sentence into its equivalent mathematical proposition into three separate steps. When each of these steps are separately examined the logical error of the Liar Paradox is unequivocally shown.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. To Reduce Nothingness Into a Reference by Falsity.Hazhir Roshangar - manuscript
    Assuming the absolute nothingness as the most basic object of thought, I present a way to refer to this object, by reducing it onto a primitive object that supersedes and comes right after the absolute nothingness. The new primitive object that is constructed can be regarded as a formal system that can generate some infinite variety of symbols. [The PDF here is outdated, for a recent draft please contact me.].
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Much Ado About Aboutness.Sam Baron, Reginald Mary Chua, Kristie Miller & James Norton - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy:1-29.
    Strong non-maximalism holds that some truths require no ontological ground of any sort. Strong non-maximalism allows one to accept that some propositions are true without being forced to endorse any corresponding ontological commitments. We show that there is a version of truthmaker theory available—anti-aboutness truthmaking—that enjoys the dialectical benefits of the strong non-maximalist’s position. According to anti-aboutness truthmaking, all truths require grounds, but a proposition need not be grounded in the very thing(s) that the proposition is about. We argue that (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Truth and Theories of Truth.Panu Raatikainen - forthcoming - In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), The Cambridge Handbook of the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge University Press.
    The concept of truth and competing philosophical theories on what truth amounts to have an important place in contemporary philosophy. The aim of this chapter is to give a synopsis of different theories of truth and the particular philosophical issues related to the concept of truth. The literature on this topic is vast, and we must necessarily be rather selective and very brief about complex questions of interpretation of various philosophers. The focus of the chapter is mainly on selected systematic (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. A Hierarchy of Classical and Paraconsistent Logics.Eduardo Alejandro Barrio, Federico Pailos & Damian Szmuc - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (1):93-120.
    In this article, we will present a number of technical results concerning Classical Logic, ST and related systems. Our main contribution consists in offering a novel identity criterion for logics in general and, therefore, for Classical Logic. In particular, we will firstly generalize the ST phenomenon, thereby obtaining a recursively defined hierarchy of strict-tolerant systems. Secondly, we will prove that the logics in this hierarchy are progressively more classical, although not entirely classical. We will claim that a logic is to (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  6. Habermas, Rorty, and the Problem of Competent Interlocutors.Claudio Cormick - 2020 - Análisis Filosófico 2 (40):213-246.
    In texts such as “Richard Rorty’s Pragmatic Turn” Jürgen Habermas defends a theory that associates, on the one hand, the truth-claim raised by a speaker for a proposition p with, on the other hand, the requirement that p be “defendable on the basis of good reasons […] at any time and against anybody”. This, as is known, has been the target of criticisms by Rorty, who−in spite of agreeing with Habermas on the central tenet that the way of evaluating our (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. 人类行为的逻辑结构.Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press.
    我的论点是,这里突出的故意表(理性、思想、思想、语言、个性等)或多或少地准确地描述了我们思考和行为的方式,因此它不包括仅仅是哲学和心理学,但一切(历史,文学,数学,政治等)。特别要注意,故意和理性,因 为我(连同西尔,维特根斯坦和其他人)认为它,包括有意识的审议语言系统2和无意识的自动前语言系统1的动作或反射。 我提供了一个关键的调查,两个最杰出的学生的行为在现代的一些主要发现, 路德维希·维特根斯坦和约翰·西尔,关于故意的逻辑结构(思想、语言、行为),以维特根斯坦的基本发现为出发点——所有真正的"哲学"问题都是一样的——关于在特定上下文中使用语言的困惑,因 此所有解决方案都是相同的——研究如何在问题语境中使用语言,使其真理条件(满意条件或 COS) 是明确的。基本问题是,一个人可以说什么,但一个人不能意味着(状态明确的COS)任何任意的话语和意义只有在非常具体的上下文中才可能。我从现代两种思想体系(被推广为"思维快,思维慢") 的角度分析各种著作,采用新的意向表和新的双系统命名法。我表明,这是一个强大的启发式描述行为。 因此,如果一个人采取正确的观点,所有行为都是密切相关的。现象幻象(遗忘我们的自动化系统1)是通用的,不仅延伸到整个哲学,而且贯穿整个生命。我确信,如果乔姆斯基、奥巴马、扎克伯格和教皇被告知他们患有与黑 格尔、胡塞尔和海德格尔同样的问题,他们将会难以置信(或者,他们只与毒品和性瘾君子在程度上有所不同,他们的动机是通过心室和核积体来刺激他们的前皮质(和其他100种化学品),这显然是事实。虽然现象学家只浪 费了很多人的时间,但他们却在浪费地球和他们后代的未来。 .
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Fixed-Point Posets in Theories of Truth.Stephen Mackereth - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic (1).
    We show that any coherent complete partial order is obtainable as the fixed-point poset of the strong Kleene jump of a suitably chosen first-order ground model. This is a strengthening of Visser’s result that any finite ccpo is obtainable in this way. The same is true for the van Fraassen supervaluation jump, but not for the weak Kleene jump.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  9. Realism and Theories of Truth.Jamin Asay - 2018 - In Juha Saatsi (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism. London: Routledge. pp. 383-393.
    The topic of truth has long been thought to be connected to scientific realism and its opposition. In this essay, I discuss the various ways that truth might be related to realism. First, I consider how truth might be of use when defining scientific realism and its opposition. Second, I consider whether various stances regarding realism require specific stances on the nature of truth. I survey "neutralist" views that argue that one's stance on realism is independent of one's view on (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. A Mathematically Derived Definitional/Semantical Theory of Truth.Seppo Heikkilä - 2018 - Nonlinear Studies 25 (1):173-189.
    Ordinary and transfinite recursion and induction and ZF set theory are used to construct from a fully interpreted object language and from an extra formula a new language. It is fully interpreted under a suitably defined interpretation. This interpretation is equivalent to the interpretation by meanings of sentences if the object language is so interpreted. The added formula provides a truth predicate for the constructed language. The so obtained theory of truth satisfies the norms presented in Hannes Leitgeb's paper 'What (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. Axiomatic Theories of Partial Ground I: The Base Theory.Johannes Korbmacher - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (2):161-191.
    This is part one of a two-part paper, in which we develop an axiomatic theory of the relation of partial ground. The main novelty of the paper is the of use of a binary ground predicate rather than an operator to formalize ground. This allows us to connect theories of partial ground with axiomatic theories of truth. In this part of the paper, we develop an axiomatization of the relation of partial ground over the truths of arithmetic and show that (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  12. Resemblance and Identity in Wallace Stevens' Conception of Metaphor.Richmond Kwesi - 2018 - In Jakub Mácha & Kacper Bartczak (eds.), Wallace Stevens: Poetry, Philosophy, and Figurative Language. Berlin, Germany: pp. 113-137.
    Aristotle and the classical rhetoricians conceived of metaphor as a figure of speech in which one thing is given a name or an attribute of another thing on the basis of some resemblance that exists between the two things. Wallace Stevens conceived of metaphor not as the production of pre-existing resemblances observed in nature but the “creation of resemblance by the imagination” (NA: 72). Resemblance, and not identity, according to Stevens, is the fundamental relation between the two terms of metaphor. (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  13. Truth Predicates, Truth Bearers, and Their Variants.Friederike Moltmann - 2018 - Synthese (Suppl 2):1-28.
    This paper argues that truth predicates in natural language and their variants, predicates of correctness, satisfaction and validity, do not apply to propositions (not even with 'that'-clauses), but rather to a range of attitudinal and modal objects. As such natural language reflects a notion of truth that is primarily a normative notion of correctness constitutive of representational objects. The paper moreover argues that 'true' is part of a larger class of satisfaction predicates whose semantic differences are best accounted for in (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  14. Non-Realist Cognitivism, Truth and Objectivity.Jussi Suikkanen - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (2):193-212.
    In On What Matters, Derek Parfit defends a new metaethical theory, which he calls non-realist cognitivism. It claims that normative judgments are beliefs; that some normative beliefs are true; that the normative concepts that are a part of the propositions that are the contents of normative beliefs are irreducible, unanalysable and of their own unique kind; and that neither the natural features of the reality nor any additional normative features of the reality make the relevant normative beliefs true. The aim (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  15. Knights, Knaves, Truth, Truthfulness, Grounding, Tethering, Aboutness, and Paradox.Stephen Yablo - 2017 - In Brian Rayman & Melvin Fitting (eds.), Raymond Smullyan on Self Reference. Springer Verlag.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16. Recognizing "Truth" in Chinese Philosophy.Lajos L. Brons - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (3):273-286.
    The debate about truth in Chinese philosophy raises the methodological question How to recognize "truth" in some non-Western tradition of thought? In case of Chinese philosophy it is commonly assumed that the dispute concerns a single question, but a distinction needs to be made between the property of /truth/, the concept of TRUTH, and the word *truth*. The property of /truth/ is what makes something true; the concept of TRUTH is our understanding of /truth/; and *truth*· is the word we (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  17. Minimal Truthmakers.Donnchadh O'conaill & Tuomas E. Tahko - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):228-244.
    A minimal truthmaker for a given proposition is the smallest portion of reality which makes this proposition true. Minimal truthmakers are frequently mentioned in the literature, but there has been no systematic account of what they are or of their importance. In this article we shall clarify the notion of a minimal truthmaker and argue that there is reason to think that at least some propositions have minimal truthmakers. We shall then argue that the notion can play a useful role (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  18. Epistemic Friction: An Essay on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic.Gila Sher - 2016 - Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.
    Gila Sher approaches knowledge from the perspective of the basic human epistemic situation—the situation of limited yet resourceful beings, living in a complex world and aspiring to know it in its full complexity. What principles should guide them? Two fundamental principles of knowledge are epistemic friction and freedom. Knowledge must be substantially constrained by the world (friction), but without active participation of the knower in accessing the world (freedom) theoretical knowledge is impossible. This requires a grounding of all knowledge, empirical (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  19. On Truth, the Truth of Existence, and the Existence of Truth: A Dialogue with the Thought of Duns Scotus.Liran Shia Gordon - 2015 - Philosophy and Theology 27 (2):389-425.
    In order to make sense of Scotus’s claim that rationality is perfected only by the will, a Scotistic doctrine of truth is developed in a speculative way. It is claimed that synthetic a priori truths are truths of the will, which are existential truths. This insight holds profound theological implications and is used on the one hand to criticize Kant's conception of existence, and on the other hand, to offer another explanation of the sense according to which the existence of (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  20. Hermenéutica: El Lógos de la Fenomenología.Andrés-Francisco Contreras - 2014 - Studia Heideggeriana 3:127-158.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  21. Replacing Truth?Matti Eklund - 2014 - In Brett Sherman & Alexis Burgess (eds.), Metasemantics.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  22. Antirealism and the Conditional Fallacy: The Semantic Approach.Patrick Girard & Luca Moretti - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):761-783.
    The expression conditional fallacy identifies a family of arguments deemed to entail odd and false consequences for notions defined in terms of counterfactuals. The antirealist notion of truth is typically defined in terms of what a rational enquirer or a community of rational enquirers would believe if they were suitably informed. This notion is deemed to entail, via the conditional fallacy, odd and false propositions, for example that there necessarily exists a rational enquirer. If these consequences do indeed follow from (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. Semantic Defectiveness and the Liar.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):845-863.
    In this paper, we do two things. First, we provide some support for adopting a version of the meaningless strategy with respect to the liar paradox, and, second, we extend that strategy, by providing, albeit tentatively, a solution to that paradox—one that is semantic, rather than logical.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  24. Formulating Deflationism.Arvid Båve - 2013 - Synthese 190 (15):3287-3305.
    I here argue for a particular formulation of truth-deflationism, namely, the propositionally quantified formula, (Q) “For all p, <p> is true iff p”. The main argument consists of an enumeration of the other (five) possible formulations and criticisms thereof. Notably, Horwich’s Minimal Theory is found objectionable in that it cannot be accepted by finite beings. Other formulations err in not providing non-questionbegging, sufficiently direct derivations of the T-schema instances. I end by defending (Q) against various objections. In particular, I argue (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  25. Truth and God.Graham Oppy - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society: The Virtual Issue 1 (1).
    This paper was part of a special online issue on Truth. I critically discuss Peter Geach's paper "Truth and God".
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  26. Domains, Plural Truth, and Mixed Atomic Propositions.Jeremy Wyatt - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):225-236.
    In this paper, I discuss two concerns for pluralist truth theories: a concern about a key detail of these theories and a concern about their viability. The detail-related concern is that pluralists have relied heavily upon the notion of a domain, but it is not transparent what they take domains to be. Since the notion of a domain has been present in philosophy for some time, it is important for many theorists, not only truth pluralists, to be clear on what (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  27. Truth-Bearers and Modesty.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2011 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 82 (1):49–75.
    In this paper I discuss Künne’s Modest Theory of truth, and develop a variation on a worry that Field expresses with respect to Horwich’s related view. The worry is not that deflationary accounts are false, but rather that, because they take propositions as truth-bearers, they are not philosophically interesting. Compatibly with the intuitions of ordinary speakers, we can understand proposition so that the proposals do account for a property that such truth-bearers have. Nevertheless, we saliently apply the truth-concept also to (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  28. The Merely Conventional Existence of the World.Jan Westerhoff - 2011 - In Georges Dreyfus, Bronwyn Finnigan, Jay Garfield, Guy Newland, Graham Priest, Mark Siderits, Koji Tanaka, Sonam Thakchoe, Tom Tillemans & Jan Westerhoff (eds.), Moonshadows. Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    A platitude questioned by many Buddhist thinkers in India and Tibet is the existence of the world. We might be tempted to insert some modifier here, such as “substantial,” “self-existent,” or “intrinsically existent,” for, one might argue, these thinkers did not want to question the existence of the world tout court but only that of a substantial, self-existent, or otherwise suitably qualified world. But perhaps these modifiers are not as important as is generally thought, for the understanding of the world (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  29. Deflationism and the Primary Truth Bearer.Arvid Båve - 2010 - Synthese 173 (3):281 - 297.
    The paper discusses what kind of truth bearer, or truth-ascription, a deflationist should take as primary. I first present number of arguments against a sententialist view. I then present a deflationary theory which takes propositions as primary, and try to show that it deals neatly with a wide range of linguistic data. Next, I consider both the view that there is no primary truth bearer, and the most common account of sentence truth given by deflationists who take propositions as primary, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  30. Kripke: modalità e verità.Achille C. Varzi - 2010 - In Andrea Borghini (ed.), (ed.), Il genio compreso. La filosofia di Saul Kripke. Carocci Editore. pp. 21–76, 186–191.
    An introduction to Kripke’s semantics for propositional and quantified modal logic (with special reference to its historical development from the original 1959 version to the extended versions of 1963 and 1965) and to his theory of truth.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. Truth, Ramsification, and the Pluralist's Revenge.Cory Wright - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):265–283.
    Functionalists about truth employ Ramsification to produce an implicit definition of the theoretical term _true_, but doing so requires determining that the theory introducing that term is itself true. A variety of putative dissolutions to this problem of epistemic circularity are shown to be unsatisfactory. One solution is offered on functionalists' behalf, though it has the upshot that they must tread on their anti-pluralist commitments.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  32. Truth, Pluralism, Monism, Correspondence.Cory Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2010 - In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    When talking about truth, we ordinarily take ourselves to be talking about one-and-the-same thing. Alethic monists suggest that theorizing about truth ought to begin with this default or pre-reflective stance, and, subsequently, parlay it into a set of theoretical principles that are aptly summarized by the thesis that truth is one. Foremost among them is the invariance principle.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  33. Why is a Truth-Predicate Like a Pronoun?Arvid Båve - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):297 - 310.
    I begin with an exposition of the two main variants of the Prosentential Theory of Truth (PT), those of Dorothy Grover et al. and Robert Brandom. Three main types of criticisms are then put forward: (1) material criticisms to the effect that (PT) does not adequately explain the linguistic data, (2) an objection to the effect that no variant of (PT) gives a properly unified account of the various occurrences of "true" in English, and, most importantly, (3) a charge that (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  34. Radikal Epistemische Wahrheitsbegriffe.Thorsten Sander - 2009 - In Kamp, Georg & Felix Thiele (eds.), Erkennen und Handeln. München: Wilhelm Fink. pp. 75-96.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. \"Przewrót Kanta\" w ujęciu Rudolfa Euckena. Studium z historii problemu prawdy.Tomasz Kubalica - 2008 - Idea 20 (20).
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Frege and Semantics.Richard Heck - 2007 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):27-63.
    In recent work on Frege, one of the most salient issues has been whether he was prepared to make serious use of semantical notions such as reference and truth. I argue here Frege did make very serious use of semantical concepts. I argue, first, that Frege had reason to be interested in the question how the axioms and rules of his formal theory might be justified and, second, that he explicitly commits himself to offering a justification that appeals to the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   23 citations  
  37. Review - Bare Facts And Naked Truths. [REVIEW]Bo R. Meinertsen - 2006 - Metapsychology Online Reviews 10.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38. ¿Empirismo sin dogmas?David Villena Saldaña - 2006 - Solar 2 (2):51-71.
    This papers assesses the possibility of an empiricism without dogmas. It advances an argument against Quine's conceptions regarding philosophy of language and tries to expand the Davidsonian semantics and epistemic program.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. On the Functionalization of Pluralist Approaches to Truth.Cory Wright - 2005 - Synthese 145 (1):1-28.
    Traditional inflationary approaches that specify the nature of truth are attractive in certain ways; yet, while many of these theories successfully explain why propositions in certain domains of discourse are true, they fail to adequately specify the nature of truth because they run up against counterexamples when attempting to generalize across all domains. One popular consequence is skepticism about the efficaciousness of inflationary approaches altogether. Yet, by recognizing that the failure to explain the truth of disparate propositions often stems from (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  40. Truth and Other Self-Effacing Properties.Chase B. Wrenn - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):577–586.
    A “self-effacing” property is one that is definable without referring to it. Colin McGinn (2000) has argued that there is exactly one such property: truth. I show that if truth is a self-effacing property, then there are very many others—too many even to constitute a set.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. Donald Davidson, Verità e interpretazione.Sergio Volodia Marcello Cremaschi - 2000 - In Franco Volpi (ed.), Dizionario delle opere filosofiche. Milano, Italy: Bruno Mondadori. pp. 273.
    A discussion of 'Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation', a collection of 18 essays by Davidson already published since 1964. The first key idea of the book is the notion of 'radical interpretation', based on the semantic conception of truth, which contrasts with Frege's and the early Wittgenstein's conception of meaning, and is an extension of Quine's notion of radical translation. The second idea is the critique of the distinction between empirical content and the conceptual scheme that organizes it, a distinction (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. Truth-Value Gaps, Ontological Commitments, and Incommensurability (Doctoral Dissertation).Xinli Wang - 1998 - Dissertation, The University of Connecticut
    According to the accepted translation-failure interpretation, the problem of incommensurability involves the nature of the meaning-referential relation between scientific languages. The incommensurability thesis is that some competing scientific languages are mutually untranslatable due to the radical variance of meaning or/and reference of the terms they employ. I argue that this interpretation faces many difficulties and cannot give us a tenable, coherent, and integrated notion of incommensurability. It has to be rejected. ;On the basis of two case studies, I find that (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  43. Zitierte Zeichenreihen.Olaf Müller - 1996 - Erkenntnis 44 (3):279 - 304.
    We use quotation marks when we wish to refer to an expression. We can and do so refer even when this expression is composed of characters that do not occur in our alphabet. That's why Tarski, Quine, and Geach's theories of quotation don't work. The proposals of Davidson, Frege, and C. Washington, however, do not provide a plausible account of quotation either. (Section I). The problem is to construct a Tarskian theory of truth for an object language that contains quotation (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  44. Debate on the Notion of Truth in the Phil Sci (科学哲学中有关科学真理性的争论)).Xinli Wang & 王 新力 - 1988 - Developments in Philosophy of China (国内哲学动态) (115):9-15.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  45. Domains of Discourse.Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward - 1987 - Logique Et Analyse 117 (17):173-176.
    Suppose there is a domain of discourse of English, then everything of which any predicate is true is a member of that domain. If English has a domain of discourse, then, since ‘is a domain of discourse of English’ is itself a predicate of English and true of that domain, that domain is a member of itself. But nothing is a member of itself. Thus English has no domain of discourse. We defend this argument and go on to argue to (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46. Conditions.Roger Wertheimer - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (12):355-364.
    Critique of prevailing textbook conception of sufficient conditions and necessary conditions as a truth functional relation of material implication (p->q)/(~q->~p). Explanation of common sense conception of condition as correlative of consequence, involving dependence. Utility of this conception exhibited in resolving puzzles regarding ontology, truth, and fatalism.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  47. The Value of Truth.John Altmann - manuscript
    The Value of Truth looks at the conditions that truths would have to meet to ascertain a value, as well as the different kinds of values a truth can possess.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  48. On a Theory of Truth and on the Regress Problem.S. Heikkilä - manuscript
    A theory of truth is introduced for a first--order language L of set theory. Fully interpreted metalanguages which contain their truth predicates are constructed for L. The presented theory is free from infinite regress, whence it provides a proper framework to study the regress problem. Only ZF set theory, concepts definable in L and classical two-valued logic are used.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49. ¿Es la verdad idéntica a la verdad? [REVIEW]Fabio Morandín-Ahuerma - manuscript
    La incertidumbre no significa por necesidad relativismo. En el aquí y en el ahora se puede hacer una reflexión de implicaciones prácticas en torno a la verdad. Cuando se es objeto del engaño no hace falta conocer la «anatomía de la verdad». Entre mentir y no mentir no hay subjetivismos. “Resulta imposible pensar que mentimos por accidente”, dice Gerardo Martínez Cristerna en su obra “El que miente al mentir”.
    Remove from this list   Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. Reality: Research on True Nature of The Self and Existence.Susree Sangeeta Panda - manuscript
    Possession, Belonging, Self-denial and Detachment of the Soul The state of “I” and “ME” are the attachment to the world and its objects. Self denial and denial of the self from everything is the detachment of the soul from the earthly life. When we don’t relate ourselves to the life-cycle of birth and death; realizing everything belongs to the universe and not to consider oneself the owner of any earthly objects or relations makes one detached from the self. When we (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark