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  1. added 2019-04-02
    Truth-Predicates Still Not Like Pronouns: A Reply to Salis.Arvid Båve - forthcoming - Philosophia:1-9.
    I here argue that my original critique of the Prosentential theory of truth (PT) withstands Pietro Salis's recent objections, particularly, my objection that (PT) makes an idle analogy between "true" and proforms, and that the analogy breaks down in several ways.
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  2. added 2019-02-06
    Pluralism and the Liar.Cory Wright - 2017 - In Bradley Armour-Garb (ed.), Reflections on the Liar. New York, NY, USA: pp. 347–373.
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  3. added 2019-01-30
    To Reduce Nothingness Into a Reference by Falsity.Hazhir Roshangar - manuscript
    Assuming the absolute nothingness as the most basic object of thought, I present a way to refer to this object, by reducing it onto a primitive object that supersedes and comes right after the absolute nothingness. The new primitive object that is constructed can be regarded as a formal system that can generate some infinite variety of symbols. [The PDF here is outdated, for a recent draft please contact me.].
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  4. added 2019-01-19
    A Consistent Theory of Truth for Languages Which Conform to Classical Logic.Seppo Heikkilä - forthcoming - Nonlinear Studies.
    For languages which conform to classical logic such extensions are constructed that they possess a consistent theory of truth. Every language, whose sentences have meanings which make them true or false, is shown to have an extension possessing a consistent theory of truth when that extension is interpreted by meanings of its sentences.
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  5. added 2019-01-15
    Postscript: Reply to McLeod.Lajos L. Brons - 2018 - In Bo Mou (ed.), Philosophy of Language, Chinese Language, Chinese Philosophy: Constructive Engagement. Brill. pp. 364-370.
    This is my reply to McLeod’s reply (2015a) to my (2015) paper commenting on his (2011) interpretation of Wang Chong 王充 as an alethic pluralist.
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  6. added 2018-09-20
    Truth & Transcendence: Turning the Tables on the Liar Paradox.Gila Sher - 2017 - In Bradley Armour-Garb (ed.), Reflections on the Liar. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 281-306.
    Confronting the Liar Paradox is commonly viewed as a prerequisite for developing a theory of truth. In this paper I turn the tables on this traditional conception of the relation between the two. The theorist of truth need not constrain his search for a “material” theory of truth, i.e., a theory of the philosophical nature of truth, by committing himself to one solution or another to the Liar Paradox. If he focuses on the nature of truth (leaving issues of formal (...)
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  7. added 2018-09-20
    Epistemic Friction: An Essay on Knowledge, Truth, and Logic.Gila Sher - 2016 - Oxford: Oxford University Press UK.
    Gila Sher approaches knowledge from the perspective of the basic human epistemic situation—the situation of limited yet resourceful beings, living in a complex world and aspiring to know it in its full complexity. What principles should guide them? Two fundamental principles of knowledge are epistemic friction and freedom. Knowledge must be substantially constrained by the world (friction), but without active participation of the knower in accessing the world (freedom) theoretical knowledge is impossible. This requires a grounding of all knowledge, empirical (...)
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  8. added 2018-04-22
    Truth Predicates, Truth Bearers, and Their Variants.Friederike Moltmann - forthcoming - Synthese:1-28.
    This paper argues that truth predicates in natural language and their variants, predicates of correctness, satisfaction and validity, do not apply to propositions (not even with 'that'-clauses), but rather to a range of attitudinal and modal objects. As such natural language reflects a notion of truth that is primarily a normative notion of correctness constitutive of representational objects. The paper moreover argues that 'true' is part of a larger class of satisfaction predicates whose semantic differences are best accounted for in (...)
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  9. added 2018-04-09
    Truthmakers Without Truth.Rognvaldur Ingthorsson - 2006 - Metaphysica 7 (2):53–71.
    It is often taken for granted that truth is mind-independent, i.e. that, necessarily, if the world is objectively speaking in a certain way, then it is true that it is that way, independently of anyone thinking that it is that way. I argue that proponents of correspondence-truth, in particular immanent realists, should not take the mind-independence of truth for granted. The assumption that the mind-independent features of the world, i.e. ‘facts’, determine the truth of propositions, does not entail that truth (...)
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  10. added 2017-10-17
    A Mathematically Derived Definitional/Semantical Theory of Truth.Seppo Heikkilä - 2018 - Nonlinear Studies 25 (1):173-189.
    Ordinary and transfinite recursion and induction and ZF set theory are used to construct from a fully interpreted object language and from an extra formula a new language. It is fully interpreted under a suitably defined interpretation. This interpretation is equivalent to the interpretation by meanings of sentences if the object language is so interpreted. The added formula provides a truth predicate for the constructed language. The so obtained theory of truth satisfies the norms presented in Hannes Leitgeb's paper 'What (...)
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  11. added 2017-07-15
    On Truth, the Truth of Existence, and the Existence of Truth: A Dialogue with the Thought of Duns Scotus.Liran Shia Gordon - 2015 - Philosophy and Theology 27 (2):389-425.
    In order to make sense of Scotus’s claim that rationality is perfected only by the will, a Scotistic doctrine of truth is developed in a speculative way. It is claimed that synthetic a priori truths are truths of the will, which are existential truths. This insight holds profound theological implications and is used on the one hand to criticize Kant's conception of existence, and on the other hand, to offer another explanation of the sense according to which the existence of (...)
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  12. added 2017-06-26
    Truth and Existence.Jan Heylen & Leon Horsten - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):106-114.
    Halbach has argued that Tarski biconditionals are not ontologically conservative over classical logic, but his argument is undermined by the fact that he cannot include a theory of arithmetic, which functions as a theory of syntax. This article is an improvement on Halbach's argument. By adding the Tarski biconditionals to inclusive negative free logic and the universal closure of minimal arithmetic, which is by itself an ontologically neutral combination, one can prove that at least one thing exists. The result can (...)
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  13. added 2017-05-26
    Minimalism About Truth: Special Issue Introduction.Joseph Ulatowski & Cory Wright - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):927-933.
    The theme of this special issue is minimalism about truth, a conception which has attracted extensive support since the landmark publication of Paul Horwich's Truth (1990). Many well-esteemed philosophers have challenged Horwich's alethic minimalism, an especially austere version of deflationary truth theory. In part, this is at least because his brand of minimalism about truth also intersects with several different literatures: paradox, implicit definition, bivalence, normativity, propositional attitudes, properties, explanatory power, meaning and use, and so forth. Deflationist sympathizers have introduced (...)
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  14. added 2017-05-07
    Truth: Explanation, Success, and Coincidence.Will Gamester - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (5):1243-1265.
    Inflationists have argued that truth is a causal-explanatory property on the grounds that true belief facilitates practical success: we must postulate truth to explain the practical success of certain actions performed by rational agents. Deflationists, however, have a seductive response. Rather than deny that true belief facilitates practical success, the deflationist maintains that the sole role for truth here is as a device for generalisation. In particular, each individual instance of practical success can be explained only by reference to a (...)
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  15. added 2017-03-24
    Truth, Explanation, Minimalism.Cory Wright - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):987–1009.
    Minimalists about truth contend that traditional inflationary theories systematically fail to explain certain facts about truth, and that this failure licenses a ‘reversal of explanatory direction’. Once reversed, they purport that their own minimal theory adequately explains all of the facts involving truth. But minimalists’ main objection to inflationism seems to misfire, and the subsequent reversal of explanatory direction, if it can be made sense of, leaves minimalism in no better explanatory position; and even if the objection were serviceable and (...)
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  16. added 2017-03-21
    Review of "Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications", Edited by John MacFarlane. [REVIEW]Adam C. Podlaskowski - 2014 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 8 (1):95-98.
    This is a book review of John MacFarlane's "Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications.".
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  17. added 2017-03-02
    Review of Joshua Rasmussen's Defending the Correspondence Theory of Truth. [REVIEW]Joseph Ulatowski - 2015 - Polish Journal of Philosophy 9 (2):83-89.
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  18. added 2017-01-12
    Axiomatic Theories of Partial Ground I.Johannes Korbmacher - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (2):161-191.
    This is part one of a two-part paper, in which we develop an axiomatic theory of the relation of partial ground. The main novelty of the paper is the of use of a binary ground predicate rather than an operator to formalize ground. This allows us to connect theories of partial ground with axiomatic theories of truth. In this part of the paper, we develop an axiomatization of the relation of partial ground over the truths of arithmetic and show that (...)
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  19. added 2017-01-04
    Forms of Correspondence: The Intricate Route From Thought to Reality.Gila Sher - 2013 - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press. pp. 157--179.
    The paper delineates a new approach to truth that falls under the category of “Pluralism within the bounds of correspondence”, and illustrates it with respect to mathematical truth. Mathematical truth, like all other truths, is based on correspondence, but the route of mathematical correspondence differs from other routes of correspondence in (i) connecting mathematical truths to a special aspect of reality, namely, its formal aspect, and (ii) doing so in a complex, indirect way, rather than in a simple and direct (...)
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  20. added 2016-12-08
    Replacing Truth.Kevin Scharp - 2007 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):606 – 621.
    Of the dozens of purported solutions to the liar paradox published in the past fifty years, the vast majority are "traditional" in the sense that they reject one of the premises or inference rules that are used to derive the paradoxical conclusion. Over the years, however, several philosophers have developed an alternative to the traditional approaches; according to them, our very competence with the concept of truth leads us to accept that the reasoning used to derive the paradox is sound. (...)
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  21. added 2016-10-04
    Recognizing "Truth" in Chinese Philosophy.Lajos L. Brons - 2016 - Logos and Episteme 7 (3):273-286.
    The debate about truth in Chinese philosophy raises the methodological question How to recognize "truth" in some non-Western tradition of thought? In case of Chinese philosophy it is commonly assumed that the dispute concerns a single question, but a distinction needs to be made between the property of /truth/, the concept of TRUTH, and the word *truth*. The property of /truth/ is what makes something true; the concept of TRUTH is our understanding of /truth/; and *truth*· is the word we (...)
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  22. added 2016-09-05
    Formalizing the Logical (Self-Reference) Error of the Liar Paradox.Pete Olcott - manuscript
    This paper decomposes the Liar Paradox into its semantic atoms using Meaning Postulates (1952) provided by Rudolf Carnap. Formalizing truth values of propositions as Boolean properties of these propositions is a key new insight. This new insight divides the translation of a declarative sentence into its equivalent mathematical proposition into three separate steps. When each of these steps are separately examined the logical error of the Liar Paradox is unequivocally shown.
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  23. added 2016-08-11
    The Nature of Truth.Jeremiah Joven Joaquin, Robert James M. Boyles, Mark Anthony Dacela & Victorino Raymundo Lualhati - 2013 - In Leni Garcia (ed.), Exploring the Philosophical Terrain. C&E Publishing. pp. 38–50.
    This article surveys different philosophical theories about the nature of truth. We give much importance to truth; some demand to know it, some fear it, and others would even die for it. But what exactly is truth? What is its nature? Does it even have a nature in the first place? When do we say that some truth-bearers are true? Philosophers offer varying answers to these questions. In this article, some of these answers are explored and some of the problems (...)
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  24. added 2016-07-31
    Hermenéutica: El Lógos de la Fenomenología.Andrés-Francisco Contreras - 2014 - Studia Heideggeriana 3:127-158.
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  25. added 2016-07-13
    Non-Realist Cognitivism, Truth and Objectivity.Jussi Suikkanen - 2017 - Acta Analytica 32 (2):193-212.
    In On What Matters, Derek Parfit defends a new metaethical theory, which he calls non-realist cognitivism. It claims that normative judgments are beliefs; that some normative beliefs are true; that the normative concepts that are a part of the propositions that are the contents of normative beliefs are irreducible, unanalysable and of their own unique kind; and that neither the natural features of the reality nor any additional normative features of the reality make the relevant normative beliefs true. The aim (...)
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  26. added 2016-04-12
    Brentano on Truth.Johannes Brandl - forthcoming - In U. Kriegel (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Brentano and the Brentano School. Routledge.
    How to understand Brentano’s account of truth is a question of some controversy. A number of different views have been put forward as positions that Brentano held at some stage in his career. The received view has it that the early Brentano subscribed to a form of correspondence theory which he later rejected in favor of a definition of truth in terms of correct judging, where the correctness of a judgment is defined in terms of the notion of self-evidence (see (...)
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  27. added 2016-04-03
    Deflationary Truth and Pathologies.Cezary Cieśliński - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (3):325-337.
    By a classical result of Kotlarski, Krajewski and Lachlan, pathological satisfaction classes can be constructed for countable, recursively saturated models of Peano arithmetic. In this paper we consider the question of whether the pathology can be eliminated; we ask in effect what generalities involving the notion of truth can be obtained in a deflationary truth theory (a theory of truth which is conservative over its base). It is shown that the answer depends on the notion of pathology we adopt. It (...)
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  28. added 2016-03-16
    \"Przewrót Kanta\" w ujęciu Rudolfa Euckena. Studium z historii problemu prawdy.Tomasz Kubalica - 2008 - Idea 20 (20).
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  29. added 2016-03-03
    Minimalism and Truth.John O'Leary-Hawthorne & Graham Oppy - 1997 - Noûs 31 (2):170-196.
    This paper canvasses the various dimensions along which theories of truth may disagree about the extent to which truth is minimal.
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  30. added 2016-02-05
    The Many (yet Few) Faces of Deflationism.Jeremy Wyatt - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly (263):362-382.
    It's often said that according to deflationary theories of truth, truth is not a ‘substantial’ property. While this is a fine slogan, it is far from transparent what deflationists mean (or ought to mean) in saying that truth is ‘insubstantial’. Focusing so intently upon the concept of truth and the word ‘true’, I argue, deflationists and their critics have been insufficiently attentive to a host of metaphysical complexities that arise for deflationists in connection with the property of truth. My aim (...)
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  31. added 2016-01-09
    On Artifacts and Truth-Preservation.Shawn Standefer - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Logic 12 (3):135-158.
    In Saving Truth from Paradox, Hartry Field presents and defends a theory of truth with a new conditional. In this paper, I present two criticisms of this theory, one concerning its assessments of validity and one concerning its treatment of truth-preservation claims. One way of adjusting the theory adequately responds to the truth-preservation criticism, at the cost of making the validity criticism worse. I show that in a restricted setting, Field has a way to respond to the validity criticism. I (...)
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  32. added 2015-12-23
    Truth-Value Gaps, Ontological Commitments, and Incommensurability (Doctoral Dissertation).Xinli Wang - 1998 - Dissertation, The University of Connecticut
    According to the accepted translation-failure interpretation, the problem of incommensurability involves the nature of the meaning-referential relation between scientific languages. The incommensurability thesis is that some competing scientific languages are mutually untranslatable due to the radical variance of meaning or/and reference of the terms they employ. I argue that this interpretation faces many difficulties and cannot give us a tenable, coherent, and integrated notion of incommensurability. It has to be rejected. ;On the basis of two case studies, I find that (...)
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  33. added 2015-12-23
    Debate on the Notion of Truth in the Phil Sci (科学哲学中有关科学真理性的争论)).Xinli Wang & 王 新力 - 1988 - Developments in Philosophy of China (国内哲学动态) (115):9-15.
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  34. added 2015-10-23
    Knights, Knaves, Truth, Truthfulness, Grounding, Tethering, Aboutness, and Paradox.Stephen Yablo - 2017 - In Brian Rayman & Melvin Fitting (eds.), Raymond Smullyan on Self Reference. Springer Verlag.
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  35. added 2014-12-15
    An Explanatory Role for the Concept of Truth.Boris Rähme - 2014 - In Fabio Bacchini, Stefano Caputo & Massimo Dell'Utri (eds.), New Frontiers in Truth. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 15-37.
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  36. added 2014-10-10
    Kripke: modalità e verità.Achille C. Varzi - 2010 - In Andrea Borghini (ed.), (ed.), Il genio compreso. La filosofia di Saul Kripke. Carocci Editore. pp. 21–76, 186–191.
    An introduction to Kripke’s semantics for propositional and quantified modal logic (with special reference to its historical development from the original 1959 version to the extended versions of 1963 and 1965) and to his theory of truth.
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  37. added 2014-07-25
    The Logic of Qualia.Merriam Paul - manuscript
    We indicate how to construct a logic of qualia.
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  38. added 2014-06-04
    Pluralism and the Absence of Truth.Jeremy Wyatt - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Connecticut
    In this dissertation, I argue that we should be pluralists about truth and in turn, eliminativists about the property Truth. Traditional deflationists were right to suspect that there is no such property as Truth. Yet there is a plurality of pluralities of properties which enjoy defining features that Truth would have, were it to exist. So although, in this sense, truth is plural, Truth is non-existent. The resulting account of truth is indebted to deflationism as the provenance of the suspicion (...)
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  39. added 2014-04-26
    Minimal Truthmakers.Donnchadh O'Conaill & Tuomas E. Tahko - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):228-244.
    A minimal truthmaker for a given proposition is the smallest portion of reality which makes this proposition true. Minimal truthmakers are frequently mentioned in the literature, but there has been no systematic account of what they are or of their importance. In this article we shall clarify the notion of a minimal truthmaker and argue that there is reason to think that at least some propositions have minimal truthmakers. We shall then argue that the notion can play a useful role (...)
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  40. added 2014-03-29
    Truth, Pluralism, Monism, Correspondence.Cory Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen - 2010 - In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    When talking about truth, we ordinarily take ourselves to be talking about one-and-the-same thing. Alethic monists suggest that theorizing about truth ought to begin with this default or pre-reflective stance, and, subsequently, parlay it into a set of theoretical principles that are aptly summarized by the thesis that truth is one. Foremost among them is the invariance principle.
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  41. added 2014-03-29
    Zitierte Zeichenreihen.Olaf Müller - 1996 - Erkenntnis 44 (3):279 - 304.
    We use quotation marks when we wish to refer to an expression. We can and do so refer even when this expression is composed of characters that do not occur in our alphabet. That's why Tarski, Quine, and Geach's theories of quotation don't work. The proposals of Davidson, Frege, and C. Washington, however, do not provide a plausible account of quotation either. (Section I). The problem is to construct a Tarskian theory of truth for an object language that contains quotation (...)
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  42. added 2014-03-14
    On the Functionalization of Pluralist Approaches to Truth.Cory Wright - 2005 - Synthese 145 (1):1-28.
    Traditional inflationary approaches that specify the nature of truth are attractive in certain ways; yet, while many of these theories successfully explain why propositions in certain domains of discourse are true, they fail to adequately specify the nature of truth because they run up against counterexamples when attempting to generalize across all domains. One popular consequence is skepticism about the efficaciousness of inflationary approaches altogether. Yet, by recognizing that the failure to explain the truth of disparate propositions often stems from (...)
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  43. added 2013-09-16
    Semantic Defectiveness and the Liar.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):845-863.
    In this paper, we do two things. First, we provide some support for adopting a version of the meaningless strategy with respect to the liar paradox, and, second, we extend that strategy, by providing, albeit tentatively, a solution to that paradox—one that is semantic, rather than logical.
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  44. added 2013-05-28
    On a Theory of Truth and on the Regress Problem.S. Heikkilä - manuscript
    A theory of truth is introduced for a first--order language L of set theory. Fully interpreted metalanguages which contain their truth predicates are constructed for L. The presented theory is free from infinite regress, whence it provides a proper framework to study the regress problem. Only ZF set theory, concepts definable in L and classical two-valued logic are used.
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  45. added 2013-01-21
    Domains, Plural Truth, and Mixed Atomic Propositions.Jeremy Wyatt - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):225-236.
    In this paper, I discuss two concerns for pluralist truth theories: a concern about a key detail of these theories and a concern about their viability. The detail-related concern is that pluralists have relied heavily upon the notion of a domain, but it is not transparent what they take domains to be. Since the notion of a domain has been present in philosophy for some time, it is important for many theorists, not only truth pluralists, to be clear on what (...)
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  46. added 2012-10-14
    Formulating Deflationism.Arvid Båve - 2013 - Synthese 190 (15):3287-3305.
    I here argue for a particular formulation of truth-deflationism, namely, the propositionally quantified formula, (Q) “For all p, <p> is true iff p”. The main argument consists of an enumeration of the other (five) possible formulations and criticisms thereof. Notably, Horwich’s Minimal Theory is found objectionable in that it cannot be accepted by finite beings. Other formulations err in not providing non-questionbegging, sufficiently direct derivations of the T-schema instances. I end by defending (Q) against various objections. In particular, I argue (...)
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  47. added 2012-10-14
    Deflationism and the Primary Truth Bearer.Arvid Båve - 2010 - Synthese 173 (3):281 - 297.
    The paper discusses what kind of truth bearer, or truth-ascription, a deflationist should take as primary. I first present number of arguments against a sententialist view. I then present a deflationary theory which takes propositions as primary, and try to show that it deals neatly with a wide range of linguistic data. Next, I consider both the view that there is no primary truth bearer, and the most common account of sentence truth given by deflationists who take propositions as primary, (...)
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  48. added 2012-10-14
    Why is a Truth-Predicate Like a Pronoun?Arvid Båve - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):297 - 310.
    I begin with an exposition of the two main variants of the Prosentential Theory of Truth (PT), those of Dorothy Grover et al. and Robert Brandom. Three main types of criticisms are then put forward: (1) material criticisms to the effect that (PT) does not adequately explain the linguistic data, (2) an objection to the effect that no variant of (PT) gives a properly unified account of the various occurrences of "true" in English, and, most importantly, (3) a charge that (...)
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  49. added 2012-08-18
    The Merely Conventional Existence of the World.Jan Westerhoff - 2011 - In Georges Dreyfus, Bronwyn Finnigan, Jay Garfield, Guy Newland, Graham Priest, Mark Siderits, Koji Tanaka, Sonam Thakchoe, Tom Tillemans & Jan Westerhoff (eds.), Moonshadows. Conventional Truth in Buddhist Philosophy. Oxford University Press.
    A platitude questioned by many Buddhist thinkers in India and Tibet is the existence of the world. We might be tempted to insert some modifier here, such as “substantial,” “self-existent,” or “intrinsically existent,” for, one might argue, these thinkers did not want to question the existence of the world tout court but only that of a substantial, self-existent, or otherwise suitably qualified world. But perhaps these modifiers are not as important as is generally thought, for the understanding of the world (...)
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  50. added 2012-07-28
    The Value of Truth.John Altmann - manuscript
    The Value of Truth looks at the conditions that truths would have to meet to ascertain a value, as well as the different kinds of values a truth can possess.
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1 — 50 / 54