Logiczne podstawy ontologii składni języka

Studia Filozoficzne 271 (6-7):263-284 (1988)
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Abstract
By logical foundations of language syntax ontology we understand here the construction of formalized linguistic theories based on widely conceived mathematical logic and dependent on two trends in language ontology. The formalization includes exclusively the syntactic aspect of logical analysis of language characterized categorially according to Ajdukiewicz's approach [1935, 1960]. Any categorial language L is characterized formally on two levels: on one of them it concerns the language of expression-tokens, on the other one - that of expression-types. Accepting the view that expression-concretes, that is expression-tokens - thus, physical objects are fundamental language layer, whereas the secondary layer for L are expression-abstracts, that is expression-types - thus, ideal objects, it is the nominalistic, concretistic philosophical view on the ontological nature of language entities that is adhered to. Supporting the view that expression-types are the basic language layer, while expression-concretes are the secondary one, we take the opposite standpoint - platonizing one. We prove that the two dual approaches towards the two-level syntax theory of language are logically eqivalent. In the scope of language syntax, both conceptions deriving from two different existential assumption are equivalent. This statement is philosophical significance, since it proves that in syntactical studies on language the assumption of the existence of abstract language beings (interpreted as classes equiform tokens) can be neglected. The idea was signalized by author in ealier paper "On the type-token relationships'' [1986) and than, in a slighly diffrent form in English "On the eliminatibility of ideal linguistic entities, Studia Logica 48,no 4 (1989), pp. 587-615.
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