Hegel and Analytic Philosophy of Action

The Owl of Minerva 42 (1/2):41-62 (2010)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
A primary fault line in the analytic philosophy of action is the debate between causal/Davidsonian and interpretivist/Anscombian theories of action. The fundamental problem of the former is producing a criterion for distinguishing intentional from non-intentional causal chains; the fundamental problem of the latter is producing an account of the relation between reasons and actions that is represented by the ‘because’ in the claim that the agent acted because she had the reason. It is argued that Hegel’s conception of teleology can be used to develop the interpretivist position by solving both its and the causal theory’s fundamental problems.
Reprint years
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
First archival date: 2019-06-19
Latest version: 2 (2019-06-24)
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
170 ( #35,835 of 65,603 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
16 ( #42,709 of 65,603 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.