Non-branching Clause

Metaphysica 11 (2):191-210 (2010)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The central claim of the Parfitian psychological approach to personal identity is that the fact about personal identity is underpinned by a non-branching psychological continuity relation. Hence, for the advocates of the Parfitian view, it is important to understand what it is for a relation to take or not take a branching form. Nonetheless, very few attempts have been made in the literature of personal identity to define the non-branching clause. This paper undertakes this task. Drawing upon a recent debate between Anthony Brueckner and Harold Noonan on the issue, I present three candidates for the non-branching clause.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
YINC
Upload history
Archival date: 2018-04-03
View other versions
Added to PP index
2010-09-13

Total views
134 ( #39,620 of 2,454,404 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #49,948 of 2,454,404 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.