Why Monogamy is Morally Permissible: A Defense of Some Common Justifications for Monogamy
Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (4):539-552 (2020)
Abstract
Harry Chalmers argues that monogamy involves restricting one’s partner’s access to goods in a morally troubling way that is analogous to an agreement between partners to have no additional friends. Chalmers finds the traditional defenses of monogamy wanting, since they would also justify a friendship-restricting agreement. I show why three traditional defenses of monogamy hold up quite well and why they don’t, for the most part, also justify friendship-restricting agreements. In many cases, monogamy can be justified on grounds of practicality, specialness, or jealousy.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1007/s10790-019-09727-z
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2019-12-13
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2019-12-13
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620 (#13,449)
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308 (#1,388)
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