View topic on PhilPapers for more information
Related categories

36 found
Order:
More results on PhilPapers
  1. Is It Bad to Prefer Attractive Partners?William D'Alessandro - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-20.
    Philosophers have rightly condemned lookism—that is, discrimination in favor of attractive people or against unattractive people—in education, the justice system, the workplace and elsewhere. Surprisingly, however, the almost universal preference for attractive romantic and sexual partners has rarely received serious ethical scrutiny. On its face, it’s unclear whether this is a form of discrimination we should reject or tolerate. I consider arguments for both views. On the one hand, a strong case can be made that preferring attractive partners is bad. (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  2. Love and the Anatomy of Needing Another.Monique Wonderly - forthcoming - In John Doris & Manuel Vargas (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Psychology. Oxford, UK:
    The idea that we need our beloveds has a rich and longstanding history in classic literature, pop culture, social sciences, and of course, philosophical treatments of love. Yet on little reflection, the idea that one needs one’s beloved is as puzzling as it is familiar. In what, if any sense, do we really need our beloveds? And insofar as we do need them, is this feature of love something to be celebrated or lamented? In the relevant philosophical literature, there are (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3. Moral Responsibility Reconsidered.Gregg D. Caruso & Derk Pereboom - 2022 - Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
    This Element examines the concept of moral responsibility as it is used in contemporary philosophical debates and explores the justifiability of the moral practices associated with it, including moral praise/blame, retributive punishment, and the reactive attitudes of resentment and indignation. After identifying and discussing several different varieties of responsibility-including causal responsibility, take-charge responsibility, role responsibility, liability responsibility, and the kinds of responsibility associated with attributability, answerability, and accountability-it distinguishes between basic and non-basic desert conceptions of moral responsibility and considers a (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4. Non-harmonious love.Pilar Lopez-Cantero - 2022 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 30 (3):276-297.
    A common approach in the philosophy of love defines love as caring about one another and promoting one another's interests, aims and values. The view faces several problems and has been re-formulated to avoid them. However, here I argue that a larger re-formulation of the definition of love is needed in order to accommodate three instances of what I call 'non-harmonious' relationships. I identify three types of non-harmonious love (featuring problematic interests, opposing interests and neutral interests the lovers do not (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. Why Should LGBTQI Marriage Be Legalized.Yang Pachankis - 2022 - Academia Letters 4 (5157).
    Traditional paradigm on marriage equality focused on a humanitarian appeal and was set as a path dependency model on marriage equality for the suppressed regions. However, such gender based focus has largely neglected the multilateral movements underlying the macro- political-economic structures that shaped law as a power political means. Consequentially, LGBTQI existence became marginalized from the public consciousness with structural realist state hierarchies that further undermines the fundamental freedoms of the LGBTQI popula- tion. This makes the question on LGBTQI equal (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  6. Mary Astell on Neighborly Love.Timothy Yenter - 2022 - Religions 13 (6).
    In discussing the obligation to love everyone, Mary Astell (1666–1731) recognizes and responds to what I call the theocentric challenge: if humans are required to love God entirely, then they cannot fulfill the second requirement to love their neighbor. In exploring how Astell responds to this challenge, I argue that Astell is an astute metaphysician who does not endorse the metaphysical views she praises. This viewpoint helps us to understand the complicated relationship between her views and those of Descartes, Malebranche, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Sex, Love, and Paternalism.David Birks - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1):257-270.
    Paternalistic behaviour directed towards a person’s informed and competent decisions is often thought to be morally impermissible. This view is supported by what we can call the Anti-Paternalism Principle. While APP might seem plausible when employed to show the wrongness of paternalism by the state, there are some cases of paternalistic behaviour between private, informed, and competent individuals where APP seems mistaken. This raises a difficulty for supporters of APP. Either they need to reject APP to accommodate our intuitions in (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Love In-Between.Laura Candiotto & Hanne De Jaegher - 2021 - The Journal of Ethics 25 (4):501-524.
    In this paper, we introduce an enactive account of loving as participatory sense-making inspired by the “I love to you” of the feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray. Emancipating from the fusionist concept of romantic love, which understands love as unity, we conceptualise loving as an existential engagement in a dialectic of encounter, in continuous processes of becoming-in-relation. In these processes, desire acquires a certain prominence as the need to know (the other, the relation, oneself) more. We build on Irigaray’s account of (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  9. Unrequited Love, Self-victimisation and the Target of Appropriate Resentment.Anca Gheaus - 2021 - The Journal of Ethics 25 (4):487-499.
    In “Tragedy and Resentment” Ulrika Carlsson claims that there are cases when we are justified in feeling non-moral resentment against someone who harms us without wronging us, when the harm either consists in their attitude towards us or in the emotional suffering triggered by their attitudes. Since they had no duty to protect us from harm, the objectionable attitude is not disrespect but a failure to show love, admiration, or appreciation for us. I explain why unrequited love is the wrong (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  10. Do We Love For Reasons?Yongming Han - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (1):106-126.
    Do we love for reasons? It can seem as if we do, since most cases of non‐familial love seem *selective*: coming to love a non‐family‐member often begins with our being drawn to them for what they are like. I argue, however, that we can vindicate love's selectivity, even if we maintain that there are no reasons for love; indeed, that gives us a simpler, and hence better, explanation of love's selectivity. We don't, in short, come to love *for* reasons. That (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  11. The Amorality of Romantic Love.Arina Pismenny - 2021 - In Rachel Fedock, Michael Kühler & Raja Rosenhagen (eds.), Love, Justice, and Autonomy: Philosophical Perspectives. New York, NY, USA: pp. 23-42.
    It has been argued that romantic love is an intrinsically moral phenomenon – a phenomenon that is directly connected to morality. The connection is elucidated in terms of reasons for love, and reasons of love. It is said that romantic love is a response to moral reasons – the moral qualities of the beloved. Additionally, the reasons that love produces are also moral in nature. Since romantic love is a response to moral qualities and a source of moral motivation, it (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  12. Murdochian Presentationalism, Autonomy, and the Ideal Lovers' Pledge.T. Raja Rosenhagen - 2021 - In T. Raja Rosenhagen, Rachel Fedock & Michael Kühler (eds.), Love, Justice, and Autonomy. Philosophical Perspectives. New York, NY, USA: Routledge. pp. 102-130.
    How to conceptualize loving relationships so as to accommodate that just love is geared toward preserving and fostering individual autonomy? To develop an answer, this paper draws on the recent debate on the rational role of experience to motivate a view dubbed Murdochian presentationalism. Murdochian presentationalism takes seriously two presentationalist ideas: 1) individuals harboring different world views who respond to identical situations differently can be equally rational; 2) our views and concepts develop under the constant pressure of experience. It combines (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  13. The Affective and the Political: Rousseau and Contemporary Kantianism.Byron Davies - 2020 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 59:301-339.
    Jean-Jacques Rousseau is often associated with a certain political mode of relating to another, where a person (“a Citizen”) is a locus of enforceable demands. I claim that Rousseau also articulated an affective mode of relating to another, where a person is seen as the locus of a kind of value (expressive of their being an independent point of view) that cannot be demanded. These are not isolated sides of a distinction, for the political mode constitutes a solution to certain (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  14. Love by (Someone Else’s) Choice.Pilar Lopez-Cantero - 2020 - Philosophy and Public Issues - Filosofia E Questioni Pubbliche 10 (3):155-189.
    Love enhancement can give us as a say on whom we love and thus ‘free’ us from our brain chemistry, which is mostly out of our control. In that way, we become more autonomous in love and in our life in general, as long as love enhancement is a free, voluntary choice. So goes the argument in favour of this addition to medical interventions of relationships. In this paper, I show that proponents of love enhancement have overlooked, or at least (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. Lost without you: the Value of Falling out of Love.Pilar Lopez-Cantero & Alfred Archer - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (3-4):1-15.
    In this paper we develop a view about the disorientation attached to the process of falling out of love and explain its prudential and moral value. We start with a brief background on theories of love and situate our argument within the views concerned with the lovers’ identities. Namely, love changes who we are. In the context of our paper, we explain this common tenet in the philosophy of love as a change in the lovers’ self-concepts through a process of (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  16. Why, and to what extent, is sexual infidelity wrong?Natasha McKeever - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (3):515-537.
    Sexual infidelity is widespread, but it is also widely condemned, yet relatively little philosophical work has been done on what makes it wrong and how wrong it is. In this paper, I argue that sexual infidelity is wrong if it involves breaking a commitment to be sexually exclusive, which has special significance in the relationship. However, it is not necessarily worse than other kinds of infidelity, and the context in which it takes place ought to be considered. I finish the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  17. Consent Is Not Enough: A Case Against Liberal Sexual Ethics.David McPherson - 2020 - In Bob Fischer (ed.), College Ethics: A Reader on Moral Issues that Affect You, 2nd edition. Oxford University Press.
    The standard liberal sexual ethic maintains that consent is the only requirement for ethical sexual relations. While consent is certainly necessary for an adequate sexual ethic (and it’s important to know what it involves), I argue that it’s far from sufficient. The key claims that I advance are the following: (1) The consent-only model of sexual ethics affirms a “casual” view of sex and therefore it can’t make sense of and properly combat what’s worst in the sexual domain: namely, the (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  18. Why Monogamy is Morally Permissible: A Defense of Some Common Justifications for Monogamy.Kyle York - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (4):539-552.
    Harry Chalmers argues that monogamy involves restricting one’s partner’s access to goods in a morally troubling way that is analogous to an agreement between partners to have no additional friends. Chalmers finds the traditional defenses of monogamy wanting, since they would also justify a friendship-restricting agreement. I show why three traditional defenses of monogamy hold up quite well and why they don’t, for the most part, also justify friendship-restricting agreements. In many cases, monogamy can be justified on grounds of practicality, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  19. Distributive Justice as a Matter of Love: A Relational Approach to Liberty and Property.Thaddeus Metz - 2019 - In Ingolf Dalferth & Trevor Kimball (eds.), Love and Justice. Mohr Siebeck. pp. 339-352.
    Usually a relational approach, such as one appealing to care or love, is contrasted with an account of justice. In this chapter, however, I argue that distributive justice is well conceived as itself a matter of honouring people in virtue of their capacity to love and to be loved. After spelling out a familiar conception of love, I explain how treating people with respect in light of this capacity provides a plausible basis for human rights, one that rivals influential individualist (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  20. On Neighborly and Preferential Love in Kierkegaard's Works of Love.Matt Rosen - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy and Scripture 8:1-20.
    I consider the question of the possibility of the coexistence of neighborly love (love for strangers) and preferential love (love for persons because of or despite their attributes). This question has long perplexed interpreters of Kierkegaard. I make a threefold intervention into this interpretive debate. First, I aim to show that we shouldn’t privilege preferential love over neighborly love. Second, I reformulate preferential and neighborly love on a ‘topological’ model, so as to get a better grip on them. And third, (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  21. Artificial Intelligence, Robots and the Ethics of the Future.Constantin Vica & Cristina Voinea - 2019 - Revue Roumaine de Philosophie 63 (2):223–234.
    The future rests under the sign of technology. Given the prevalence of technological neutrality and inevitabilism, most conceptualizations of the future tend to ignore moral problems. In this paper we argue that every choice about future technologies is a moral choice and even the most technology-dominated scenarios of the future are, in fact, moral provocations we have to imagine solutions to. We begin by explaining the intricate connection between morality and the future. After a short excursion into the history of (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Stump's Forgiveness.Brandon Warmke - 2019 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 11 (1):145-163.
    To love someone, Eleonore Stump tells us, is to have two desires: a desire her objective good and a desire for union with her. In Atonement, Stump claims that loving someone—understood as having these desires—is necessary and sufficient for morally appropriate forgiveness. I offer several arguments against this claim.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  23. 'I Dont Want To be a Playa No More': An Exploration of the Denigrating effects of 'Player' as a Stereotype Against African American Polyamorous Men.Justin L. Clardy - 2018 - Analize Journal of Gender and Feminist Studies 1 (11):38-58.
    This paper shows how amatonormativity and its attendant social pressures converge at the intersections of race, gender, romantic relationality, and sexuality to generate peculiar challenges to polyamorous African American men in American society. Contrary to the view maintained in the “slut-vs-stud” phenomenon, I maintain that the label ‘player’ when applied to polyamorous African American men functions as a pernicious stereotype and has denigrating effects. Specifically, I argue that stereotyping polyamorous African American men as players estranges them from themselves and it (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. Social Ontology. Emotional Sharing as the Foundation of Care Relationships.Guido Cusinato - 2018 - In S. Bourgault & E. Pulcini, Emotions and Care: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. Peeters.
    The origin of the concept of “emotional sharing” can be traced back to the first edition of Sympathiebuch [1913/23], in which Max Scheler paved the way to a phenomenology of emotions and to social ontology. The importance of his findings is evident: consider the central role of emotional sharing in Michael Tomasello’s analysis and the lively debate on social ontology and collective intentionality.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. The Break-Up Check: Exploring Romantic Love through Relationship Terminations.Pilar Lopez-Cantero - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (3):689-703.
    People who experience love often experience break-ups as well. However, philosophers of love have paid little attention to the phenomenon. Here, I address that gap by looking at the grieving process which follows unchosen relationship terminations. I ask which one is the loss that, if it were to be recovered, would stop grief or make it unwarranted. Is it the beloved, the reciprocation of love, the relationship, or all of it? By answering this question I not only provide with an (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  26. Ubuntu, Christianity and Two Kinds of Reconciliation.Thaddeus Metz - 2018 - In Mohammed Girma (ed.), The Healing of Memories: African Christian Responses to Politically Induced Trauma. Rowman and Littlefield Publishers. pp. 137-157.
    I consider the implications of two globally influential love-centred value systems for how to respond to painful memories that are a consequence of large-scale social conflict. More specifically, I articulate a moral-philosophical interpretation of the sub-Saharan worldview of ubuntu, and consider what it entails for responding to such trauma. According to this ethic, one should strive to become a real person, which one can do insofar as one honours those capable of communal (or broadly loving) relationships, ones of identity and (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27. "Mama, Do You Love Me?": A Defense of Unloving Parents.Sara Protasi - 2018 - In Adrienne Martin (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Love in Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 35-46.
    In this chapter I critique the contemporary Western ideal of unconditional maternal love. In the first section, I draw some preliminary distinctions and clarify the scope and limitations of my inquiry. In the second section, I argue that unloving mothers exist, and are not psychologically abnormal. In the third section, I go further and suggest that lack of maternal love can be fitting and even morally permissible. In the fourth section, I sketch some implications that lack of maternal love and (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  28. Is the Requirement of Sexual Exclusivity Consistent with Romantic Love?Natasha McKeever - 2017 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 34 (3):353-369.
    In some cultures, people tend to believe that it is very important to be sexually exclusive in romantic relationships and idealise monogamous romantic relationships; but there is a tension in this ideal. Sex is generally considered to have value, and usually when we love someone we want to increase the amount of value in their lives, not restrict it without good reason. There is thus a call, not yet adequately responded to by philosophers, for greater clarity in the reasons §why (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  29. Kant and Aristotle on Altruism and the Love Command: Is Universal Friendship Possible.Stephen R. Palmquist - 2017 - Aretè: International Journal of Philosophy, Human & Social Science 2:95-110.
    This article examines the plausibility of regarding altruism in terms of universal friendship. Section 1 frames the question around Aristotle’s ground-breaking philosophy of friendship. For Aristotle, most friendships exist for selfish reasons, motivated by a desire either for pleasure(playmates) or profit (workmates); relatively few friendships are genuine, being motivated by a desire for shared virtue (soulmates). In contrast to this negative answer to the main question, Section 2 examines a possible religious basis for affirming altruism, arising out of the so-called (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. Love: what's sex got to do with it?Natasha McKeever - 2016 - International Journal of Applied Philosophy 30 (2):201-218.
    It is usually taken for granted that romantic relationships will be sexual, but it seems that there is no necessary reason for this, as it is possible for romantic relationships to not include sex. Indeed, sometimes sex is a part of a romantic relationship for only a relatively short period of it. Furthermore, scientific explanations of the link between sex and love don’t seem fully satisfying because they tell us only about the mechanics of sex, rather than its meaning or (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  31. The (dis)value of commitment to one's spouse.Anca Gheaus - 2015 - In After Marriage? Oxford University Press.
    The chapter advances two claims: first, that commitment to one’s spouse is only instrumentally valuable, adding no intrinsic value to the relationship. Moreover, commitment has costs: it partially forecloses the future, thus making one less attentive to life’s possibilities; therefore, it would be desirable for people to achieve the same goods without commitment. The second, more ambitious, claim is that commitment in general, and marital commitments in particular, are problematic instruments for securing the good of romantic and sexual love. It (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. Commitment, Reasons, and the Will.Ruth Chang - 2013 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 8. Oxford University Press. pp. 74-113.
    This paper argues that there is a particular kind of ‘internal’ commitment typically made in the context of romantic love relationships that has striking meta-normative implications for how we understand the role of the will in practical normativity. Internal commitments cannot plausibly explain the reasons we have in committed relationships on the usual model – as triggering reasons that are already there, in the way that making a promise triggers a reason via a pre-existing norm of the form ‘If you (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  33. Wholehearted Love: An Augustinian Reconstruction of Frankfurt.Alexander Jech - 2009 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
    Harry G. Frankfurt’s work on agency and reflexivity represents one of the most important attempts in the current philosophical literature to elaborate the structure of agency. Frankfurt wishes to provide an account of what I call the “deep structures” of agency—those features of agency, such as care and love, in virtue of which the surface features, such as desire, are to be explained and understood. These deep structures are important because of their power to explain unified diachronic patterns in our (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34. Tough Love.Daniel Callcut - 2005 - Florida Philosophical Review 5 (1):35-44.
    In this paper I examine Bernard Williams’ claim that an appealing conception of love can come into conflict with impartial morality. First, I explain how Williams’ claim can survive one strategy to head off the possibility of conflict. I then examine J.D.Velleman’s Kantian conception of love as another possible way to reject Williams’ claim. I argue, however, that Velleman’s attempt to transcend love’s partiality in his account of love produces an unappealing and unconvincing ideal. This is made particularly clear, I (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  35. Love.Neera K. Badhwar - 2003 - In LaFollette H. (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Practical Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 42.
    "[L]ove is not merely a contributor - one among others - to meaningful life. In its own way it may underlie all other forms of meaning....by its very nature love is the principal means by which creatures like us seek affective relations to persons, things, or ideals that have value and importance for us. I. The Look of Love.
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  36. Ovids Schule der ‘elegischen’ Liebe: Erotodidaxe und Psychagogie in der Ars amatoria.Jula Wildberger - 1998 - Frankfurt am Main et al.: Peter Lang.
    This dissertation in classics might be of interest for gender studies as well since it is a sustained demonstration how one social and literary sterotype (the elegiac lover -- der elegisch Liebende) is systematically transformed into another (the artist of love -- der Liebeskünstler) as part of generic transformation (turning Latin love elegy into didactic poetry). The counterpart of these stereotypes is the "harsh lady" (dura domina), who is domesticated in the third book of the Ars amatoria. The copyright for (...)
    Remove from this list   Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark