Truthmaker Monism

Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 29:61-73 (2020)
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Monism is a metaphysical view according to which there is only one fundamental object. This paper will explore monism within the context of truthmaker theory, or Truthmaker Monism, a view rarely discussed in literature. Although few truthmaker theorists defend monism, at least explicitly, some theories seem to share the spirit of monism to some extent. Interestingly, they are proposed as solutions for the same problem, called the problem of negative truth. A close examination will show that while each of these solutions can account for the problem, they are unsatisfactory for different reasons. This paper will suggest a novel solution to the problem of negative truth which preserves the advantages of existing solutions while avoiding the difficulties with which they are faced.

Author Profiles

Tora Koyama
Yamaguchi University
Taishi Yukimoto
Kansai University


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