Is Hume a Perspectivalist?

Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Hume notoriously pursues a constructive science of human nature in the Treatise while raising serious skeptical doubts about that project and leaving them apparently unanswered. On the perspectivalist reading, Hume endorses multiple incommensurable epistemic perspectives in the Treatise. This reading faces two significant objections: that it renders Hume’s epistemology inconsistent (or at least highly incoherent) and that it is ad hoc. In this paper, I propose a perspectivalist account of epistemic justification in the Treatise that addresses, to a significant degree, these concerns. Hume has available to him an account – what I will call epistemic dispositionalism – that is internally consistent, allows for epistemic continuity between perspectives, and is thoroughly grounded in his naturalism.

Author's Profile

Sam Zahn
California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-03-22

Downloads
72 (#91,048)

6 months
72 (#65,167)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?