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  1. Why Skepticism Fails.Steven M. Duncan - manuscript
    Do skeptical arguments undermine reason, as Hume supposes? In this paper, I argue that they do not and that skepticism is thus no threat to dogmatism about the possibility of knowledge.
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  2. Darwin Versus Kant and Hume.Justin Le Saux - manuscript
    I claim evolution through natural selection is inconsistent with Kantian epistemology, because there is nothing about humans or 'the mind' which does not vary, so its inappropriate to base universal laws of nature on how the variable mind might generates experience. I also claim that the apparent self sufficient world presented by natural selection is at least suspiciously inconsistent with Hume's views that it is impossible to see how anything could itself (be sufficient to) produce anything.
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  3. How Kant Thought He Could Reach Hume.Charles Goldhaber - forthcoming - In Camilla Serck-Hanssen & Beatrix Himmelmann (eds.), Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress: The Court of Reason (Oslo, 6–9 August 2019). De Gruyter.
    I argue that Kant thought his Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts could reach skeptical empiricists like Hume by providing an overlooked explanation of the mind's a priori relation to the objects of experience. And he thought empiricists may be motivated to listen to this explanation because of an instability and dissatisfaction inherent to empiricism.
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  4. Review of Peter S. Fosl, Hume's Scepticism: Pyrrhonian and Academic. [REVIEW]Charles Goldhaber - forthcoming - Hume Studies.
    Peter Fosl's new monograph offers a bold reading of Hume as a "radical," "coherent," and "hybrid" skeptic, who draws influence from both the Pyrrhonian and Academic skeptical traditions. I press some concerns about whether Fosl's reading of Hume can accommodate his scientific ambitions.
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  5. Response to My Critics (The Sydney Sessions).Stefanie Rocknak - forthcoming - Hume Studies.
    Response to Don Baxter, Don Garrett and Jennifer Marusic regarding my book Imagined Causes: Hume's Conception of Objects; initially delivered at the 2016 Hume Conference in Sydney, Australia as part of the Author Meets Critics session.
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  6. The Beach of Skepticism: Kant and Hume on the Practice of Philosophy and the Proper Bounds of Skepticism.Karl Schafer - forthcoming - In Peter Thielke (ed.), Cambridge Critical Guide to Kant’s Prolegomena. Cambridge: Cambridge. pp. 111-132.
    The focus of this chapter will be Kant’s understanding of Hume, and its impact on Kant’s critical philosophy. Contrary to the traditional reading of this relationship, which focuses on Kant’s (admittedly real) dissatisfaction with Hume’s account of causation, my discussion will focus on broader issues of philosophical methodology. Following a number of recent interpreters, I will argue that Kant sees Hume as raising, in a particularly forceful fashion, a ‘demarcation challenge’ concerning how to distinguish the legitimate use of reason in (...)
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  7. Hume's Skeptical Definitions of "Cause".David Storrs-Fox - 2020 - Hume Studies 43 (1):3-28.
    The relation between Hume’s constructive and skeptical aims has been a central concern for Hume interpreters. Hume’s two definitions of ‘cause’ in the Treatise and first Enquiry apparently represent an important constructive achievement, but this paper argues that the definitions must be understood in terms of Hume’s skepticism. The puzzle I address is simply that Hume gives two definitions rather than one. I use Don Garrett’s interpretation as a foil to develop my alternative skeptical interpretation. Garrett claims the definitions exhibit (...)
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  8. Quasi-Realism and Inductive Scepticism in Hume’s Theory of Causation.Dominic K. Dimech - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):637-650.
    Interpreters of Hume on causation consider that an advantage of the ‘quasi-realist’ reading is that it does not commit him to scepticism or to an error theory about causal reasoning. It is unique to quasi-realism that it maintains this positive epistemic result together with a rejection of metaphysical realism about causation: the quasi-realist supplies an appropriate semantic theory in order to justify the practice of talking ‘as if’ there were causal powers in the world. In this paper, I problematise the (...)
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  9. Hume on External Existence: A Sceptical Predicament.Dominic K. Dimech - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Sydney
    This thesis investigates Hume’s philosophy of external existence in relation to, and within the context of, his philosophy of scepticism. In his two main works on metaphysics – A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40) and the first Enquiry (first ed. 1748) – Hume encounters a predicament pertaining to the unreflective, ‘vulgar’ attribution of external existence to mental perceptions and the ‘philosophical’ distinction between perceptions and objects. I argue that we should understand this predicament as follows: the vulgar opinion is our (...)
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  10. Hume's Scepticism Regarding Reason.John Asquith - 2016 - Dissertation, Oxford Brookes University
    There is a tradition perhaps as old as philosophy itself which sees the rationality of man – and in particular, the rationality of the philosopher - as both his essential and his redeeming characteristic; it can not unfairly be said that the discipline of philosophy at least is characterised by its dependence on reason. In this context, the philosophy of David Hume presents something of a stark challenge: Although interpretations vary as to the extent and nature of his scepticism, one (...)
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  11. Realismo ontológico e antirrealismo epistemológico na problema do mundo externo em Hume.Leandro Hollanda - 2016 - In Jaimir Conte, Marília Cortês de Ferraz & Flávio Zimmermann (eds.), Ensaios sobre a filosofia de Hume. Florianópolis: Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC). pp. 403-432.
    No Tratado da natureza humana, David Hume dedica uma longa seção à problemática sobre a possibilidade da existência do mundo externo intitulada “Do ceticismo quanto aos sentidos”. A seção traz idas e vindas do autor no que diz respeito à resposta para o problema. Inicialmente, Hume dá como certa a existência externa dos corpos, i.e., independente das percepções, e avisa que sua investigação se limitará, apenas, às causas que levam a crer nisso. Sua pretensão inicial não é cumprida e logo (...)
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  12. The Title Principle (Or Lack Thereof) in the Enquiry.Hsueh Qu - 2016 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 33 (3):257-274.
    The Title Principle is seen by a number of commentators as crucial to Hume’s resolution of skeptical doubts in THN 1.4.7, thus providing an answer to Kemp Smith’s (1941) famous worry regarding the tension between Hume’s skepticism and his naturalism. However, I will argue that in the Enquiry, Hume rejects both the Title Principle and the role of the passions in his epistemology. Those who think that neither the Title Principle nor the passions play a significant role in THN 1.4.7 (...)
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  13. Frederick Schmitt, Hume's Epistemology in the Treatise: A Veritistic Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. 448 Pp. £55.00 Hb. ISBN 9780199683116. [REVIEW]Stefanie Rocknak - 2015 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 13 (2):152-158.
    In this book, Schmitt claims that Hume, however implicitly, employs a fully-developed epistemology in the Treatise. In particular, Hume employs a “veritistic” epistemology, i.e. one that is grounded in truth, particularly, true beliefs. In some cases, these true beliefs are “certain,” are “infallible” (78) and are justified, as in the case of knowledge, i.e. demonstrations. In other cases, we acquire these beliefs through a reliable method, i.e. when they are produced by causal proofs. Such beliefs are also “certain” (69, 81) (...)
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  14. The Ancients, the Vulgar, and Hume's Skepticism.Maria Magoula Adamos - 2014 - In P. Hanna (ed.), Anthology of Philosophical Studies. ATINER. pp. 5-15.
    Section III of part IV of Book I of Hume's Treatise entitled “Of the ancient philosophy” has been virtually ignored by most Hume scholars. Although philosophers seem to concentrate on sections II and VI of part IV and pay little or no attention to section III, the latter section is paramount in showing how serious Hume's skepticism is, and how Hume's philosophy, contrary to his intention, is far removed from "the sentiments of the vulgar". In this paper I shall first (...)
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  15. Hume’s Practically Epistemic Conclusions?Hsueh Qu - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):501-524.
    The inoffensive title of Section 1.4.7 of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, ‘Conclusion of this Book’, belies the convoluted treatment of scepticism contained within. It is notoriously difficult to decipher Hume’s considered response to scepticism in this section, or whether he even has one. In recent years, however, one line of interpretation has gained popularity in the literature. The ‘usefulness and agreeableness reading’ (henceforth U&A) interprets Hume as arguing in THN 1.4.7 that our beliefs and/or epistemic policies are justified via (...)
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  16. Constancy and Coherence in 1.4.2 of Hume’s Treatise: The Root of “Indirect” Causation and Hume’s Position on Objects.Stefanie Rocknak - 2013 - The European Legacy (4):444-456.
    This article shows that in 1.4.2.15-24 of the Treatise of Human Nature, Hume presents his own position on objects, which is to be distinguished from both the vulgar and philosophical conception of objects. Here, Hume argues that objects that are effectively imagined to have a “perfect identity” are imagined due to the constancy and coherence of our perceptions (what we may call ‘level 1 constancy and coherence’). In particular, we imagine that objects cause such perceptions, via what I call ‘indirect (...)
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  17. Scepticism and the Development of the Transcendental Dialectic.Brian A. Chance - 2012 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (2):311-331.
    Kant's response to scepticism in the Critique of Pure Reason is complex and remarkably nuanced, although it is rarely recognized as such. In this paper, I argue that recent attempts to flesh out the details of this response by Paul Guyer and Michael Forster do not go far enough. Although they are right to draw a distinction between Humean and Pyrrhonian scepticism and locate Kant's response to the latter in the Transcendental Dialectic, their accounts fail to capture two important aspects (...)
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  18. Hume's Legacy and the Idea of British Empiricism.Paul Russell - 2012 - In Alan Bailey & Dan O'Brien (eds.), The Continuum Companion to Hume. Continuum. pp. 377.
    David Hume’s views on the subject of free will are among the most influential contributions to this long-disputed topic. Throughout the twentieth century, and into this century, Hume has been widely regarded as having presented the classic defense of the compatibilist position, the view that freedom and responsibility are consistent with determinism. Most of Hume’s core arguments on this issue are found in the sections entitled “Of liberty and necessity,” first presented in Book 2 of A Treatise of Human Nature (...)
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  19. Hume's Negative Argument Concerning Induction.Stefanie Rocknak - 2011 - In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Where does the necessity that seems to accompany causal inferences come from? “Why [do] we conclude that … particular causes must necessarily have such particular effects?” In 1.3.6 of the Treatise, Hume entertains the possibility that this necessity is a function of reason. However, he eventually dismisses this possibility, where this dismissal consists of Hume’s “negative” argument concerning induction. This argument has received, and continues to receive, a tremendous amount of attention. How could causal inferences be justified if they are (...)
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  20. A natureza da filosofia de Hume.Jaimir Conte - 2010 - Princípios 17 (28):211-236.
    Meu objetivo neste artigo é destacar algumas das ideias centrais defendidas por Hume e, a fim de caracterizar a natureza de sua filosofia, contrapor duas interpretações frequentes de sua obra: a interpretação cética e interpretação naturalista. A fim de apontar as principais razões que estão por trás dessas duas interpretações que tentam apreender a natureza da filosofia de Hume, procuro abordar inicialmente alguns dos princípios centrais da teoria humeana e, em seguida, especialmente sua análise das inferências causais. No final, argumento (...)
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  21. Two Puzzles in Hume's Epistemology.Mark Collier - 2008 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 25 (4):301 - 314.
    There are two major puzzles in Hume’s epistemology. The first involves Hume’s fall into despair in the conclusion of Book One of the Treatise. When Hume reflects back upon the results of his research, he becomes so alarmed that he nearly throws his books and papers into the fire. Why did his investigations push him towards such intense skeptical sentiments? What dark discoveries did he make? The second puzzle concerns the way in which Hume emerges from this skeptical crisis and (...)
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  22. Hume's Attack on Human Rationality.Idan Shimony - 2005 - Dissertation, Tel Aviv University
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  23. Humen pyrrhonismin kielto.Jani Hakkarainen - 2004 - In Heta Gylling, S. Albert Kivinen & Risto Vilkko (eds.), Kielto. Helsinki: Helsinki University Press. pp. 29-35.
    Title in English: Hume's Denial of Pyrrhonism.
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  24. Hume's Reality: A Lesson in Causality.Stefanie Rocknak - 2003 - In Proceedings Metaphysics 2003 Second World Conference. Rome, Metropolitan City of Rome, Italy:
    In Book I, III §9 of the Treatise, Hume makes the claim that “[all general] belief arises only from causation” (T 107). Following, he makes the even stronger claim that all general beliefs are to be thought of as beliefs in reality, and thus, all belief in reality is dependent on pre-established beliefs in both specific causal relations and the causal relation in general (T 108). In the first part of this paper, I explain Hume’s motivation behind both claims, while (...)
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  25. The Prolegomena and the Critiques of Pure Reason.Gary Hatfield - 2001 - In Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann & Ralph Schumacher (eds.), Kant Und Die Berliner Aufklärung: Akten des IX Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 185-208.
    This chapter considers Kant's relation to Hume as Kant himself understood it when he wrote the Critique of Pure Reason and the Prolegomena. It first seeks to refine the question of Kant's relation to Hume's skepticism, and it then considers the evidence for Kant's attitude toward Hume in three works: the A Critique, Prolegomena, and B Critique. It argues that in the A Critique Kant viewed skepticism positively, as a necessary reaction to dogmatism and a spur toward critique. In his (...)
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  26. Husserl’s Phenomenologization of Hume: Reflections on Husserl’s Method of Epoché.Stefanie Rocknak - 2001 - Philosophy Today 45 (5):28-36.
    This paper argues that Husserl’s method is partially driven by an attempt to avoid certain absurdities inherent in Hume’s epistemology. In this limited respect, we may say that Hume opened the door to phenomenology, but as a sacrificial lamb. However, Hume was well aware of his self-defeating position, and perhaps, in some respects, the need for an alternative. Moreover, Hume’s “mistakes” may have incited Husserl’s discovery of the epoche, and thus, transcendental phenomenology.
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  27. The Epistemology of Thomas Reid.Derek R. Brookes - 1996 - Discipline Filosofiche 2 (VI):119-168.
    This paper is a reconstruction and analysis of Thomas Reid’s epistemology, based upon an examination of his extant manuscripts and publications. I argue that, in Reid’s view, a certain degree of “evidence” (or, as I shall say, ‘epistemic justification’) is that which distinguishes mere true belief from knowledge; and that this degree of justification may be ascribed to a person’s belief if and only if (i) the evidence upon which her belief is grounded is such that she holds it with (...)
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  28. Hume’s Academic Scepticism: A Reappraisal of His Philosophy of Human Understanding.John P. Wright - 1986 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):407-435.
    A philosopher once wrote the following words:If I examine the PTOLOMAIC and COPERNICAN systems, I endeavour only, by my enquiries, to know the real situation of the planets; that is, in other words, I endeavour to give them, in my conception, the same relations, that they bear towards each other in the heavens. To this operation of the mind, therefore, there seems to be always a real, though often an unknown standard, in the nature of things; nor is truth or (...)
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  29. The Scottish Philosophy of Common Sense.S. A. Grave - 1960 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    The purpose of this book is to piece together in some detail the philosophy of Common Sense from its fragmentary state in the writings of Thomas Reid and the other members of his school, to consider it in relation to David Hume, and to try and show the significance of its account of the nature and authority of common sense for present-day discussion.
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