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  1. Why Skepticism Fails.Steven M. Duncan - manuscript
    Do skeptical arguments undermine reason, as Hume supposes? In this paper, I argue that they do not and that skepticism is thus no threat to dogmatism about the possibility of knowledge.
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  2. Darwin versus Kant and Hume.Justin Le Saux - manuscript
    I claim evolution through natural selection is inconsistent with Kantian epistemology, because there is nothing about humans or 'the mind' which does not vary, so its inappropriate to base universal laws of nature on how the variable mind might generates experience. I also claim that the apparent self sufficient world presented by natural selection is at least suspiciously inconsistent with Hume's views that it is impossible to see how anything could itself (be sufficient to) produce anything.
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  3. David Hume’s skepticism in Thomas Reid’s reading.Vinícius França Freitas - forthcoming - Filosofia Unisinos:1-15.
    The paper advances the hypothesis that, in Thomas Reid's reading, David Hume's skepticism of the Treatise on Human Nature is not solely due to his acceptance of the ‘ideal hypothesis’ – the principle according to which ideas are the immediate objects of the mental operations –, but it has another source, namely, that doubt on the reliability of the faculties of the senses, memory, and reason. Moreover, the paper argues that the suggested distinction between two roots for Hume’s skepticism allows (...)
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  4. Introduction to "Hume’s ‘Dialogues concerning Natural Religion’: A Critical Guide".Paul Russell - forthcoming - In Hume’s ‘Dialogues concerning Natural Religion’: A Critical Guide. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
    This introduction provides a brief overview of the issues and arguments that arise in Hume's _Dialogues concerning Natural Religion_ (1779). It also provides a few brief comments relating to the historical context in which this text should be interpreted , as well as an account of the place of the _Dialogues_ in relation to Hume's other philosophical works.
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  5. Ambiguity and "Atheism" in Hume's Dialogues.Paul Russell - forthcoming - In Hume’s ‘Dialogues concerning Natural Religion’: A Critical Guide. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
    This paper considers the question of “atheism” as it arises in Hume’s _Dialogues_. It argues that the concept of “atheism” involves several signficiant ambiguities that are indicative of philosophical and interpretive disagreements of a more substantial nature. It defends the view that Philo’s general sceptical orientation accurately represents Hume’s own “irreligious” and “atheistic” commitments, both in the _Dialogues_ and in his other (“earlier”) writings. While Hume was plainly a “speculative atheist”, his “practical atheism” was targeted more narrowly against “superstition” - (...)
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  6. Is Hume a Perspectivalist?Sam Zahn - 2025 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 12.
    Hume notoriously pursues a constructive science of human nature in the Treatise while raising serious skeptical doubts about that project and leaving them apparently unanswered. On the perspectivalist reading, Hume endorses multiple incommensurable epistemic perspectives in the Treatise. This reading faces two significant objections: that it renders Hume’s epistemology inconsistent (or at least highly incoherent) and that it is ad hoc. In this paper, I propose a perspectivalist account of epistemic justification in the Treatise that addresses, to a significant degree, (...)
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  7. Hume's Skeptical Philosophy and the Moderation of Pride.Charles Goldhaber - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (6):621–36.
    Hume describes skeptical philosophy as having a variety of desirable effects. It can counteract dogmatism, produce just reasoning, and promote social cohesion. When discussing how skepticism may achieve these effects, Hume typically appeals to its effects on pride. I explain how, for Hume, skeptical philosophy acts on pride and how acting on pride produces the desirable effects. Understanding these mechanisms, I argue, sheds light on how, why, when, and for whom skeptical philosophy can be useful. It also illuminates the value (...)
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  8. Mental Faculties and Powers and the Foundations of Hume’s Philosophy.Karl Schafer - 2024 - In Sebastian Bender & Dominik Perler (eds.), Powers and Abilities in Early Modern Philosophy. New York, NY: Routledge.
    With respect to the topic of “powers and abilities,” most readers will associate David Hume with his multi-pronged critique of traditional attempts to make robust explanatory use of those notions in a philosophical or scientific context. But Hume’s own philosophy is also structured around the attribution to human beings of a variety of basic faculties or mental powers – such as the reason and the imagination, or the various powers involved in Hume’s account of im- pressions of reflection and the (...)
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  9. Hume and the Demands of Philosophy: Science, Skepticism, and Moderation by Nathan I. Sasser. [REVIEW]Charles Goldhaber - 2023 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 21 (3):313–17.
    Nathan Sasser's ‘purely practical reading of Hume’s response to skepticism’ is so natural and compelling that it is almost surprising that his new monograph, Hume and the Demands of Philosophy, offers its first systematic defence. I praise the book's clarity and concision, and then raise concerns about omitted topics, especially concerning Hume's views on the practical value of sceptical philosophy.
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  10. Responses to Ryan, Fosl and Gautier: SKEPSIS Book Symposium on 'Recasting Hume and Early Modern Philosophy', by Paul Russell.Paul Russell - 2023 - Skepsis: A Journal for Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Research 14 (26):121-139.
    In the replies to my critics that follow I offer a more detailed account of the specific papers that they discuss or examine. The papers that they are especially concerned with are: “The Material World and Natural Religion in Hume’s Treatise” (Ryan) [Essay 3], “Hume’s Skepticism and the Problem of Atheism” (Fosl) [Essay 12], and “Hume’s Philosophy of Irreligion and the Myth of British Empiricism (Gautier) [Essay 16].
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  11. Hume's Real Riches.Charles Goldhaber - 2022 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 39 (1):45–57.
    Hume describes his own “open, social, and cheerful humour” as “a turn of mind which it is more happy to possess, than to be born to an estate of ten thousand a year.” Why does he value a cheerful character so highly? I argue that, for Hume, cheerfulness has two aspects—one manifests as mirth in social situations, and the other as steadfastness against life’s misfortunes. This second aspect is of special interest to Hume in that it safeguards the other virtues. (...)
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  12. Response to My Critics (The Sydney Sessions).Stefanie Rocknak - 2022 - Hume Studies 45 (1):77-93.
    Response to Don Baxter, Don Garrett and Jennifer Marusic regarding my book Imagined Causes: Hume's Conception of Objects; initially delivered at the 2016 Hume Conference in Sydney, Australia as part of the Author Meets Critics session.
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  13. How Kant Thought He Could Reach Hume.Charles Goldhaber - 2021 - In Camilla Serck-Hanssen & Beatrix Himmelmann (eds.), The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress. De Gruyter. pp. 717-726.
    I argue that Kant tries to change the mind of skeptical empiricists like Hume by offering, rather than compelling acceptance of, an alternative conception of our knowledge, and that his offer can appeal because of an instability inherent to the skeptic’s position. This article is a short précis of my "Kant's Offer to the Skeptical Empiricist" in Journal of the History of Philosophy.
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  14. How Kant Thought He Could Reach Hume.Charles Goldhaber - 2021 - In Camilla Serck-Hanssen & Beatrix Himmelmann (eds.), The Court of Reason: Proceedings of the 13th International Kant Congress. De Gruyter. pp. 717–726.
    I argue that Kant thought his Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts could reach skeptical empiricists like Hume by providing an overlooked explanation of the mind's a priori relation to the objects of experience. And he thought empiricists may be motivated to listen to this explanation because of an instability and dissatisfaction inherent to empiricism. This article is a précis of my "Kant's Offer to the Skeptical Empiricist" in Journal of the History of Philosophy.
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  15. Hume's 'Two Definitions' of Causation and the Ontology of 'Double Existence' (revised) with an Appendix 2021.Paul Russell - 2021 - In Recasting Hume and Early Modern Philosophy: Selected Essays. New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 3-31.
    This essay provides an interpretation of Hume’s “two definitions” of causation. It argues that the two definitions of causation must be interpreted in terms of Hume’s fundamental ontological distinction between perceptions and (material) objects. Central to Hume’s position on this subject is the claim that, while there is a natural tendency to suppose that there exist (metaphysical) causal powers in objects themselves, this is a product of our failure to distinguish perceptions and objects. Properly understood, our idea of causation involves (...)
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  16. (1 other version)The Beach of Skepticism: Kant and Hume on the Practice of Philosophy and the Proper Bounds of Skepticism.Karl Schafer - 2021 - In Peter Thiekle (ed.), Cambridge Critical Guide to Kant’s Prolegomena. Cambridge. pp. 111-132.
    The focus of this chapter will be Kant’s understanding of Hume, and its impact on Kant’s critical philosophy. Contrary to the traditional reading of this relationship, which focuses on Kant’s (admittedly real) dissatisfaction with Hume’s account of causation, my discussion will focus on broader issues of philosophical methodology. Following a number of recent interpreters, I will argue that Kant sees Hume as raising, in a particularly forceful fashion, a ‘demarcation challenge’ concerning how to distinguish the legitimate use of reason in (...)
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  17. Hume's Scepticism: Pyrrhonian and Academic by Peter S. Fosl. [REVIEW]Charles Goldhaber - 2020 - Hume Studies 46 (1):171-174.
    Peter Fosl's new monograph offers a bold reading of Hume as a "radical," "coherent," and "hybrid" skeptic, who draws influence from both the Pyrrhonian and Academic skeptical traditions. I press some concerns about whether Fosl's reading of Hume can accommodate his scientific ambitions.
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  18. Hume's Skeptical Definitions of "Cause".David Storrs-Fox - 2020 - Hume Studies 43 (1):3-28.
    The relation between Hume’s constructive and skeptical aims has been a central concern for Hume interpreters. Hume’s two definitions of ‘cause’ in the Treatise and first Enquiry apparently represent an important constructive achievement, but this paper argues that the definitions must be understood in terms of Hume’s skepticism. The puzzle I address is simply that Hume gives two definitions rather than one. I use Don Garrett’s interpretation as a foil to develop my alternative skeptical interpretation. Garrett claims the definitions exhibit (...)
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  19. Bredo Johnsen. Righting Epistemology: Hume’s Revolution. [REVIEW]Matt Carlson - 2019 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 7 (5):32-38.
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  20. Quasi-Realism and Inductive Scepticism in Hume’s Theory of Causation.Dominic K. Dimech - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):637-650.
    Interpreters of Hume on causation consider that an advantage of the ‘quasi-realist’ reading is that it does not commit him to scepticism or to an error theory about causal reasoning. It is unique to quasi-realism that it maintains this positive epistemic result together with a rejection of metaphysical realism about causation: the quasi-realist supplies an appropriate semantic theory in order to justify the practice of talking ‘as if’ there were causal powers in the world. In this paper, I problematise the (...)
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  21. Hume's Epistemology: The State of the Question.Hsueh M. Qu - 2019 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 57 (3):301-323.
    This article surveys the state of the literature on Hume’s epistemology, focusing on treatments of what has come to be known as the ‘Kemp Smith problem’, that is, the problem of reconciling Hume’s scepticism with his naturalism. It first surveys the literature on this issue with regard to the Treatise, moving on to briefly compare the Treatise and the Enquiry in virtue of their epistemological frameworks, before finally examining the literature with regard to the first Enquiry.
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  22. Hume on External Existence: A Sceptical Predicament.Dominic K. Dimech - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Sydney
    This thesis investigates Hume’s philosophy of external existence in relation to, and within the context of, his philosophy of scepticism. In his two main works on metaphysics – A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40) and the first Enquiry (first ed. 1748) – Hume encounters a predicament pertaining to the unreflective, ‘vulgar’ attribution of external existence to mental perceptions and the ‘philosophical’ distinction between perceptions and objects. I argue that we should understand this predicament as follows: the vulgar opinion is our (...)
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  23. (1 other version)Hume's Internalist Epistemology in EHU 12.Hsueh Qu - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 3 (96):517-539.
    Much has been written about Kemp Smith’s (1941) famous problem regarding the tension between Hume’s naturalism and his scepticism. However, most commentators have focused their attention on the Treatise; those who address Enquiry often take it to express essentially the same message as the Treatise. When Hume’s scepticism in the Enquiry has been investigated in its own right, commentators have tended to focus on Hume’s inductive scepticism in Sections 4 and 5. All in all, it seems that Section 12 has (...)
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  24. Hume's scepticism regarding reason.John Asquith - 2016 - Dissertation, Oxford Brookes University
    There is a tradition perhaps as old as philosophy itself which sees the rationality of man – and in particular, the rationality of the philosopher - as both his essential and his redeeming characteristic; it can not unfairly be said that the discipline of philosophy at least is characterised by its dependence on reason. In this context, the philosophy of David Hume presents something of a stark challenge: Although interpretations vary as to the extent and nature of his scepticism, one (...)
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  25. Realismo ontológico e antirrealismo epistemológico na problema do mundo externo em Hume.Leandro Hollanda - 2016 - In Jaimir Conte, Marília Cortês de Ferraz & Flávio Zimmermann (eds.), Ensaios sobre a filosofia de Hume. Santa Catarina: Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina (UFSC). pp. 403-432.
    No Tratado da natureza humana, David Hume dedica uma longa seção à problemática sobre a possibilidade da existência do mundo externo intitulada “Do ceticismo quanto aos sentidos”. A seção traz idas e vindas do autor no que diz respeito à resposta para o problema. Inicialmente, Hume dá como certa a existência externa dos corpos, i.e., independente das percepções, e avisa que sua investigação se limitará, apenas, às causas que levam a crer nisso. Sua pretensão inicial não é cumprida e logo (...)
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  26. The Title Principle (Or Lack Thereof) in the Enquiry.Hsueh Qu - 2016 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 33 (3):257-274.
    The Title Principle is seen by a number of commentators as crucial to Hume’s resolution of skeptical doubts in THN 1.4.7, thus providing an answer to Kemp Smith’s (1941) famous worry regarding the tension between Hume’s skepticism and his naturalism. However, I will argue that in the Enquiry, Hume rejects both the Title Principle and the role of the passions in his epistemology. Those who think that neither the Title Principle nor the passions play a significant role in THN 1.4.7 (...)
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  27. Scepticism and Naturalism in Cavell and Hume.Peter S. Fosl - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (1):29-54.
    This essay argues that the exploration of scepticism and its implications in the work of Stanley Cavell and David Hume bears more similarities than is commonly acknowledged, especially along the lines of what I wish to call “sceptical naturalism.” These lines of similarity are described through the way each philosopher relates the “natural” and “nature” to the universal, the necessary, and the conventional.
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  28. Frederick Schmitt, Hume's Epistemology in the Treatise: A Veritistic Interpretation. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. 448 pp. £55.00 hb. ISBN 9780199683116. [REVIEW]Stefanie Rocknak - 2015 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 13 (2):152-158.
    In this book, Schmitt claims that Hume, however implicitly, employs a fully-developed epistemology in the Treatise. In particular, Hume employs a “veritistic” epistemology, i.e. one that is grounded in truth, particularly, true beliefs. In some cases, these true beliefs are “certain,” are “infallible” (78) and are justified, as in the case of knowledge, i.e. demonstrations. In other cases, we acquire these beliefs through a reliable method, i.e. when they are produced by causal proofs. Such beliefs are also “certain” (69, 81) (...)
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  29. The Ancients, the Vulgar, and Hume's Skepticism.Maria Magoula Adamos - 2014 - In Patricia Hanna (ed.), Anthology of Philosophical Studies. ATINER. pp. 5-15.
    Section III of part IV of Book I of Hume's Treatise entitled “Of the ancient philosophy” has been virtually ignored by most Hume scholars. Although philosophers seem to concentrate on sections II and VI of part IV and pay little or no attention to section III, the latter section is paramount in showing how serious Hume's skepticism is, and how Hume's philosophy, contrary to his intention, is far removed from "the sentiments of the vulgar". In this paper I shall first (...)
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  30. Hume’s practically epistemic conclusions?Hsueh Qu - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):501-524.
    The inoffensive title of Section 1.4.7 of Hume’s Treatise of Human Nature, ‘Conclusion of this Book’, belies the convoluted treatment of scepticism contained within. It is notoriously difficult to decipher Hume’s considered response to scepticism in this section, or whether he even has one. In recent years, however, one line of interpretation has gained popularity in the literature. The ‘usefulness and agreeableness reading’ (henceforth U&A) interprets Hume as arguing in THN 1.4.7 that our beliefs and/or epistemic policies are justified via (...)
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  31. Constancy and Coherence in 1.4.2 of Hume’s Treatise: The Root of “Indirect” Causation and Hume’s Position on Objects.Stefanie Rocknak - 2013 - The European Legacy (4):444-456.
    This article shows that in 1.4.2.15-24 of the Treatise of Human Nature, Hume presents his own position on objects, which is to be distinguished from both the vulgar and philosophical conception of objects. Here, Hume argues that objects that are effectively imagined to have a “perfect identity” are imagined due to the constancy and coherence of our perceptions (what we may call ‘level 1 constancy and coherence’). In particular, we imagine that objects cause such perceptions, via what I call ‘indirect (...)
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  32. Scepticism and the Development of the Transcendental Dialectic.Brian A. Chance - 2012 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (2):311-331.
    Kant's response to scepticism in the Critique of Pure Reason is complex and remarkably nuanced, although it is rarely recognized as such. In this paper, I argue that recent attempts to flesh out the details of this response by Paul Guyer and Michael Forster do not go far enough. Although they are right to draw a distinction between Humean and Pyrrhonian scepticism and locate Kant's response to the latter in the Transcendental Dialectic, their accounts fail to capture two important aspects (...)
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  33. (1 other version)Hume's Philosophy of Irreligion and the Myth of British Empiricism.Paul Russell - 2012 - In Alan Bailey & Dan O'Brien (eds.), The Continuum Companion to Hume. Continuum. pp. 377-395.
    This chapter outlines an alternative interpretation of Hume’s philosophy, one that aims, among other things, to explain some of the most perplexing puzzles concerning the relationship between Hume’s skepticism and his naturalism. The key to solving these puzzles, it is argued, rests with recognizing Hume’s fundamental irreligious aims and objectives, beginning with his first and greatest work, A Treatise of Human Nature. The irreligious interpretation not only reconfigures our understanding of the unity and structure of Hume’s thought, it also provides (...)
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  34. Hume's Legacy and the Idea of British Empiricism.Paul Russell - 2012 - In Alan Bailey & Dan O'Brien (eds.), The Continuum Companion to Hume. Continuum. pp. 377.
    David Hume’s views on the subject of free will are among the most influential contributions to this long-disputed topic. Throughout the twentieth century, and into this century, Hume has been widely regarded as having presented the classic defense of the compatibilist position, the view that freedom and responsibility are consistent with determinism. Most of Hume’s core arguments on this issue are found in the sections entitled “Of liberty and necessity,” first presented in Book 2 of A Treatise of Human Nature (...)
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  35. Scepticism, relativism and the argument from the criterion.Howard Sankey - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1):182-190.
    This article explores the relationship between epistemic relativism and Pyrrhonian scepticism. It is argued that a fundamental argument for contemporary epistemic relativism derives from the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. Pyrrhonian scepticism is compared and contrasted with Cartesian scepticism about the external world and Humean scepticism about induction. Epistemic relativism is characterized as relativism due to the variation of epistemic norms, and is contrasted with other forms of cognitive relativism, such as truth relativism, conceptual relativism and ontological relativism. An argument (...)
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  36. Hume's negative argument concerning induction.Stefanie Rocknak - 2011 - In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone (eds.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
    Where does the necessity that seems to accompany causal inferences come from? “Why [do] we conclude that … particular causes must necessarily have such particular effects?” In 1.3.6 of the Treatise, Hume entertains the possibility that this necessity is a function of reason. However, he eventually dismisses this possibility, where this dismissal consists of Hume’s “negative” argument concerning induction. This argument has received, and continues to receive, a tremendous amount of attention. How could causal inferences be justified if they are (...)
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  37. (1 other version)A natureza da filosofia de Hume.Jaimir Conte - 2010 - Princípios 17 (28):211-236.
    Meu objetivo neste artigo é destacar algumas das ideias centrais defendidas por Hume e, a fim de caracterizar a natureza de sua filosofia, contrapor duas interpretações frequentes de sua obra: a interpretação cética e interpretação naturalista. A fim de apontar as principais razões que estão por trás dessas duas interpretações que tentam apreender a natureza da filosofia de Hume, procuro abordar inicialmente alguns dos princípios centrais da teoria humeana e, em seguida, especialmente sua análise das inferências causais. No final, argumento (...)
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  38. Stroud's Humean Skepticism.Michael Morales - 2010 - Southwest Philosophical Studies 32:93-97.
    In “The Constraints of Hume’s Naturalism” Barry Stroud takes on the task of looking at Hume’s negative and positive accounts of induction in conjunction. Stroud goes about doing this so that we might walk away with “a more general lesson about naturalism, at least when it is indulged in for philosophical purposes”. Given the boldness of Stroud’s quote from above there should be some explicit talk of this general lesson about naturalism outside of Hume’s, but there is none that is (...)
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  39. Two Puzzles in Hume's Epistemology.Mark Collier - 2008 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 25 (4):301 - 314.
    There are two major puzzles in Hume’s epistemology. The first involves Hume’s fall into despair in the conclusion of Book One of the Treatise. When Hume reflects back upon the results of his research, he becomes so alarmed that he nearly throws his books and papers into the fire. Why did his investigations push him towards such intense skeptical sentiments? What dark discoveries did he make? The second puzzle concerns the way in which Hume emerges from this skeptical crisis and (...)
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  40. The Riddle of Hume's Treatise: Skepticism, Naturalism, and Irreligion.Paul Russell - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY PRIZE for the best published book in the history of philosophy [Awarded in 2010] _______________ -/- Although it is widely recognized that David Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature (1739-40) belongs among the greatest works of philosophy, there is little agreement about the correct way to interpret his fundamental intentions. It is an established orthodoxy among almost all commentators that skepticism and naturalism are the two dominant themes in this work. The difficulty has been, (...)
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  41. Skepticism about Induction.Ruth Weintraub - 2008 - In John Greco (ed.), The Oxford handbook of skepticism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 129.
    This article considers two arguments that purport to show that inductive reasoning is unjustified: the argument adduced by Sextus Empiricus and the (better known and more formidable) argument given by Hume in the Treatise. While Sextus’ argument can quite easily be rebutted, a close examination of the premises of Hume’s argument shows that they are seemingly cogent. Because the sceptical claim is very unintuitive, the sceptical argument constitutes a paradox. And since attributions of justification are theoretical, and the claim that (...)
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  42. Hume's Attack on Human Rationality.Idan Shimony - 2005 - Dissertation, Tel Aviv University
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  43. Humen pyrrhonismin kielto.Jani Hakkarainen - 2004 - In Heta Gylling, S. Albert Kivinen & Risto Vilkko (eds.), Kielto. Helsinki University Press. pp. 29-35.
    Title in English: Hume's Denial of Pyrrhonism.
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  44. Hume's Reality: A Lesson in Causality.Stefanie Rocknak - 2003 - In David G. Murray (ed.), Proceedings Metaphysics 2003 Second World Conference. Foundazione Idente di Studi e di Ricerca,.
    In Book I, III §9 of the Treatise, Hume makes the claim that “[all general] belief arises only from causation” (T 107). Following, he makes the even stronger claim that all general beliefs are to be thought of as beliefs in reality, and thus, all belief in reality is dependent on pre-established beliefs in both specific causal relations and the causal relation in general (T 108). In the first part of this paper, I explain Hume’s motivation behind both claims, while (...)
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  45. The New Hume Debate, Edited By Rupert Read, Kenneth Richman. [REVIEW]Paul Russell - 2003 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 41 (1):132-134.
    Review of The New Hume Debate Revised Edition Edited By Rupert Read, Kenneth Richman: Pub: 2000 -/- '... The editors have done an excellent job of choosing and presenting some of the more important papers on this subject. The volume contains a useful bibliography and a citation index. ... There is also a helpful introduction, written by Richman, which provides a synopsis of the individual papers in this volume. A few important contributions are not included in the collection ... Nevertheless, (...)
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  46. (1 other version)The Prolegomena and the Critiques of Pure Reason.Gary Hatfield - 2001 - In Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann & Ralph Schumacher (eds.), Kant und die Berliner Aufklaerung: Akten des IX. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Band 1: Hauptvortraege. Walter de Gruyter. pp. 185-208.
    This chapter examines the question of Kant's relation to Hume's skepticism and then considers the evidence for Kant's attitude toward Hume in three contexts: the A Critique, the Prolegomena, and the B Critique. It argues that in the A Critique Kant viewed skepticism positively, as a necessary reaction to dogmatism and a spur toward critique. In his initial statement of the critical philosophy Kant treated Hume as an ally in curbing dogmatism, but one who stopped short of what was really (...)
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  47. The Prolegomena and the Critiques of Pure Reason.Gary Hatfield - 2001 - In Volker Gerhardt, Rolf-Peter Horstmann & Ralph Schumacher (eds.), Kant Und Die Berliner Aufklärung: Akten des IX Internationalen Kant-Kongresses. New York: Walter de Gruyter. pp. 185-208.
    This chapter considers Kant's relation to Hume as Kant himself understood it when he wrote the Critique of Pure Reason and the Prolegomena. It first seeks to refine the question of Kant's relation to Hume's skepticism, and it then considers the evidence for Kant's attitude toward Hume in three works: the A Critique, Prolegomena, and B Critique. It argues that in the A Critique Kant viewed skepticism positively, as a necessary reaction to dogmatism and a spur toward critique. In his (...)
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  48. Hume and ancient scepticism.Julia Annas - 2000 - Acta Philosophica Fennica 66:271-285.
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  49. Probability and skepticism about reason in Hume's treatise.Antonia Lolordo - 2000 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 8 (3):419 – 446.
    This paper attempts to reconstruct Hume's argument in Treatise 1.4.1, 'Of Scepticism with Regard to Reason'.
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  50. The Epistemology of Thomas Reid.Derek R. Brookes - 1996 - Discipline Filosofiche 2 (VI):119-168.
    This paper is a reconstruction and analysis of Thomas Reid’s epistemology, based upon an examination of his extant manuscripts and publications. I argue that, in Reid’s view, a certain degree of “evidence” (or, as I shall say, ‘epistemic justification’) is that which distinguishes mere true belief from knowledge; and that this degree of justification may be ascribed to a person’s belief if and only if (i) the evidence upon which her belief is grounded is such that she holds it with (...)
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