Abstract
Under the circumstances of pluralism people often claim that the state ought to be neutral
towards its citizens’ conceptions of the good life. However, what it means for the state to be
neutral is often unclear. This is partly because there are different conceptions of neutrality and
partly because what neutrality entails depends largely on the context in which neutrality is
demanded. This paper discusses three different conceptions of neutrality – neutrality of impact,
neutrality as equality of opportunity and justificatory neutrality – and analyses the strengths and
weaknesses of the different conceptions in different contexts. It suggests that there are two common elements of neutrality in all its exemplifications: a) an element of “hands-off” and b) an
element of equal treatment. It therefore argues that while justificatory neutrality is necessary
for the state to be neutral it is not sufficient and claims that while conceptions of the good must
not enter the
justification
of state regulations, they must be taken into consideration when delib-
erating the
implementation
of these regulations.