Overcoming the Obstacles to the Relativity of Truth

Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 14 (2):232-241 (2007)
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Abstract

This is a reply to Tomas Marvan's paper "Obstacles to the Relativity of Truth", published in the same issue, in which I attempt to provide an interpretation of the relativist schema "x is true relative to y" by understanding x as ranging over propositions and y as ranging over circumstances of evaluation, as in the familiar Kaplanian picture of semantics. I then answer some of Marvan's worries and reject certain views considered relativist on the basis that they are, in fact, different views in disguise.

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Dan Zeman
University of Warsaw

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