Explanationism and the awareness of logical truths

Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):1-7 (2024)
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Abstract

In Appearance and Explanation, McCain and Moretti propose a novel internalist account of epistemic justification called phenomenal explanationism, which combines phenomenal conservatism and explanationism. I argue that the current version of phenomenal explanationism faces a dilemma: either it omits the awareness requirement but implies an implausible form of logical-mathematical omniscience, or it preserves the requirement but leads to a vicious regress. I suggest how phenomenal explanationism might be revised to avoid this dilemma.

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Xiaoxing Zhang
Université Paris-Sorbonne (PhD)

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