Alternatywizm, dysjunktywizm i pluralizm doświadczeniowy

Studia Humanistyczne AGH 17 (1):7-19 (2018)
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The claim currently known as “disjunctivism” is usually interpreted in terms of exclusive disjunction. However, it can be also explicated through the lens of alternative denial. The aim of this paper is to show that the latter interpretation is more accurate. Firstly, it reflects the core of disjunctivism more precisely. Secondly, it reduces metaphysical weight of the claim, thereby making it more plausible.
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