Dysjunktywizm i natura percepcyjnej relacji

Analiza I Egzystencja 35:87-111 (2016)
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Abstract
This paper surveys selected (though arguably representative) versions of metaphysical and epistemological disjunctivism. Although they share a common logical structure, it is hard to find a further common denominator among them. Two main conclusions are: (1) a specific standpoint on the nature of perceptual relation is not such a common denominator, which means that it is very unlikely that all of these views could be refuted with a single objection; (2) contrary to what its name suggests, disjunctivism can be correctly expressed without the employment of disjunction.
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Archival date: 2018-10-15
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The Transparency of Experience.Martin, Michael G. F.

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