Dysjunktywizm i natura percepcyjnej relacji

Analiza I Egzystencja 35:87-111 (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This paper surveys selected (though arguably representative) versions of metaphysical and epistemological disjunctivism. Although they share a common logical structure, it is hard to find a further common denominator among them. Two main conclusions are: (1) a specific standpoint on the nature of perceptual relation is not such a common denominator, which means that it is very unlikely that all of these views could be refuted with a single objection; (2) contrary to what its name suggests, disjunctivism can be correctly expressed without the employment of disjunction.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
ZIBDIN
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-10-15
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2018-10-11

Total views
22 ( #37,173 of 39,984 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
17 ( #25,525 of 39,984 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.