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  1. (1 other version)Can there be vague objects?Gareth Evans - 1978 - Analysis 38 (4):208.
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  • Truth and the absence of fact.Hartry H. Field - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Presenting a selection of thirteen essays on various topics at the foundations of philosophy--one previously unpublished and eight accompanied by substantial new postscripts--this book offers outstanding insight on truth, meaning, and propositional attitudes; semantic indeterminacy and other kinds of "factual defectiveness;" and issues concerning objectivity, especially in mathematics and in epistemology. It will reward the attention of any philosopher interested in language, epistemology, or mathematics.
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  • The concept of logical consequence.John Etchemendy - 1990 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    Of course we all know now that mathematics has proved that logic doesn't really make sense, but Etchemendy (philosophy, Stanford Univ.) goes further and challenges the received view of the conceptual underpinnings of modern logic by arguing that Tarski's model-theoretic analysis of logical consequences is wrong. He may have found the soft underbelly of the dead horse. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.
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  • (6 other versions)The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Ian Hacking.
    Thomas S. Kuhn's classic book is now available with a new index.
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  • General semantics.David K. Lewis - 1970 - Synthese 22 (1-2):18--67.
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  • Vagueness, truth and logic.Kit Fine - 1975 - Synthese 30 (3-4):265-300.
    This paper deals with the truth-Conditions and the logic for vague languages. The use of supervaluations and of classical logic is defended; and other approaches are criticized. The truth-Conditions are extended to a language that contains a definitely-Operator and that is subject to higher order vagueness.
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  • Singular terms, truth-value gaps, and free logic.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (17):481-495.
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  • Presupposition, implication, and self-reference.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (5):136-152.
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  • (1 other version)Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content.Hartry Field - 2005 - In José Medina & David Wood (eds.), Truth. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
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  • Truth and the Absence of Fact.Hartry Field - 2001 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (4):806-807.
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  • (1 other version)Vague identity: Evans misunderstood.David K. Lewis - 1988 - Analysis 48 (3):128-130.
    In his note "can there be vague objects?" ("analysis", 1978), Gareth evans presents a purported proof that there can be no vague identity statements. Some readers think that evans endorses the proof and its false conclusion. Not so. His point is that those who put vagueness in the world, Rather than in language, Will have no way to fault the proof and no way to escape the false conclusion.
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  • Tarski's Theory of Truth.Hartry Field - 1972 - Journal of Philosophy 69 (13):347.
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  • Presuppositions: Supervaluations and Free Logic.B. C. van Fraassen - 1969 - In Karel Lambert (ed.), The logical way of doing things. New Haven,: Yale University Press. pp. 67-92.
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  • (1 other version)Vagueness and ignorance.Timothy Williamson - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing about language. New York: Routledge. pp. 145 - 177.
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  • (1 other version)Deflationist views of meaning and content.Hartry Field - 1994 - Mind 103 (411):249-285.
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  • (1 other version)Review of Wlliamson Vagueness[REVIEW]Rosanna Keefe - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (180):392-394.
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  • Truth.Paul Horwich - 2005 - In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 261-272.
    What is truth. Paul Horwich advocates the controversial theory of minimalism, that is that the nature of truth is entirely captured in the trivial fact that each proposition specifies its own condition for being true, and that truth is therefore an entirely mundane and unpuzzling concept. The first edition of Truth, published in 1980, established itself as the best account of minimalism and as an excellent introduction to the debate for students. For this new edition, Horwich has refined and developed (...)
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  • Indeterminacy, degree of belief, and excluded middle.Hartry Field - 2000 - Noûs 34 (1):1–30.
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  • (1 other version)Can there be vague objects?Gareth Evans - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • (1 other version)Vague Identity: Evans misunderstood.David Lewis - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • Theory change and the indeterminacy of reference.Hartry Field - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (14):462-481.
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  • (1 other version)The Concept of Logical Consequence.John Etchemendy - 1994 - Erkenntnis 41 (2):281-284.
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  • Quine and the correspondence theory.Hartry Field - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (2):200-228.
    A correspondence theory of truth explains truth in terms of various correspondence relations (e.G., Reference) between words and the extralinguistic world. What are the consequences of quine's doctrine of indeterminacy for correspondence theories? in "ontological relativity" quine implicitly claims that correspondence theories are impossible; that is what the doctrine of 'relative reference' amounts to. But quine's doctrine of relative reference is incoherent. Those who think the indeterminacy thesis valid should not try to relativize reference, They should abandon the relation and (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Concept of Logical Consequence.John Etchemendy - 1990 - Mind 100 (3):382-385.
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  • Vagueness as a modality.Ken Akiba - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):359-370.
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