- Modal Cognitivism and Modal Expressivism.David Elohim - manuscriptdetails
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Forms of Luminosity: Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.David Elohim - 2017details
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Fragmentation, metalinguistic ignorance, and logical omniscience.Jens Christian Bjerring & Weng Hong Tang - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (7):2129-2151.details
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Forms of Luminosity: Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.David Elohim - 2017 - Dissertation, Arché, University of St Andrewsdetails
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Structure and Categoricity: Determinacy of Reference and Truth Value in the Philosophy of Mathematics.Tim Button & Sean Walsh - 2016 - Philosophia Mathematica 24 (3):283-307.details
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The philosophy of mathematics and the independent 'other'.Penelope Rush - unknowndetails
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Truth, Pretense and the Liar Paradox.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2015 - In T. Achourioti, H. Galinon, J. Martínez Fernández & K. Fujimoto (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Dordrecht: Imprint: Springer. pp. 339-354.details
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Propositional Names.Ryan Christensen - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (1):163-177.details
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Is epistemic expressivism incompatible with inquiry?J. Adam Carter & Matthew Chrisman - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):323-339.details
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Indicative conditionals:Factual or Epistemic?John Cantwell - 2008 - Studia Logica 88 (1):157-194.details
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Why is a truth-predicate like a pronoun?Arvid Båve - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):297 - 310.details
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Are truth and reference quasi-disquotational?Ray Buchanan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (1):43 - 75.details
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Problems in Epistemic Space.Jens Christian Bjerring - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (1):153-170.details
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Impossible worlds and logical omniscience: an impossibility result.Jens Christian Bjerring - 2013 - Synthese 190 (13):2505-2524.details
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Σ01 soundness isn’t enough: Number theoretic indeterminacy’s unsavory physical commitments.Sharon Berry - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (2):469-484.details
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Our Reliability is in Principle Explainable.Dan Baras - 2017 - Episteme 14 (2):197-211.details
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A strike against a striking principle.Dan Baras - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1501-1514.details
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A reliability challenge to theistic Platonism.Dan Baras - 2017 - Analysis 77 (3):479-487.details
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Relativism, metasemantics, and the future.Derek Ball - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (9-10):1036-1086.details
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Functionalism and tacit knowledge of grammar.David Balcarras - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):18-48.details
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Alethic Pluralism and the Role of Reference in the Metaphysics of Truth.Brian Ball - 2017 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (1):116-135.details
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The Story About Propositions.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2010 - Noûs 46 (4):635-674.details
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Semantic defectiveness and the liar.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):845-863.details
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Deflationism (About Theories of Truth).Bradley Armour-Garb - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (4):267-277.details
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Challenges to Deflationary Theories of Truth.Bradley Armour-Garb - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (4):256-266.details
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A deflationist approach to indeterminacy and vagueness.Ken Akiba - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (1):69 - 86.details
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Moderate Epistemic Expressivism.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):337-357.details
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The Representational Foundations of Computation.Michael Rescorla - 2015 - Philosophia Mathematica 23 (3):338-366.details
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Substantive perspectivism: an essay on philosophical concern with truth.Bo Mou - 2009 - New York: Springer.details
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Pluralism about Truth as Alethic Disjunctivism.Nikolaj Jang Linding Lee Pedersen & Cory Wright - 2012 - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.details
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Indeterminate truth.Patrick Greenough - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):213-241.details
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The Dual Aspects Theory of Truth.Benjamin Jarvis - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (3-4):209-233.details
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Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism.Michael P. Lynch - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):76-97.details
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Unifying the Philosophy of Truth.Theodora Achourioti, Henri Galinon, José Martínez Fernández & Kentaro Fujimoto (eds.) - 2015 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.details
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Philosophical Investigation Series: Selected Texts on Metaphysics, Language and Mind / Série Investigação Filosófica: Textos Selecionados de Metafísica, Linguagem e Mente.Rodrigo Cid & Pedro Merlussi (eds.) - 2020 - Pelotas: Editora da UFPel / NEPFIL Online.details
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Théories causales de la référence pour les noms propres.Nicolae Sfetcu - 2020 - Drobeta Turnu Severin: MultiMedia Publishing.details
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Semantics and Truth.Jan Woleński - 2019 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer Verlag.details
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The language of thought hypothesis.Murat Aydede - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Indeterminacy and normative silence.J. R. G. Williams - 2012 - Analysis 72 (2):217-225.details
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Gavagai again.John Robert Gareth Williams - 2008 - Synthese 164 (2):235-259.details
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Non-Factualist Interpretation of the Skeptical Solution and the Self-Refutation Argument.Michał Wieczorkowski - forthcoming - Acta Analytica:1-17.details
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Leave Truth Alone: On Deflationism and Contextualism.Daniel Whiting - 2010 - European Journal of Philosophy 19 (4):607-624.details
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Deflationism, Arithmetic, and the Argument from Conservativeness.Daniel Waxman - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):429-463.details
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Revisiting Quine on Truth by Convention.Jared Warren - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (2):119-139.details
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Quantifier Variance and Indefinite Extensibility.Jared Warren - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (1):81-122.details
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A Metasemantic Challenge for Mathematical Determinacy.Jared Warren & Daniel Waxman - 2020 - Synthese 197 (2):477-495.details
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The Inaccuracy of Partial Truth in Yablovian If-Thenism.Joseph Ulatowski - 2017 - Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (2):206-211.details
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Existence questions.Amie L. Thomasson - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (1):63 - 78.details
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“Assertion” and intentionality.Jason Stanley - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (1):87-113.details
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What is logical deflationism? Two non-metalinguistic conceptions of logic.Lionel Shapiro - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-28.details
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