- Truth, Revenge, and Internalizability.Kevin Scharp - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):597-645.details
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(1 other version)Metafizički minimalizam.Fritz J. McDonald - 2011 - Prolegomena 10 (1):39-52.details
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(1 other version)Metaphysical Minimalism.Fritz J. McDonald - 2011 - Prolegomena 10 (1):39-52.details
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The philosophy of mathematics and the independent 'other'.Penelope Rush - unknowndetails
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Semantic defectiveness and the liar.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):845-863.details
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Indeterminacy and normative silence.J. R. G. Williams - 2012 - Analysis 72 (2):217-225.details
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Moderate Epistemic Expressivism.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):337-357.details
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Review: Two Conceptions of Truth? Comment. [REVIEW]Vann McGee - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 124 (1):71 - 104.details
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Is epistemic expressivism incompatible with inquiry?J. Adam Carter & Matthew Chrisman - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (3):323-339.details
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On Epistemic Agency.Kristoffer Hans Ahlstrom - 2010 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts at Amherstdetails
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The Story About Propositions.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2010 - Noûs 46 (4):635-674.details
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Reference magnetism and the reduction of reference.J. R. G. Williams - manuscriptdetails
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Open-endedness, schemas and ontological commitment.Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Marcus Rossberg - 2010 - Noûs 44 (2):329-339.details
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Epistemology without metaphysics.Hartry Field - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (2):249 - 290.details
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Why is a truth-predicate like a pronoun?Arvid Båve - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):297 - 310.details
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Are truth and reference quasi-disquotational?Ray Buchanan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 113 (1):43 - 75.details
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Truth and disquotation.Richard G. Heck - 2005 - Synthese 142 (3):317--352.details
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The question of realism.Kit Fine - 2001 - Philosophers' Imprint 1:1-30.details
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Saving the truth schema from paradox.Hartry Field - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (1):1-27.details
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(1 other version)Indeterminate truth.Patrick Greenough - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):213-241.details
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(1 other version)The language of thought hypothesis.Murat Aydede - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Functionalism and tacit knowledge of grammar.David Balcarras - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):18-48.details
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(1 other version)Future Contingency and Classical Indeterminism.Richard Gaskin - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (8):1-18.details
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(1 other version)Physical Possibility and Determinate Number Theory.Sharon Berry - 2021 - Philosophia Mathematica 29 (3):299-317.details
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Representation, Deflationism, and the Question of Realism.Camil Golub - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 7.details
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Categoricity by convention.Julien Murzi & Brett Topey - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3391-3420.details
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Σ01 soundness isn’t enough: Number theoretic indeterminacy’s unsavory physical commitments.Sharon Berry - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (2):469-484.details
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Modal and Hyperintensional Cognitivism and Modal and Hyperintensional Expressivism.David Elohim - manuscriptdetails
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Relativism, metasemantics, and the future.Derek Ball - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (9-10):1036-1086.details
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Directival Theory of Meaning Resurrected.Paweł Grabarczyk - 2017 - Studia Semiotyczne—English Supplement 29 (1):62-81.details
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Théories causales de la référence pour les noms propres.Nicolae Sfetcu - 2020 - Drobeta Turnu Severin: MultiMedia Publishing.details
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Causal Theories of Reference for Proper Names.Nicolae Sfetcu - manuscriptdetails
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Modal Cognitivism and Modal Expressivism.David Elohim - manuscriptdetails
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The Inaccuracy of Partial Truth in Yablovian If-Thenism.Joseph Ulatowski - 2017 - Australasian Philosophical Review 1 (2):206-211.details
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(1 other version)Forms of Luminosity: Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.David Elohim - 2017 - Dissertation, Arché, University of St Andrewsdetails
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(1 other version)Forms of Luminosity: Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.David Elohim - 2017details
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Lost in Translation?Giulia Felappi & Marco Santambrogio - 2019 - Topoi 38 (2):265-276.details
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Our Reliability is in Principle Explainable.Dan Baras - 2017 - Episteme 14 (2):197-211.details
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Structure and Categoricity: Determinacy of Reference and Truth Value in the Philosophy of Mathematics.Tim Button & Sean Walsh - 2016 - Philosophia Mathematica 24 (3):283-307.details
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Revisiting Quine on Truth by Convention.Jared Warren - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (2):119-139.details
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“Assertion” and intentionality.Jason Stanley - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (1):87-113.details
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Truth, Pretense and the Liar Paradox.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2015 - In T. Achourioti, H. Galinon, J. Martínez Fernández & K. Fujimoto (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Dordrecht: Imprint: Springer. pp. 339-354.details
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‘In Defence of Sententialism’.Giulia Felappi - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (4):581-603.details
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The Representational Foundations of Computation.Michael Rescorla - 2015 - Philosophia Mathematica 23 (3):338-366.details
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An explanatory role for the concept of truth.Boris Rähme - 2014 - In Fabio Bacchini, Stefano Caputo & Massimo Dell'Utri (eds.), New Frontiers in Truth. Cambridge Scholar. pp. 15-37.details
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(1 other version)Pluralism about Truth as Alethic Disjunctivism.Nikolaj Jang Linding Lee Pedersen & Cory Wright - 2012 - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.details
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Impossible worlds and logical omniscience: an impossibility result.Jens Christian Bjerring - 2013 - Synthese 190 (13):2505-2524.details
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Supposition and desire in a non-classical setting.J. Robert G. Williams - unknowndetails
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Bivalence and the challenge of truth-value gaps.Teresa Marques - 2004 - Dissertation, Stirlingdetails
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Substantive perspectivism: an essay on philosophical concern with truth.Bo Mou - 2009 - New York: Springer.details
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