Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Life's Dominion: An Argument About Abortion and Euthanasia.Ronald Dworkin - unknown
    In 1993, Professor of Jurisprudence, Ronald Dworkin of Oxford University and Professor of Law at New York University, delivered the Georgetown Law Center’s thirteenth Annual Philip A. Hart Memorial Lecture: "Life’s Dominion: An Argument About Abortion and Euthanasia." Dworkin is Professor of Philosophy and Frank Henry Sommer Professor of Law at New York University. He received B.A. degrees from both Harvard College and Oxford University, and an LL.B. from Harvard Law School and clerked for Judge Learned Hand. He was associated (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   149 citations  
  • Consent and end of life decisions.John Harris - 2003 - Journal of Medical Ethics 29 (1):10-15.
    This paper discusses the role of consent in decision making generally and its role in end of life decisions in particular. It outlines a conception of autonomy which explains and justifies the role of consent in decision making and criticises some misapplications of the idea of consent, particular the role of fictitious or “proxy” consents.Where the inevitable outcome of a decision must be that a human individual will die and where that individual is a person who can consent, then that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   45 citations  
  • The misguided marriage of responsibility and autonomy.Marina A. L. Oshana - 2002 - The Journal of Ethics 6 (3):261-280.
    Much of the literature devoted to the topics of agent autonomy and agent responsibility suggests strong conceptual overlaps between the two, although few explore these overlaps explicitly. Beliefs of this sort are commonplace, but they mistakenly conflate the global state of being autonomous with the local condition of acting autonomously or exhibiting autonomy in respect to some act or decision. Because the latter, local phenomenon of autonomy seems closely tied to the condition of being responsible for an act, we tend (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Competency and risk-relativity.Tom Buller - 2001 - Bioethics 15 (2):93–109.
    In this paper I discuss the view that the appropriate concept of competence is a decision‐relative one: that a person may be competent to make one decision but not another. The argument that I present is that neither of the two competing theories supporting the decision‐relative approach, internalism and externalism, can provide a coherent explanation of why a person’s competence should be thought to be relative to a particular decision. On the one hand, internalism, which regards competence as exhaustively a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations