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CAN A COHERENT ACCOUNT BE PROVIDED OF WHAT IT IS FOR A BEING TO BE OMNIPOTENT, WHICH BRINGS OUT WHAT THEISTS HAVE WANTED TO SAY WHEN THEY CLAIM THAT GOD IS OMNIPOTENT? IT IS ARGUED THAT IT CAN. A BEING S IS SAID TO BE OMNIPOTENT AT A TIME T IF FOR ANY LOGICALLY CONTINGENT STATE OF AFFAIRS X AFTER T, SUCH THAT THE OCCURRENCE OF X AFTER T DOES NOT ENTAIL THAT S DID NOT BRING ABOUT X AT T, (...) |
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It has been maintained that we need not tolerate such entities as pains, events, tasks, and obligations. They are indeed not required in connection with sentences like ‘Jones has a pain’, ‘the event of the sun’s rising occurred at eight’, ‘Jones performed at eight the task of lifting a stone’, or ‘Jones has the obligation to give Smith a horse’, which can be paraphrased without reference to the entities in question—for instance, in the case of the second example, as ‘the (...) |
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Several of these essays have been printed whole in journals; others are in varying degrees new. Two main themes run through them. One is the problem of meaning, particularly as involved in the notion of an analytic statement. The other is the notion of ontological, commitment, particularly as involved in the problem of universals. |
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This book, one of the first full-length studies of the modalities to emerge from the debate to which Saul Kripke, David Lewis, Ruth Marcus, and others are contributing, is an exploration and defense of the notion of modality de re, the idea that objects have both essential and accidental properties. Plantinga develops his argument by means of the notion of possible worlds and ranges over such key problems as the nature of essence, transworld identity, negative existential propositions, and the existence (...) |
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Can belief in God be rationally justified? Reviewing in detail traditional and modern arguments for and against the existence of God, Professor Plantinga concludes that they must all be judged unsuccessful. He then turns to the related philosophical problem of the existence of other minds, and defends the so-called analogical argument against current criticisms. He goes on to show, however, that although this argument affords us the best reasons we have for belief in other minds, it finally succumbs to the (...) |
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Modal propositional logic; Modal predicate logic; A survey of modal logic. |
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In chapter one, I motivate the results to follow by discussing their impact on our conception of the nature of philosophy. ;In chapter two, I define, by way of a description of its rules of inference, a system of quantified modal logic. I then use this system in subsequent chapters to codify definitions of concepts and to construct formal derivations. ;Chapter three considers an essay by Nasser and Brown in which they attempt to answer our basic question: does an omniscient (...) |
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In an earlier issue of "Philosophical Studies" George Mavrodes provided a general definition of omnipotence. I argue that his general definition is inadequate because it fails to exclude from being omnipotent beings who have finite abilities but who possess their limited abilities necessarily. |
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