In chapter one, I motivate the results to follow by discussing their impact on our conception of the nature of philosophy. ;In chapter two, I define, by way of a description of its rules of inference, a system of quantified modal logic. I then use this system in subsequent chapters to codify definitions of concepts and to construct formal derivations. ;Chapter three considers an essay by Nasser and Brown in which they attempt to answer our basic question: does an omniscient (...) being exist? I also evaluate their claim to be addressing an argument by Hartshorne . ;In chapter four I distinguish four traditional concepts of omniscience. Each is defined in terms of the formal system of chapter two, making use of only non-logical predicate, the dyadic relation 'x knows that p'. I then define adequacy conditions and prove that the definitions given meet them. ;In chapter five, I construct valid derivations of the existence of an omniscient being . ;In chapter six, I consider the premisses used in the Seven Epistemic Ways, and show that, with the exception of the premise that it is possible that there be an omniscient being, each of these premisses is a theorem when omniscience is construed as in the classical tradition . ;In chapter seven alternatives to the classical concepts of omniscience are defined formally . I then show which of the seven ways are sound when the premisses are interpreted in terms of these alternative concepts. (shrink)

It has been maintained that we need not tolerate such entities as pains, events, tasks, and obligations. They are indeed not required in connection with sentences like ‘Jones has a pain’, ‘the event of the sun’s rising occurred at eight’, ‘Jones performed at eight the task of lifting a stone’, or ‘Jones has the obligation to give Smith a horse’, which can be paraphrased without reference to the entities in question—for instance, in the case of the second example, as ‘the (...) sun rose at eight’. (shrink)

Several of these essays have been printed whole in journals; others are in varying degrees new. Two main themes run through them. One is the problem of meaning, particularly as involved in the notion of an analytic statement. The other is the notion of ontological, commitment, particularly as involved in the problem of universals.

This book, one of the first full-length studies of the modalities to emerge from the debate to which Saul Kripke, David Lewis, Ruth Marcus, and others are contributing, is an exploration and defense of the notion of modality de re, the idea that objects have both essential and accidental properties. Plantinga develops his argument by means of the notion of possible worlds and ranges over such key problems as the nature of essence, transworld identity, negative existential propositions, and the existence (...) of unactual objects in other possible worlds. He also applies his logical theories to the elucidation of two problems in the philosophy of religion: the problem of evil and the ontological argument. (shrink)

Can belief in God be rationally justified? Reviewing in detail traditional and modern arguments for and against the existence of God, Professor Plantinga concludes that they must all be judged unsuccessful. He then turns to the related philosophical problem of the existence of other minds, and defends the so-called analogical argument against current criticisms. He goes on to show, however, that although this argument affords us the best reasons we have for belief in other minds, it finally succumbs to the (...) same malady that afflicts the teleological argument of God. (shrink)

CAN A COHERENT ACCOUNT BE PROVIDED OF WHAT IT IS FOR A BEING TO BE OMNIPOTENT, WHICH BRINGS OUT WHAT THEISTS HAVE WANTED TO SAY WHEN THEY CLAIM THAT GOD IS OMNIPOTENT? IT IS ARGUED THAT IT CAN. A BEING S IS SAID TO BE OMNIPOTENT AT A TIME T IF FOR ANY LOGICALLY CONTINGENT STATE OF AFFAIRS X AFTER T, SUCH THAT THE OCCURRENCE OF X AFTER T DOES NOT ENTAIL THAT S DID NOT BRING ABOUT X AT T, (...) S IS ABLE AT T TO BRING ABOUT X. THIS ACCOUNT IS IMMUNE TO DIFFICULTIES SUCH AS THOSE OFFERED BY THE PARADOX OF THE STONE. (shrink)

Modal propositional logic; Modal predicate logic; A survey of modal logic.

In an earlier issue of "Philosophical Studies" George Mavrodes provided a general definition of omnipotence. I argue that his general definition is inadequate because it fails to exclude from being omnipotent beings who have finite abilities but who possess their limited abilities necessarily.

Baruch Brody contends that the fundamental assumption on which the tradition is based is erroneous and that once this assumption is shown to be in error, all philosophical problems in this area have to be rethought. Originally published in 1980. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and (...) hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)