An argument against the bias towards the near; how a defence of temporal neutrality is not a defence of S; an appeal to inconsistency; why we should reject S and accept CP.

I take as my starting point the “one very simple principle” proclaimed by Mill in On Liberty … “That principle is, that the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. He cannot rightfully be compelled to do (...) or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right.”. (shrink)

The Theory of Market Failure explores how markets respond, both in theory and in practice, to public‐goods and externality problems. Most of the articles in this anthology find that markets often meet the demand for public goods in a variety of cases where existing theory would lead one to expect market failure. Moreover, upon reflection, existing theory reveals itself to be in need of supplementation by a more realistic picture of how flexible markets (and evolving systems of property rights) respond (...) to the demand for public goods and for the means of internalizing externalities. (shrink)

There has been a persistent tendency to identify what is called “the freerider problem” in the production of collective goods with the prisoner's dilemma. However, in this article I want to challenge that identification by presenting an analysis of what are in fact a variety of collective action problems in the production of collective goods. My strategy is not to consult any intuitions about what the free-rider problem is; rather I will be looking at the problematic game-theoretic structures of various (...) situations associated with the production of different types of collective goods, thereby showing what sorts of difficulties a community concerned with their voluntary production would face. I call all of these dilemmas free-rider problems because in all of them certain individuals find it rational to take advantage of others' willingness to contribute to the good in a way that threatens its production. Some readers may feel that the term ‘free-rider problem’ is so identified with the prisoner's dilemma that my extension of the term in this way “jars”; if so, I invite them to coin another word for the larger phenomenon. My aim is not to engage in linguistic analysis but to attempt at least a partial analysis of the complicated structure of collective good production. (shrink)

Is a rational morality a necessary evil—a mean between what an individual would judge best—bettering his situation at whatever cost to others, and worst—having one's situation worsened at other's pleasure? It would seem that Glaucon's fable of the ring of Gyges may be applied to our account of morality. And indeed, matters may be worse—a contractarian morality such as we have developed may seem to be a tool for the clever and strong to use in domination, using the language of (...) cooperation to conceal the reality of exploitation. If we understand ourselves on the model of economic man, treating all basic motivation as exemplifying asociality and all human relationships as contractual, we may find these conclusions hard to escape. Even though we could understand the rational arguments in support of morality, our feelings would be engaged only by our own concerns, and we would lack any affective capacity for morality. (shrink)

Anthony de Jasay attempts to demonstrate that public goods can be supplied privately without loss of efficiency, since there may be enough people willing to finance public‐goods production voluntarily, even at the risk of subsidizing free riders, rather than risk that public goods will not be produced at all. Jasay's argument rests on the implausible assumption that the goods in question are completely indivisible. This assumption forces persons interested in having a given public good either to finance it or do (...) without it entirely; they do not have the option of financing smaller quantities or poorer qualities of the good. (shrink)

There is a presumption in some circles that the identification of an externality or a public good presents a prima facie case for government intervention. Tyler Cowen has assembled a group of articles that challenge this view by arguing that the market, broadly construed, can handle many problems of public goods and externalities that are normally considered the province of the state. Although these articles present a stimulating perspective on problems of externalities and public goods, several of the essays overstate (...) their case and misrepresent the standard theory of public goods and externalities. (shrink)