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  1. Hume's Problem: Induction and the Justification of Belief.Colin Howson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
    In the mid-eighteenth century David Hume argued that successful prediction tells us nothing about the truth of the predicting theory. But physical theory routinely predicts the values of observable magnitudes within very small ranges of error. The chance of this sort of predictive success without a true theory suggests that Hume's argument is flawed. However, Colin Howson argues that there is no flaw and examines the implications of this disturbing conclusion; he also offers a solution to one of the central (...)
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  • The Meta‐Inductivist’s Winning Strategy in the Prediction Game: A New Approach to Hume’s Problem.Gerhard Schurz - 2008 - Philosophy of Science 75 (3):278-305.
    This article suggests a ‘best alternative' justification of induction (in the sense of Reichenbach) which is based on meta-induction . The meta-inductivist applies the principle of induction to all competing prediction methods which are accessible to her. It is demonstrated, and illustrated by computer simulations, that there exist meta-inductivistic prediction strategies whose success is approximately optimal among all accessible prediction methods in arbitrary possible worlds, and which dominate the success of every noninductive prediction strategy. The proposed justification of meta-induction is (...)
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  • Induction and the Justification of Belief.Colin Howson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
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