Opinion about neonatal male circumcision is deeply divided. Some take it to be a prophylactic measure with unequivocal and significant health benefits, while others consider it a form of child abuse. We argue against both these polar views. In doing so, we discuss whether circumcision constitutes bodily mutilation, whether the absence of the child's informed consent makes it wrong, the nature and strength of the evidence regarding medical harms and benefits, and what moral weight cultural considerations have. We conclude that (...) nontherapeutic circumcision of infant boys is a suitable matter for parental discretion. (shrink)

Opponents of male circumcision have increasingly used human rights positions to articulate their viewpoint. We characterize the meaning of the term “human rights.” We discuss these human rights arguments with special attention to the claims of rights to an open future and to bodily integrity. We offer a three-part test under which a parental decision might be considered an unacceptable violation of a child's right. The test considers the impact of the practice on society, the impact of the practice on (...) the individual, and the likelihood of adverse impact. Infant circumcision is permissible under this test. We conclude that infant circumcision may be proscribed as violating local norms, even though it does not violate human rights. (shrink)

The principle of the child's right to an open future was first proposed by the legal philosopher Joel Feinberg and developed further by bioethicist Dena Davis. The principle holds that children possess a unique class of rights called rights in trust—rights that they cannot yet exercise, but which they will be able to exercise when they reach maturity. Parents should not, therefore, take actions that permanently foreclose on or pre-empt the future options of their children, but leave them the greatest (...) possible scope for exercising personal life choices in adulthood. Davis particularly applies the principle to genetic counselling, arguing that parents should not take deliberate steps to create physically abnormal children, and to religion, arguing that while parents are entitled to bring their children up in accordance with their own values, they are not entitled to inflict physical or mental harm, neither by omission nor commission. In this paper, I aim to elucidate the open future principle, and consider whether it is applicable to non-therapeutic circumcision of boys, whether performed for cultural/religious or for prophylactic/health reasons. I argue that the principle is highly applicable to non-therapeutic circumcision, and conclude that non-therapeutic circumcision would be a violation of the child's right to an open future, and thus objectionable from both an ethical and a human rights perspective. (shrink)

Western feminists, physicians, and ethicists condemn the traditional genital surgeries performed on women in some non‐Western cultures. But coming to moral judgment is not the end of the story; we must also decide what to do about our judgments. We must learn to work respectfully with, not independently of, local resources for cultural self‐examination and change.

Despite global and local attempts to end genital mutilation, in their various forms, whether of males or females, the practice has persisted throughout human history in most parts of the world. Various medical, scientific, hygienic, aesthetic, religious, and cultural reasons have been used to justify it. In this symposium on circumcision, against the background of the other articles by Hutson, Short, and Viens, the practice is set by the author within a wider, global context by discussing a range of rationalisations (...) used to support different types of genital mutilation throughout time and across the globe. It is argued that in most cases the rationalisations invented to provide support for continuing the practice of genital mutilation—whether male or female—within various cultural and religious settings have very little to do with finding a critical and reflective moral justification for these practices. In order to question the ethical acceptability of the practice in its non-therapeutic forms, we need to focus on child rights protection. (shrink)

The view that we must respect cultural traditions is a welcome change from the past, when colonial powers ridiculed native customs and often sought to eradicate them. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to ask whether there is a limit to tolerance of a ritual that has been designated a “harmful traditional practice” by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, the United Nations Population Fund, and the recently created agency, UN Women. The article “Seven Things To Know (...) About Female Genital Surgeries in Africa,” by the Public Policy Advisory Network on Female Genital Surgeries in Africa, contends that a need exists for more balanced critical thinking and open debate about what the authors choose to call “female genital surgery.” No one can reasonably quarrel with the call for accurate information in descriptions of the methods and consequences of female genital cutting. The network's own discussion of the facts is highly questionable, however. (shrink)

The Public Policy Advisory Network on Female Genital Surgeries in Africa has written an article expressing concern about the media's inaccurate depiction of this practice and suggesting a more fact‐based approach to reporting on it. I applaud the network for soliciting input from various fields. I cannot agree more that some in the media have misconstrued, exaggerated, and used inflammatory language; words like “torture,” “barbaric,” and “horrific” will likely enrage readers while reinforcing discrimination against women who practice or have undergone (...) genital cutting. The authors also assert that “any genuine public policy debate should be grounded in the best available evidence and begins with fact checking.” Again, I couldn't agree more. My concern is that there is bias in the way some of the data are presented in this article. (shrink)

Basing normative judgment and policy on a rich empirical account of the issue at hand is usually a good idea. But doing nothing and awaiting further evidence can sometimes itself be bad judgment. This is the case with female genital cutting. We already know what is needed to define the conditions under which female genital cutting is morally unacceptable and that we can legitimately act on this knowledge.