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Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):589-601.details
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Vagueness and contradiction.Roy A. Sorensen - 2001 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Vagueness and Contradiction.Roy Sorensen - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):695-703.details
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Deflationary truth and the liar.Keith Simmons - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (5):455-488.details
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The logic of paradox.Graham Priest - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):219 - 241.details
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Truthmaking and difference-making.David Lewis - 2001 - Noûs 35 (4):602–615.details
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Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.details
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Truth.Paul Horwich - 1999 - In Meaning. Oxford University Press. pp. 261-272.details
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Meaning.Paul Horwich - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Deep ignorance, brute supervenience, and the problem of the many.Terry Horgan - 1997 - Philosophical Issues 8:229-236.details
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Being and truth.Paul Horwich - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):258-273.details
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Inheritors and paradox.Dorothy Grover - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (10):590-604.details
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Recent Work on Vagueness.M. Eklund - 2011 - Analysis 71 (2):352-363.details
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A neglected deflationist approach to the liar.Jc Beall - 2001 - Analysis 61 (2):126–129.details
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A neglected deflationist approach to the liar.J. Beall - 2001 - Analysis 61 (2):126-129.details
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Minimalism, the generalization problem and the liar.Bradley Armour-Garb - 2004 - Synthese 139 (3):491 - 512.details
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Truth.Paul Horwich - 1990 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. Edited by Frank Jackson & Michael Smith.details
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Truth-meaning-reality.Paul Horwich - 2010 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Blindspots.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Laws and Lawmakers Science, Metaphysics, and the Laws of Nature.Marc Lange - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Saving truth from paradox.Hartry H. Field - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Truth and truthmakers.D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Can Empirical Knowledge Have a Foundation?Laurence Bonjour - 1978 - American Philosophical Quarterly 15 (1):1-14.details
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Minimalists about truth can (and should) be epistemicists, and it helps if they are revision theorists too.Greg Restall - 2005 - In J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), Deflationism and Paradox. Clarendon Press.details
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A minimalist critique of Tarski on truth.Paul Horwich - 2005 - In J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), Deflationism and Paradox. Oxford University Press.details
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Minimalism, epistemicism, and paradox.Bradley Armour-Garb & J. C. Beall - 2005 - In J. C. Beall & Bradley Armour-Garb (eds.), Deflationism and Paradox. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Blindspots.Roy Sorensen - 1990 - Mind 99 (393):137-140.details
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