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Verbal Disputes.David J. Chalmers - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (4):515-566.details
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Four Dimensionalism.Theodore Sider - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (2):197-231.details
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The Case for Comparability.Cian Dorr, Jacob M. Nebel & Jake Zuehl - 2023 - Noûs 57 (2):414-453.details
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(1 other version)Anti-exceptionalism about logic.Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):631-658.details
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Shadows of Syntax: Revitalizing Logical and Mathematical Conventionalism.Jared Warren - 2020 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Context dependence, disagreement, and predicates of personal taste.Peter Lasersohn - 2005 - Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (6):643--686.details
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Naturalness.Cian Dorr & John Hawthorne - 2013 - In Karen Bennett & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, Volume 8. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 1.details
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Vagueness and grammar: The semantics of relative and absolute gradable adjectives.Christopher Kennedy - 2007 - Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (1):1 - 45.details
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Tolerant, Classical, Strict.Pablo Cobreros, Paul Egré, David Ripley & Robert van Rooij - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (2):347-385.details
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Can we do without pragmatic encroachment.Brian Weatherson - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):417–443.details
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Dispositions without Conditionals.Barbara Vetter - 2014 - Mind 123 (489):129-156.details
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The Good, the Bad, and the Transitivity of Better Than.Jacob M. Nebel - 2018 - Noûs 52 (4):874-899.details
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The Broadest Necessity.Andrew Bacon - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (5):733-783.details
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Quantum indeterminacy and the double-slit experiment.Claudio Calosi & Jessica Wilson - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3291-3317.details
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Ontic Vagueness: A Guide for the Perplexed.Elizabeth Barnes - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):601-627.details
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Decision-Making Under Indeterminacy.J. Robert G. Williams - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.details
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Semantic Plasticity and Speech Reports.Cian Dorr & John Hawthorne - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (3):281-338.details
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The open future: bivalence, determinism and ontology.Elizabeth Barnes & Ross Cameron - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 146 (2):291-309.details
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Consequentialism and Collective Action.Brian Hedden - 2020 - Ethics 130 (4):530-554.details
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The dynamics of vagueness.Chris Barker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (1):1-36.details
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The Epistemology of Modality.Margot Strohminger & Juhani Yli-Vakkuri - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):825-838.details
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Ontic vagueness and metaphysical indeterminacy.J. Robert G. Williams - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (4):763-788.details
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Logical Predictivism.Ben Martin & Ole Hjortland - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (2):285-318.details
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Inconsistent Languages.Matti Eklund - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):251-275.details
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Eligibility and inscrutability.J. Robert G. Williams - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (3):361-399.details
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The Varieties of Agnosticism.Filippo Ferrari & Luca Incurvati - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (2):365-380.details
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Vague, So Untrue.David Braun & Theodore Sider - 2007 - Noûs 41 (2):133 - 156.details
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Logic, Metalogic and Neutrality.Timothy Williamson - 2013 - Erkenntnis 79 (2):211-231.details
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Logical pluralism without the normativity.Christopher Blake-Turner & Gillian Russell - 2018 - Synthese:1-19.details
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Outline of a theory of strongly semantic information.Luciano Floridi - 2004 - Minds and Machines 14 (2):197-221.details
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Against vague existence.Theodore Sider - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):135 - 146.details
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What Counts as Evidence for a Logical Theory?Ole Thomassen Hjortland - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Logic 16 (7):250-282.details
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Truth in the Garden of Forking Paths.John MacFarlane - 2008 - In Manuel García-Carpintero & Max Kölbel (eds.), Relative truth. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 81--102.details
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Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency.Declan Smithies - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (4):723-741.details
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Arbitrary reference.Wylie Breckenridge & Ofra Magidor - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (3):377-400.details
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Consequentializing agent‐centered restrictions: A Kantsequentialist approach.Douglas W. Portmore - 2023 - Analytic Philosophy 64 (4):443-467.details
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Can the Classical Logician Avoid the Revenge Paradoxes?Andrew Bacon - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (3):299-352.details
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Contradictions at the borders.David Ripley - 2011 - In Rick Nouwen, Robert van Rooij, Uli Sauerland & Hans-Christian Schmitz (eds.), Vagueness in Communication. Springer. pp. 169--188.details
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Truthfulness and relevance.Deirdre Wilson & Dan Sperber - 2002 - Mind 111 (443):583-632.details
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Probability and Danger.Timothy Williamson - 2009 - Amherst Lecture in Philosophy.details
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Multiple actualities and ontically vague identity.Robert Williams - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230):134-154.details
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(Un)reasonable doubt as affective experience: obsessive–compulsive disorder, epistemic anxiety and the feeling of uncertainty.Juliette Vazard - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6917-6934.details
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Mereological Nihilism and Puzzles about Material Objects.Bradley Rettler - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (4):842-868.details
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Talking about worlds.Matthew Mandelkern - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives 32 (1):298-325.details
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The A Posteriori Armchair.Daniel Nolan - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):211-231.details
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The Minimal A-theory.Meghan Sullivan - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):149-174.details
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Super-Relationism: Combining Eliminativism about Objects and Relationism about Spacetime.Baptiste Le Bihan - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2151-2172.details
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Legal Probabilism: A Qualified Defence.Brian Hedden & Mark Colyvan - 2019 - Journal of Political Philosophy 27 (4):448-468.details
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Vagueness and Zombies: Why ‘Phenomenally Conscious’ has No Borderline Cases.Jonathan A. Simon - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):2105-2123.details
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