The enduring innovations in artificial intelligence and robotics offer the promised capacity of computer consciousness, sentience and rationality. The development of these advanced technologies have been considered to merit rights, however these can only be ascribed in the context of commensurate responsibilities and duties. This represents the discernable next-step for evolution in this field. Addressing these needs requires attention to the philosophical perspectives of moral responsibility for artificial intelligence and robotics. A contrast to the moral status of animals may be (...) considered. At a practical level, the attainment of responsibilities by artificial intelligence and robots can benefit from the established responsibilities and duties of human society, as their subsistence exists within this domain. These responsibilities can be further interpreted and crystalized through legal principles, many of which have been conserved from ancient Roman law. The ultimate and unified goal of stipulating these responsibilities resides through the advancement of mankind and the enduring preservation of the core tenets of humanity. (shrink)

The Mind-Body Problem Questions: What is the mind? What is its connection to the body? Most basic division of answers: Dualist and Materialist (or Physicalist) responses.

The book is an extended study of the problem of consciousness. After setting up the problem, I argue that reductive explanation of consciousness is impossible , and that if one takes consciousness seriously, one has to go beyond a strict materialist framework. In the second half of the book, I move toward a positive theory of consciousness with fundamental laws linking the physical and the experiential in a systematic way. Finally, I use the ideas and arguments developed earlier to defend (...) a form of strong artificial intelligence and to analyze some problems in the foundations of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

This intriguing book undercuts everything you thought you knew about psychotherapy.

The enduring progression of artificial intelligence and cybernetics offers an ever-closer possibility of rational and sentient robots. The ethics and morals deriving from this technological prospect have been considered in the philosophy of artificial intelligence, the design of automatons with roboethics and the contemplation of machine ethics through the concept of artificial moral agents. Across these categories, the robotics laws first proposed by Isaac Asimov in the twentieth century remain well-recognised and esteemed due to their specification of preventing human harm, (...) stipulating obedience to humans and incorporating robotic self-protection. However the overwhelming predominance in the study of this field has focussed on human–robot interactions without fully considering the ethical inevitability of future artificial intelligences communicating together and has not addressed the moral nature of robot–robot interactions. A new robotic law is proposed and termed AIonAI or artificial intelligence-on-artificial intelligence. This law tackles the overlooked area where future artificial intelligences will likely interact amongst themselves, potentially leading to exploitation. As such, they would benefit from adopting a universal law of rights to recognise inherent dignity and the inalienable rights of artificial intelligences. Such a consideration can help prevent exploitation and abuse of rational and sentient beings, but would also importantly reflect on our moral code of ethics and the humanity of our civilisation. (shrink)

This chapter offers a novel defence of Szasz’s claim that mental illness is a myth by bringing to bear a standard type of thought experiment used in philosophical discussions of the meaning of natural kind concepts. This makes it possible to accept Szasz’s conclusion that mental illness involves problems of living, some of which may be moral in nature, while bypassing the debate about the meaning of the concept of illness. The chapter then considers the nature of schizophrenia and the (...) personality disorders (PDs) within this framework. It argues that neither is likely to constitute a scientifically valid category, but that nonetheless their symptoms can be scientifically explained. It concludes with a discussion of the way in which Cluster B or ‘bad’ PDs involve failures of virtue or character, and argues that this does not preclude them from being appropriately treated within contemporary, multidisciplinary, mental health services. (shrink)