This article aims to offer a refined way of understanding what we mean by the concepts of meaningfulness and meaning in life. The first step is to separate worthwhileness, as the broadest evaluation of life taking all types of values into account, from meaningfulness, which is seen as one type of intrinsic value along with, for example, well-being, moral praiseworthiness, and authenticity, which I argue are also separate types of intrinsic value. After discussing why we should not settle with the (...) currently popular fitting attitudes analysis of meaningfulness, I argue that the meaningfulness of a life should be seen to be about the positive contribution beyond itself that this particular life is able to make. I show how this analysis is different from previous similar accounts and how it is able to avoid a number of challenges that have troubled these previous accounts, such as the pleasure machine challenge, the results machine challenge, and the doing good unintentionally challenge. I also demonstrate how it is able to account for prototypical examples of meaningful and meaningless lives and how it is compatible with subjectivism, supernaturalism, and objective naturalism, which is seen as a merit. Finally, I conclude with some notes about what could make life meaningful, given the current analysis of meaningfulness itself. (shrink)

(1994). Why immortality is not so bad. International Journal of Philosophical Studies: Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 257-270.

Largely, the concept of energy or vital force, as first analysed by Placide Tempels in Bantu Philosophy, permeates most African ontology systems, worldviews and life views. The Ntomba Chief is chosen because of his above average vital force. This puts him in the position of intermediary between the Supreme Being, the ancestors, and his subordinates. The waning of his energy is incompatible with his position because his energy is that of his tribe. When installed, he takes an oath that, when (...) this happens, he has to accept mohilo, the ‘hastening of death’. In the Chief's case, the hastening of death is not intended to relieve his pain, as it would be with other creatures. The Chief's dying a natural death would result in the loss of the entire community's vital force. Therefore, he has to be killed ritually to avoid that risk. That the Chief agrees to be killed – via a form of advanced directive – poses an ethical dilemma for a Western observer. From the Ntomba perspective, however, where the energy is being, and being is energy, it is the only way to preserve and protect the community's raison d’être. (shrink)

Most people, including philosophers, tend to classify human motives as falling into one of two categories: the egoistic or the altruistic, the self-interested or the moral. According to Susan Wolf, however, much of what motivates us does not comfortably fit into this scheme. Often we act neither for our own sake nor out of duty or an impersonal concern for the world. Rather, we act out of love for objects that we rightly perceive as worthy of love--and it is these (...) actions that give meaning to our lives. Wolf makes a compelling case that, along with happiness and morality, this kind of meaningfulness constitutes a distinctive dimension of a good life. Written in a lively and engaging style, and full of provocative examples, Meaning in Life and Why It Matters is a profound and original reflection on a subject of permanent human concern. (shrink)

In Meaning in Life (2013, Oxford University Press), Thaddeus Metz presents a robust and innovative naturalistic account of what makes an individual’s life objectively meaningful. Metz discusses six existing arguments for purpose theory of meaning in life and offers objections to each of these arguments. Purpose theory is “the view that one’s life is meaningful just insofar as one fulfills a purpose that God has assigned to one” (Metz, 2013a, p. 80). Metz also proposes a novel argument to undermine purpose (...) theory by showing that it is inconsistent with the best argument for a God-centered theory of meaning. He argues that an infinite, immutable, simple, atemporal being could not be purposive or active. I aim to defend purpose theory against Metz’s arguments and objections by arguing that Metz’s novel argument against purpose theory fails. I argue that God need not have all these properties and that having these properties does not entail that God cannot be purposive or active. I also provide a new argument for purpose theory that addresses the concerns and inconsistencies that Metz finds with current versions of purpose theory. I conclude that purpose theory is not undermined. (shrink)