- Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications.John MacFarlane - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The Practical Origins of Ideas: Genealogy as Conceptual Reverse-Engineering (Open Access).Matthieu Queloz - 2021 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The Ethics of Conceptualization: Tailoring Thought and Language to Need.Matthieu Queloz - 2025 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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When Does Evidence Suffice for Conviction?Martin Smith - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1193-1218.details
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Debunking arguments.Daniel Z. Korman - 2019 - Philosophy Compass 14 (12):e12638.details
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(2 other versions)Decision theory as philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (4):549-577.details
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Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology.Annalisa Coliva - 2015 - London, England: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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Unreasonable Knowledge.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):1-21.details
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Interpretation psychologized.Alvin I. Goldman - 1989 - Mind and Language 4 (3):161-85.details
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Knowledge before belief.Jonathan Phillips, Wesley Buckwalter, Fiery Cushman, Ori Friedman, Alia Martin, John Turri, Laurie Santos & Joshua Knobe - 2021 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 44:e140.details
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(1 other version)Reliabilist Epistemology.Alvin Goldman & Bob Beddor - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Self-Knowledge.Brie Gertler - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)Foundationalist Theories of Epistemic Justification.Richard Fumerton & Ali Hasan - 2022 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)What is the Benacerraf Problem?Justin Clarke-Doane - 2017 - In Fabrice Pataut Jody Azzouni, Paul Benacerraf Justin Clarke-Doane, Jacques Dubucs Sébastien Gandon, Brice Halimi Jon Perez Laraudogoitia, Mary Leng Ana Leon-Mejia, Antonio Leon-Sanchez Marco Panza, Fabrice Pataut Philippe de Rouilhan & Andrea Sereni Stuart Shapiro, New Perspectives on the Philosophy of Paul Benacerraf: Truth, Objects, Infinity (Fabrice Pataut, Editor). Springer.details
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Against Minimalist Responses to Moral Debunking Arguments.Daniel Z. Korman & Dustin Locke - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15:309-332.details
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Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy of Franz Brentano.Barry Smith - 1994 - Chicago: Open Court.details
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Agents’ Abilities.Romy Jaster - 2020 - Berlin, New York: De Gruyter.details
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Free will.Timothy O'Connor & Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Anti-luck epistemology.Duncan Pritchard - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):277-297.details
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The legend of the justified true belief analysis.Julien Dutant - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):95-145.details
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First-Order Modal Logic.Melvin Fitting & Richard L. Mendelsohn - 1998 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Kluwer Academic Publishers.details
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The plurality of bayesian measures of confirmation and the problem of measure sensitivity.Branden Fitelson - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):378.details
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Rational Self-Doubt and the Failure of Closure.Joshua Schechter - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):428-452.details
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Theory of inquiry.Christoph Kelp - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (2):359-384.details
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What Is Justified Group Belief.Jennifer Lackey - 2016 - Philosophical Review 125 (3):341-396.details
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The lottery paradox, knowledge, and rationality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):373-409.details
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The ontology of epistemic reasons.John Turri - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):490-512.details
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Knowledge and Legal Proof.Sarah Moss - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.details
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Impossible Worlds.Franz Berto & Mark Jago - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge is Believing Something Because It's True.Tomas Bogardus & Will Perrin - 2022 - Episteme 19 (2):178-196.details
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(1 other version)Does Evolutionary Psychology Show That Normativity Is Mind-Dependent?Selim Berker - 2014 - In Justin D'Arms Daniel Jacobson, Moral Psychology and Human Agency: Essays on the New Science of Ethics. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 215-252.details
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(2 other versions)Contrastive knowledge.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne, Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 235.details
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Understanding Philosophy.Michael Hannon & James Nguyen - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Responsibility for Killer Robots.Johannes Himmelreich - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (3):731-747.details
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Modal Objectivity.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2017 - Noûs 53 (2):266-295.details
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Consciousness and welfare subjectivity.Gwen Bradford - 2022 - Noûs 57 (4):905-921.details
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Hyperintensionality and Overfitting.Francesco Berto - 2024 - Synthese 203:117.details
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Intrinsic vs. extrinsic value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Self-made People.David Mark Kovacs - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1071-1099.details
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A Fission Problem for Person-Affecting Views.Elliott Thornley - forthcoming - Ergo.details
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Debunking Arguments in Metaethics and Metaphysics.Daniel Z. Korman - 2019 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Brian P. McLaughlin, Metaphysics and Cognitive Science. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 337-363.details
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Cognitive Penetration and the Epistemology of Perception.Nicholas Silins - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (1):24-42.details
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Sensitivity, safety, and impossible worlds.Guido Melchior - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):713-729.details
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Knowledge and credit.Jennifer Lackey - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):27 - 42.details
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(2 other versions)The Modal Account of Luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (4-5):594-619.details
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(2 other versions)Moral Philosophy as Applied Science.Michael Ruse & Edward O. Wilson - 1986 - Philosophy 61 (236):173-192.details
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What is philosophical progress?Finnur Dellsén, Tina Firing, Insa Lawler & James Norton - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):663-693.details
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(1 other version)Respect.Robin S. Dillon - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Degrees of Epistemic Criticizability.Cameron Boult - 2024 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (2):431-452.details
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Debunking and Dispensability.Justin Clarke-Doane - 2016 - In Uri D. Leibowitz & Neil Sinclair, Explanation in Ethics and Mathematics: Debunking and Dispensability. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press UK.details
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