Should we grant a fresh start to those who come to regret their past lifestyle choices? A negative response to this question can be located in the luck egalitarian literature. As a responsibility-sensitive theory of justice, luck egalitarianism considers it just that people’s relative positions reflect their past choices, including those they regret. In a recent article, Vansteenkiste, Devooght and Schokkaert argue against the luck egalitarian view, maintaining instead that those who regret their past choices in health are disadvantaged in (...) a relevant way and should receive compensation. Employing the ideal that people should be made equal as measured by equivalent resources, they purport to show the fairness of such an arrangement through a hypothetical scenario. Relaxing the implicit assumptions of this scenario brings forth several unattractive consequences of the fresh-start idea. The main problem is that in striving to ensure that people’s past choices do not affect their own opportunities, the authors must accept that these choices put heavy strains on the opportunities available to other people. Furthermore, the luck egalitarian position is more compelling than they admit. (shrink)

In this stimulating work of political philosophy, acclaimed philosopher G. A. Cohen sets out to rescue the egalitarian thesis that in a society in which distributive justice prevails, peopleâes material prospects are roughly equal. Arguing against the Rawlsian version of a just society, Cohen demonstrates that distributive justice does not tolerate deep inequality. In the course of providing a deep and sophisticated critique of Rawlsâes theory of justice, Cohen demonstrates that questions of distributive justice arise not only for the state (...) but also for people in their daily lives. The right rules for the macro scale of public institutions and policies also apply, with suitable adjustments, to the micro level of individual decision-making. Cohen also charges Rawlsâes constructivism with systematically conflating the concept of justice with other concepts. Within the Rawlsian architectonic, justice is not distinguished either from other values or from optimal rules of social regulation. The elimination of those conflations brings justice closer to equality. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII Coda Appendix Acknowledgements.