This article analyzes the analogy made between Intellectus Agens and light, used by Aristotle in De Anima III, 5, commented by Aquinas. The investigation focuses on St. Thomas commentary, mainly on the limits of such analogy. It is shown how Thomas Aquinas is forced, in order to avoid the divinization of the Intellectus Agens, to bring a neoplatonic element to the discussion, incompatible with the Aristotelian spirit. References to the optic theories of Aristotle and Aquinas are made. It is discussed (...) what it means to say that the Intellectus Agens is an act. Finally, it is shown why does the nature of the Intellectus Agens demand an intervention of the Separate Substances. The discussion focuses on the Sententia super De anima, and recurs to other works, mainly: Quaestiones disputatae De Anima, Summa Contra Gentiles, Summa Theologiae, De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas and De substantiis separatis ad fratrem Reginaldum. /// O presente artigo analisa a analogia entre o Intellectus Agens e a luz, analogia essa utilizada por Aristóteles em De anima iii, 5 e comentada por S. Tomás de Aquino. O estudo centra-se no comentário de S. Tomás, insistindo de modo particular nos limites dessa analogia. Em particular, mostra-se de que modo o Aquinate se vê obrigado, para evitar a divinização do Intellectus Agens, a introduzir um elemento neoplatónico, incompatível com o espírito aristotélico. O artigo refere as teorias ópticas de Aristóteles e de S. Tomás. Depois analisa o que significa o Intellectus Agens como acto. Finalmente, mostra por que razão a natureza do Intellectus Agens exige a intervenção das Substâncias Separadas. A discussão está centrada no Sententiae super De anima, mas recorre também a obras como as Quaestiones disputatae De Anima, a Summa Contra Gentiles, a Summa Theologiae, De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas e De substantiis separatis ad fratrem Reginaldum. (shrink)

Anyone who comes to read some of Aquinas' works and at the same time looks around for modern discussions of them will be struck by two things: first, the greater part of the latter is the product of American and European Catholic neo-scholasticism; and second, that, with a few distinguished exceptions,1 what is contributed by writers of the analytical tradition is often a blend of uninformed generalizations and some suspicion that what Aquinas presents is not so much independent philosophy as (...) propaganda for the cause of Christian theology. (shrink)

Over the years I have written a number of articles critiquing Transcendental Thomism both from philosophical and from textual points of view. In the course of these articles, I have made comments on Bernard J. F. Lonergan’s epistemology. These comments have caught the eye of Jeremy D. Wilkins, and have provoked his article, “A Dialectic of ‘Thomist’ Realisms: John Knasas and Bernard Lonergan.” The violence of Wilkins’s reaction leads me to believe that despite the passing nature of my comments, they (...) are sufficiently incisive to have cut a nerve. Nevertheless, it is my opinion that no reader of Wilkins would come away with any accurate grasp of my understanding of Lonergan, my reasons for it, and the precise point of contention between us. So, both for the record and the benefit of calm discussion of this influential figure, I would like to provide my hermeneutic of Lonergan and to pinpoint my trouble with him. To this end, I will repeat some descriptions of Lonergan from a recently published monograph, Being and Some Twentieth-Century Thomists (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), and then address the criticisms of Wilkins. (shrink)