Jaegwon Kim is one of the most preeminent and most influential contributors to the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. This collection of essays presents the core of his work on supervenience and mind with two sets of postscripts especially written for the book. The essays focus on such issues as the nature of causation and events, what dependency relations other than causal relations connect facts and events, the analysis of supervenience, and the mind-body problem. A central problem in the philosophy (...) of mind is the problem of explaining how the mind can causally influence bodily processes. Professor Kim explores this problem in detail, criticizes the nonreductionist solution of it, and offers a modified reductionist solution of his own. Both professional philosophers and their graduate students will find this an invaluable collection. (shrink)

§0. Introduction. In [16], Barwise described his graduate study at Stanford. He told of his interactions with Kreisel and Scott, and said how he chose Feferman as his advisor. He began working on admissible fragments of infinitary logic after reading and giving seminar talks on two Ph.D. theses which had recently been completed: that of Lopez-Escobar, at Berkeley, on infinitary logic [46], and that of Platek [58], at Stanford, on admissible sets.Barwise's work on infinitary logic and admissible sets is described (...) in his thesis [4], the book [13], and papers [5]—[16]. We do not try to give a systematic review of these papers. Instead, our goal is to give a coherent introduction to infinitary logic and admissible sets. We describe results of Barwise, of course, because he did so much. In addition, we mention some more recent work, to indicate the current importance of Barwise's ideas. Many of the central results are stated without proof, but occasionally we sketch a proof, to indicate how the ideas fit together.Chapters 1 and 2 describe infinitary logic and admissible sets at the time Barwise began his work, circa 1965. From Chapter 3 on, we survey the developments that took place after Barwise appeared on the scene.§1. Background on infinitary logic. In this chapter, we describe the situation in infinitary logic at the time that Barwise began his work. We need some terminology. By a vocabulary, we mean a set L of constant symbols, and relation and operation symbols with finitely many argument places. As usual, by an L-structureM, we mean a universe set M with an interpretation for each symbol of L. (shrink)

The discussion of supervenience is replete with the use of in?nitary logical operations. For instance, one may often ?nd a supervenient property that corresponds to an in?nite collection of supervenience-base properties, and then ask about the in?nite disjunction of all those base properties. This is crucial to a well-known argument of Kim (1984) that supervenience comes nearer to reduction than many non-reductive physicalists suppose. It also appears in recent discussions such as Jackson (1998).

Supervenience in most of its guises entails necessary coextension. Thus theoretical supervenience entails nomically necessary coextension. Kim's result, thus strengthened, has yet to hit home. I suspect that many supervenience enthusiasts would cool at necessary coextension: they didn't mean to be saying anything quite so strong. Furthermore, nomically necessary coextension can be a good reason for property identification, leading to reducibility in principle. This again is more than many supervenience theorists bargained for. They wanted supervenience without reducibility. It is not (...) always available for this mediating role. (shrink)