Both critique and an appropriation of a large and diverse body of work, Home and Beyond is a major contribution to contemporary Husserl scholarship.

This book offers new answers to this persistent philosophical question by defining the question in specifically Husserlian terms and by means of a careful examination of Husserl’s later texts, including the unpublished Nachlass.

Science in a new sense arises in the first instance from Plato's establishing of logic, as a place for exploring the essential requirements of "genuine" ...

__Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity __analyzes the transcendental relevance of intersubjectivity and argues that an intersubjective transformation of transcendental philosophy can already be found in phenomenology, especially in Husserl. Husserl eventually came to believe that an analysis of transcendental intersubjectivity was a _conditio sine qua non_ for a phenomenological philosophy. Drawing on both published and unpublished manuscripts, Dan Zahavi examines Husserl's reasons for this conviction and delivers a detailed analysis of his radical and complex concept of intersubjectivity, showing that precisely his (...) reflections on transcendental intersubjectivity are capable of clarifying the core-concepts of phenomenology, thus making possible a new understanding of Husserl’s philosophy. Against this background the book compares his view with the approaches to intersubjectivity found in Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, and it then attempts to establish to what extent the phenomenological approach can contribute to the current discussion of intersubjectivity. This is achieved through a systematic confrontation with the language-pragmatical positions of Apel and Habermas. (shrink)

In his paper on transcendental intersubjectivity in Husserl, which refers mainly to the Fifth Cartesian Meditation, Schutz (1966a) marks out four stages in Husserl's argument and finds what are for him insurmountable problems in each stage. These stages are: (1) isolation of the primordial world of one's peculiar ownness by means of a further epoche; (2) apperception of the other via pairing; (3) constitution of objective, intersubjective Nature; (4) constitution of higher forms of community. Because of the problems Schutz encounters (...) in each of these stages, he concludes that Husserl's theory is unacceptable (Schutz, 1966a, p.82). Having already proved that it is unacceptable, he now explains why these problems arise in Husserl's theory. Intersubjectivity, says Schutz, is "a datum of the life-world," (1966a, p.82) not a transcendental problem. In other words, intersubjectivity must be dealt with as a problem of the life-world of the natural attitude, not a "problem of constitution which can be solved within the transcendental sphere." (Schutz, 1966a, p.82). There is no such thing as transcendental intersubjectivity, if by that is meant intersubjectivity of a plurality of transcendental egos. The role of transcendental phenomenology in the problem of intersubjectivity is to explicate within the transcendental reduction the sense: "intersubjectivity in the life-world." Husserl was diverted from this proper role of phenomenology--in his words, to "explicate the sense which this world has for us prior to all philosophy" (trans. and quoted by Schutz from "Cartesianische Meditationen, para. 62, in fine," in Schutz, 1966a, p.82)--because of the unobtrusive transformation of sense of his concept of constitution from that of explication and clarification to "creation," in the sense of providing an ontology of the lifeworld. The fact that phenomenology is in principle incapable of doing this lies behind the failure of Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity (Schutz, 1966a, pp.83-84). Unlike Schutz, I will deal with this general issue explicitly in the context of the stages in Husserl's argument and Schutz's objections. It seems to me that Husserl does remain within the sphere of clarification of sense, but to do explication and clarification of certain "senses" results inevitably in doing a kind of ontology. (shrink)

The relationship of self, and self-awareness, and experience: exploring classical phenomenological analyses and their relevance to contemporary discussions in ...

This book offers a fresh look at Edmund Husserl’s philosophy as a nonfoundational approach to understanding the self as an embodied presence. Contrary to the conventional view of Husserl as carrying on the Cartesian tradition of seeking a trustworthy foundation for knowledge in the "pure" observations of a disembodied ego, James Mensch introduces us to the Husserl who, anticipating the later investigations of Merleau-Ponty, explored how the body functions to determine our self-presence, our freedom, and our sense of time. The (...) result is a concept of selfhood that allows us to see how consciousness’s arising from sensuous experiences follows from the temporal features of embodiment. From this understanding of what is crucial to Husserl’s phenomenology, the book draws the implications for language and ethics, comparing Husserl’s ideas with those of Derrida on language and with those of Heidegger and Levinas on responsibility. Paradoxically, it is these postmodernists who are shown to be extending the logic of foundationalism to its ultimate extreme, whereas Husserl can be seen as leading the way beyond modernity to a nonfoundational account of the self and its world. (shrink)

Le 27 avril 1938, Edmund HUSSERL, l'initiateur et principal representant du courant phenomenologique dans la philosophie contemporaine, mourut a Fribourg en Brisgau, age de pres de quatre-vingts ans. Depuis la parution de ses Logische Untersuchungen en 190~ 1901, le monde philosophique international avait suivi, avec UD interet toujours croissant, les exposes successifs et de plus en plus approfondis, que le maUre fribourgeois publiait sur les prin~ cipes de sa methode, dite pMnomenologique, sur les applications concretes de celle-ci aux problemes philosophiques (...) les plus divers, ainsi que sur la phenomenologie comme systeme philo­ sophique autonome et pour ainsi dire "autarchique". Ces publi­ cations, relativement peu nombreuses, mais fort remarquees des leur parution, furent etudiees avec le plus grand soin par les representants les plus autorises des differents courants de la pensee contemporaine. Les critiques, il va sans dire, ne manquerent point. On attira l'attention sur le caractere plutöt programmatique de ces etudes, sur la terminologie fort neuve, quelque peu arbitraire, parfois meme deroutante, dont se servait l'auteur, sur son pen­ chant prononce pour des distinctions subtiles et pour des defini­ tions minutieuses a l'exces, sur la difficulte de son style et les complications parfois inutiles de son expose, enfin et surtout -­ au moins depuis 1913 - sur le caractere audacieux de sa theorie de la reduction, presentee par lui avec une insistance toute par­ ticuliere comme le fondement dernier et indispensable de toute phenomenologie presente ou future. (shrink)

Paul Ricoeur was one of the foremost interpreters and translators of Edmund Husserl's philosophy. These nine essays present Ricoeur's interpretation of the most important of Husserl's writings, with emphasis on his philosophy of consciousness rather than his work in logic. In Ricoeur's philosophy, phenomenology and existentialism came of age and these essays provide an introduction to the Husserlian elements which most heavily influenced his own philosophical position.

If one interprets transcendental subjectivity as an isolated ego and in the spirit of the Kantian tradition ignores the whole task of establishing a transcendental community of subjects, then every chance of reaching a transcendental self- and world-knowledge is lost. Krisis (Ergänzung), 120.

Translation and Introduction by Fred Kersten Alfred Schutz’s lecture, “The Problem of Intersubjectivity in Husserl,” was read and discussed at the Husserl-Colloquium in Royaumont on April 28, 1957. The German text of the lecture appeared in Philosophische Rundschau: Eine Vierteljahrsschrift für philosophische Kritik, edited by Hans-Georg Gadamer and Helmut Kuhn, Vol. V, 1957, pp. 81ff. A translation of the lecture by Frederick Kersten in collaboration with Professors Aron Gurwitsch and Professor Thomas Luckmann was published in Alfred Schutz, Collected Papers, Volume (...) III, edited by Ilse Schutz and an Introduction by Aron Gurwitsch. (shrink)

In seinen ALogischen UntersuchungenA (1900/01) hatte Husserl die EigenstAndigkeit und IdealitAt logischer Gebilde gegenA1/4ber einem falschen Subjektivismus und Psychologismus geltend gemacht. Es ging ihm dabei nicht um die formale Logik selbst als solche, sondern um die BegrA1/4ndungsfunktion der Logik fA1/4r eine apriorische Wissenschaftslehre. Diese in den AIdeenA (1913) weitergefA1/4hrte Konstitutionsproblematik wird nun in dem Werk A1/4ber AFormale und transzendentale LogikA im Sinne einer AKritik der logischen VernunftA vertieft und durch den Aoebergang von der formalen zur transzendentalen Logik begrifflich entschiedener gefaAt.

"This book contains phenomenological analyses of each dimension of temporalizing consciousness, turning primarily to Husserl's later manuscripts on time.

Die Lebenswelt als personale Welt der Praxis und Welt der endlichen Erkenntnisinteressen. 7. Die Welt als Erwerb.