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  1. Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
    In the international bestseller, Thinking, Fast and Slow, Daniel Kahneman, the renowned psychologist and winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics, takes us on a groundbreaking tour of the mind and explains the two systems that drive the way we think. System 1 is fast, intuitive, and emotional; System 2 is slower, more deliberative, and more logical. The impact of overconfidence on corporate strategies, the difficulties of predicting what will make us happy in the future, the profound effect of cognitive (...)
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  • Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: The conjunction fallacy in probability judgment.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1983 - Psychological Review 90 (4):293-315.
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  • Availability: A heuristic for judging frequency and probability.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1973 - Cognitive Psychology 5 (2):207-232.
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  • (1 other version)Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1974 - Science 185 (4157):1124-1131.
    This article described three heuristics that are employed in making judgements under uncertainty: representativeness, which is usually employed when people are asked to judge the probability that an object or event A belongs to class or process B; availability of instances or scenarios, which is often employed when people are asked to assess the frequency of a class or the plausibility of a particular development; and adjustment from an anchor, which is usually employed in numerical prediction when a relevant value (...)
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  • Reason in the Balance: An Inquiry Approach to Critical Thinking.Sharon Bailin & Mark Battersby - 2016 - Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company. Edited by Mark Battersby.
    Unlike most texts in critical thinking, _Reason in the Balance_ focuses broadly on the practice of critical inquiry, the process of carefully examining an issue in order to come to a reasoned judgment. Although analysis and critique of individual arguments have an important role to play, this text goes beyond that dimension to emphasize the various aspects that go into the practice of inquiry, including identifying issues and relevant contexts, understanding competing cases, and making a comparative judgment._ Distinctive Features of (...)
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  • Fallacy Identification in a Dialectical Approach to Teaching Critical Thinking.Mark Battersby, Sharon Bailin & Jan Albert van Laar - 2015 - Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 30 (1):9-16.
    The dialectical approach to teaching critical thinking is centred on a comparative evaluation of contending arguments, so that generally the strength of an argument for a position can only be assessed in the context of this dialectic. The identification of fallacies, though important, plays only a preliminary role in the evaluation to individual arguments. Our approach to fallacy identification and analysis sees fallacies as argument patterns whose persuasive power is disproportionate to their probative value.
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  • Reasoning.Peter C. Wason - 1966 - In New Horizons in Psychology. Penguin Books. pp. 135-151.
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  • Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky (eds.) - 1982 - Cambridge University Press.
    The thirty-five chapters in this book describe various judgmental heuristics and the biases they produce, not only in laboratory experiments but in important...
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  • Why Fallacies Appear to be Better Arguments Than They Are.Douglas Walton - 2010 - Informal Logic 30 (2):159-184.
    This paper offers a solution to the problem of understanding how a fallacious argument can be deceptive by “seeming to be valid”, or (better) appearing to be a better argument of its kind than it really is. The explanation of how fallacies are deceptive is based on heuristics and paraschemes. Heuristics are fast and frugal shortcuts to a solution to a problem that sometimes jump to a conclusion that is not justified. In fallacious instances, according to the theory proposed, this (...)
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  • Dual-processing accounts of reasoning, judgment, and social cognition.Jonathan Evans - 2008 - Annu.Rev.Psychol 59:255-278.
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