In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Semantics in Aristotle’s OrganonMark WheelerVarious contemporary commentators have made conflicting claims about Aristotle’s theory of meaning. Some have claimed that he has a denotational theory of meaning, others that he has an ideational theory of meaning, and yet others that he has confused the denotational and ideational aspects of meaning.1 Recently, Kretzmann and Irwin have presented arguments which, taken together, imply that Aristotle has no theory of meaning.2I think (...) that all of these views are mistaken. Aristotle, I shall argue, is working with a rather sophisticated and coherent theory of meaning incorporating both denotational and ideational components. In section 1, I reconstruct the general theory of linguistic signification presented in De Interpretatione [End Page 191] 16a3–9, a passage which has been the cornerstone of both ancient and contemporary interpretations of Aristotle’s theory of meaning. I develop an interpretation different in important respects from both the standard view and recent alternatives. Aristotle’s general theory emerges as a remarkably flexible account of the relations among linguistic signs, mental images, and real things.3 In section 2, I recast Aristotle’s general theory in contemporary semantic terminology and respond to various arguments purporting to show that Aristotle hasn’t a theory of meaning as these are now understood.1. ARISTOTLE’S GENERAL THEORY OF LINGUISTIC SIGNIFICATIONIn the present section, I develop an interpretation of Aristotle’s explicit, albeit terse, sketch at De Interpretatione 16a3–9 of the fundamental semiotic relations among written marks, spoken sounds, affections of the soul, and things in the world. In so doing, I consider and reject an argument according to which the passage either doesn’t present a general theory of linguistic signification or, if it does, the theory presented is fatally flawed.4 The results of this section are very general but important enough to warrant isolated attention. I argue that, given Int. 16a3–9, Aristotle is committed to the following claims: (1) Written marks are signs of spoken sounds; (2) spoken sounds are, by their very nature, signs of mental images; (3) spoken sounds are, by convention, signs of mental images; (4) the mental images signified by spoken sounds are, by their very nature, signs of real perceptible or intelligible qualities; and (5) the mental images signified by spoken sounds are, by their very nature, signs of real things.5 [End Page 192]Our passage has been the subject of extensive study. Kretzmann has called it “the most influential text in the history of semantics” (3). It is worth quoting in full:Now spoken sounds [ϕωναί] are symbols [σύμβολα] of affections in the soul [ἐν τῇ Ψυχῇ παθημάτων], and written marks [γϱαϕὀμενα] symbols of spoken sounds. And just as written marks [γϱάμματα] are not the same [τά αὐτά] for all men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place [πϱώτων] signs [σημει̑α] of—affections of the soul [παθἡματα τῆς Ψυχῆς]—are the same for all; and what these affections are likenesses [ὁμοιώματα] of—real things [πϱάγματα]—are also the same. These matters have been discussed in the work on the soul and do not belong to the present subject.6Traditionally, the passage is taken to present a sketch of Aristotle’s general theory of meaning.7 Standard interpretations run roughly as follows. First, Aristotle lays down three general semantic principles: Written marks signify spoken sounds; spoken sounds signify affections in the soul; and affections in the soul represent things in the world. These principles establish the basic semiotic relations among language, thought, and reality. Second, Aristotle implies (cf. Int. 16a6) that spoken sounds signify in the first place affections in the soul and that, by means of this primary significance, spoken sounds signify in the second place real things.8 I shall call this the ‘Semantic Primacy Thesis. ‘ Third, the affections in the soul with which Aristotle is concerned are thoughts [νοἠματα], and he refers us to book III, chapters 7–8 of the De Anima for further discussion of the nature of these. Lastly, Aristotle is developing a strictly conventionalist theory of linguistic meaning, according to which although all human beings have access to the same affections in the soul and the same real things, different written and spoken languages are used by different communities to signify... (shrink)

Avicenna (d. 1037) and Tūsī (d. 1274) have different doctrines on the contradiction and conversion of the absolute proposition. Following Avicenna's presentation of the doctrine in Pointers and reminders, and comparing it with what is given in Tūsī's commentary, allow us to pinpoint a major reason why Avicenna and Tūsī have different treatments of the modal syllogistic. Further comparison shows that the syllogistic system Rescher described in his research on Arabic logic more nearly fits Tūsī than Avicenna. This in turn (...) has consequences for analysing Avicenna's logic, and for writing the history of a fascinating period of change and diversity in the discipline in the medieval Islamic world. (shrink)

La bibliographie repertorie les livres et articles publies entre 1977 et 1994 portant sur la logique et la grammaire depuis Boece jusqu'a la fin du XVIIe siecle. L'inclusion des auteurs comme Pascal, Descartes, Arnauld, Leibniz et Locke est justifiee tant par le developpement des etudes en ce domaine que par l'extension chronologique de ces memes etudes. La recherche des sources amene les modernistes a s'interesser de plus en plus aux auteurs medievaux, tandis que certains medievistes cherchent a savoir quelle fut (...) la fortune des textes qu'ils etudient. En annexe un supplement a la bibliographie de Earline Jennifer Ashworth est propose. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Semantics in Aristotle’s OrganonMark WheelerVarious contemporary commentators have made conflicting claims about Aristotle’s theory of meaning. Some have claimed that he has a denotational theory of meaning, others that he has an ideational theory of meaning, and yet others that he has confused the denotational and ideational aspects of meaning.1 Recently, Kretzmann and Irwin have presented arguments which, taken together, imply that Aristotle has no theory of meaning.2I think (...) that all of these views are mistaken. Aristotle, I shall argue, is working with a rather sophisticated and coherent theory of meaning incorporating both denotational and ideational components. In section 1, I reconstruct the general theory of linguistic signification presented in De Interpretatione [End Page 191] 16a3–9, a passage which has been the cornerstone of both ancient and contemporary interpretations of Aristotle’s theory of meaning. I develop an interpretation different in important respects from both the standard view and recent alternatives. Aristotle’s general theory emerges as a remarkably flexible account of the relations among linguistic signs, mental images, and real things.3 In section 2, I recast Aristotle’s general theory in contemporary semantic terminology and respond to various arguments purporting to show that Aristotle hasn’t a theory of meaning as these are now understood.1. ARISTOTLE’S GENERAL THEORY OF LINGUISTIC SIGNIFICATIONIn the present section, I develop an interpretation of Aristotle’s explicit, albeit terse, sketch at De Interpretatione 16a3–9 of the fundamental semiotic relations among written marks, spoken sounds, affections of the soul, and things in the world. In so doing, I consider and reject an argument according to which the passage either doesn’t present a general theory of linguistic signification or, if it does, the theory presented is fatally flawed.4 The results of this section are very general but important enough to warrant isolated attention. I argue that, given Int. 16a3–9, Aristotle is committed to the following claims: (1) Written marks are signs of spoken sounds; (2) spoken sounds are, by their very nature, signs of mental images; (3) spoken sounds are, by convention, signs of mental images; (4) the mental images signified by spoken sounds are, by their very nature, signs of real perceptible or intelligible qualities; and (5) the mental images signified by spoken sounds are, by their very nature, signs of real things.5 [End Page 192]Our passage has been the subject of extensive study. Kretzmann has called it “the most influential text in the history of semantics” (3). It is worth quoting in full:Now spoken sounds [ϕωναί] are symbols [σύμβολα] of affections in the soul [ἐν τῇ Ψυχῇ παθημάτων], and written marks [γϱαϕὀμενα] symbols of spoken sounds. And just as written marks [γϱάμματα] are not the same [τά αὐτά] for all men, neither are spoken sounds. But what these are in the first place [πϱώτων] signs [σημει̑α] of—affections of the soul [παθἡματα τῆς Ψυχῆς]—are the same for all; and what these affections are likenesses [ὁμοιώματα] of—real things [πϱάγματα]—are also the same. These matters have been discussed in the work on the soul and do not belong to the present subject.6Traditionally, the passage is taken to present a sketch of Aristotle’s general theory of meaning.7 Standard interpretations run roughly as follows. First, Aristotle lays down three general semantic principles: Written marks signify spoken sounds; spoken sounds signify affections in the soul; and affections in the soul represent things in the world. These principles establish the basic semiotic relations among language, thought, and reality. Second, Aristotle implies (cf. Int. 16a6) that spoken sounds signify in the first place affections in the soul and that, by means of this primary significance, spoken sounds signify in the second place real things.8 I shall call this the ‘Semantic Primacy Thesis. ‘ Third, the affections in the soul with which Aristotle is concerned are thoughts [νοἠματα], and he refers us to book III, chapters 7–8 of the De Anima for further discussion of the nature of these. Lastly, Aristotle is developing a strictly conventionalist theory of linguistic meaning, according to which although all human beings have access to the same affections in the soul and the same real things, different written and spoken languages are used by different communities to signify... (shrink)

Al comparar la visión de Avicena y Kant sobre la imaginación, encontramos una sorprendente congruencia en sus doctrinas. Las doctrinas de Kant sobre la síntesis de la imaginación en su Deducción Trascendental tiene notables similitudes con la visión de Avicena. Tanto para Avicena como para Kant, la imaginación sirve para conectar lo fenoménico con lo nouménico. Al menos esta comparación tiene el doble uso de colocar las doctrinas de Kant en el contexto de la tradición aristotélica y de iluminar la (...) importancia moderna que tiene el pensamiento de Avicena. Dado que el pensamiento de Kant nos es más familiar que el de Avicena, podemos usar a Kant también para ayudar a comprender las tesis de Avicena. Por otro lado, esta comparación puede ayudar a sostener la tesis de que la comprensión de Kant yace en gran medida en sus raíces medievales y post-medievales —tal como ocurre con Copérnico, que, en su propia “Revolución Copernicana”, seguía ciertas tradiciones anteriores. (shrink)

In Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) the meaning of a word is represented as a vector in a high‐dimensional semantic space. Different meanings of a word or different senses of a word are not distinguished. Instead, word senses are appropriately modified as the word is used in different contexts. In N‐VP sentences, the precise meaning of the verb phrase depends on the noun it is combined with. An algorithm is described to adjust the meaning of a predicate as it is applied (...) to different arguments. In forming a sentence meaning, not all features of a predicate are combined with the features of the argument, but only those that are appropriate to the argument. Hence, a different “sense” of a predicate emerges every time it is used in a different context. This predication algorithm is explored in the context of four different semantic problems: metaphor interpretation, causal inferences, similarity judgments, and homonym disambiguation. (shrink)

On several critical occasions in his philosophical and theological musings, we find Abelard having recourse to what is at heart the same philosophical simile -- in one instance drawing comparison to a stone statue, in another to a bronze statue, in a third to a wax image. The common point of comparison is obvious; each of these examples gives us a case where some physical material has come to receive some manner of shape. The doctrine illustrated by these means is (...) not, as might be supposed, a conventional Aristotelian form/matter metaphysics. (shrink)