Consider the proposition, “Neither the motion of a body nor the action of a force affects space and time themselves”. We rejected this proposition when, in accepting the general theory of relativity, we accepted that the movement of a body or the action of a force affects the curvature of space-time. Compare the following proposition: “p and if and only if or ”. We think this is logically true; at least, most of us do. Some don’t, on empirical grounds—claiming that (...) we should interpret quantum mechanics as showing that the left-hand side can be true when the right-hand side is false. The idea is that the motions of bodies and actions of forces not only affect space-time relations, they also, as it were, affect logical relations as well. I think evidence from quantum mechanics—like empirical evidence generally—cannot possibly show that the equivalence fails to hold. I am convinced that I know a priori that p and if and only if or. My aim here is to explain the basis of this conviction. (shrink)

A discussion of George Bealer's conception and defense of rational intuition as a basis of philosophical knowledge, under three main heads: a) the phenomenology of intellectual intuition; b) the status of such intuition as a basic source of evidence, and the explanation of what gives it that status; and c) the defense of intuition against those who would reject it and exclude it on principle from the set of valid sources of evidence.

Johnathan Cohen's book provides a lucid and penetrating treatment of the fundamental issues of contemporary analytical philosophy. This field now spans a greater variety of topics and divergence of opinion than fifty years ago, and Cohen's book addresses the presuppositions implicit to it and the patterns of reasoning on which it relies.