In The Realm of Rights Judith Thomson provides a full-scale, systematic theory of human and social rights, bringing out what in general makes an attribution of ...

The subject of this paper, Excuses, is one not to be treated, but only to be introduced, within such limits. It is, or might be, the name of a whole branch, even a ramiculated branch, of philosophy, or at least of one fashion of philosophy. I shall try, therefore, first to state what the subject is, why it is worth studying, and how it may be studied, all this at a regrettably lofty level: and then I shall illustrate, in more (...) congenial but desultory detail, some of the methods to be used, together with their limitations, and some of the unexpected results to be expected and lessons to be learned. Much, of course, of the amusement, and of the instruction, comes in drawing the coverts of the microglot, in hounding down the minutiae, and to this I can do no more here than incite you. But I owe it to the subject to say, that it has long afforded me what philosophy is so often thought, and made, barren of -- the fun of discovery, the pleasures of co-operation, and the satisfaction of reaching agreement. (shrink)

Most of us are inclined to believe that blackmail is clearly immoral and are thus quite content that it be criminalized. Justifying this belief, however, turns out to be more of a problem than it might at first seem. In particular, it is difficult if not impossible to distinguish cases of blackmail from other hard economic transactions.

Most of us are inclined to believe that blackmail is clearly immoral and are thus quite content that it be criminalized. Justifying this belief, however, turns out to be more of a problem than it might at first seem. In particular, it is difficult if not impossible to distinguish cases of blackmail from other hard economic transactions.

This first volume in the four-volume series The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law focuses on the "harm principle," the commonsense view that prevention of harm to persons other than the perpetrator is a legitimate purpose of criminal legislation. Feinberg presents a detailed analysis of the concept and definition of harm and applies it to a host of practical and theoretical issues, showing how the harm principle must be interpreted if it is to be a plausible guide to the lawmaker.

This edition also reprints Kant's later Supplementary Explanations (1797), which was added to the second edition (1798).