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  1. (1 other version)The meaning of 'meaning'.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.
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  • (2 other versions)Individualism and the mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
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  • (4 other versions)Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Critica 17 (49):69-71.
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  • (4 other versions)Naming and Necessity.S. Kripke - 1972 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 45 (4):665-666.
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  • (2 other versions)Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description.Bertrand Russell - 1911 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 11:108--28.
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  • Afterthoughts.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 565-614.
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  • (2 other versions)Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description.Bertrand Russell - 1918 - In Mysticism and logic. Mineola, N.Y.: Dover Publications. pp. 152-167.
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  • Proper names and identifying descriptions.Keith S. Donnellan - 1970 - Synthese 21 (3-4):335 - 358.
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  • Is semantics possible?Hilary Putnam - 1970 - Metaphilosophy 1 (3):187–201.
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  • (1 other version)A puzzle about belief.Saul Aron Kripke - 1979 - In A. Margalit (ed.), Meaning and Use. Reidel. pp. 239--83.
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  • Context ex Machina.Kent Bach - 2004 - In Zoltan Gendler Szabo (ed.), Semantics Versus Pragmatics. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 15--44.
    Once upon a time it was assumed that speaking literally and directly is the norm and that speaking nonliterally or indirectly is the exception. The assumption was that normally what a speaker means can be read off of the meaning of the sentence he utters, and that departures from this, if not uncommon, are at least easily distinguished from normal utterances and explainable along Gricean lines. The departures were thought to be limited to obvious cases like figurative speech and conversational (...)
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  • Referring to artifacts.Hilary Kornblith - 1980 - Philosophical Review 89 (1):109-114.
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  • Putnam on artifacts.Stephen P. Schwartz - 1978 - Philosophical Review 87 (4):566-574.
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  • Natural kind terms.Stephen P. Schwartz - 1979 - Cognition 7 (3):301-315.
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  • Silent Reference.Stephen Neale - 2016 - In Gary Ostertag (ed.), Meanings and Other Things: Themes From the Work of Stephen Schiffer. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
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  • Natural kinds and nominal kinds.Stephen P. Schwartz - 1980 - Mind 89 (354):182-195.
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  • Against rigidity for natural kind terms.Stephen P. Schwartz - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 12):2957-2971.
    Rigid expressionism is the view that all natural kind terms and many other kind terms are rigid designators. Rigid expressionists embrace the ‘overgeneralization’ of rigidity, since they hold that not just natural kind terms but all unstructured kind terms are rigid designators. Unfortunately overgeneralization remains a defeating problem for rigid expressionism. It runs together natural kind terms and nominal kind terms in a way that enforces a false semantic uniformity. The Kripke/putnam view of natural kind terms minus the claim of (...)
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  • Formal semantics and natural kind terms.Stephen P. Schwartz - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 38 (2):189-98.
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  • How to Refer to Artifacts.Hilary Kornblith - 2007 - In Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (eds.), Creations of the Mind: Theories of Artifacts and Their Representaion. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 138-149.
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  • Introduction.Steven Schwartz - 1977 - In Stephen P. Schwartz (ed.), Naming, necessity, and natural kinds. Ithaca [N.Y.]: Cornell University Press. pp. 13-41.
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  • Are natural kind terms special?Åsa Wikforss - 2010 - In Helen Beebee & Nigel Sabbarton-Leary (eds.), The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds. New York: Routledge.
    It is commonly assumed that natural kind terms constitute a distinct semantic category. This idea emerged during the 1970's following Kripke's and Putnam's well-known remarks on natural kind terms. The idea has stayed with us, although it is now recognized that the issues are considerably more complex than initially thought. Thus, it has become clear that much of Kripke's and Putnam's discussions were based on rather simplified views of natural kinds. It also turns out that the semantic issues are less (...)
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  • Pencils Have a Point: Against General Externalism About Artifactual Words.Diego Marconi - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (3):497-513.
    Externalism about artifactual words requires that (a) members of an artifactual word’s extension share a common nature, i.e. a set of necessary features, and (b) that possession of such features determines the word’s extension independently of whether the linguistic community is aware of them (ignorance) or can accurately describe them (error). However, many common artifactual words appear to be so used that features that are universally shared among members of their extensions are hard to come by, and even fewer can (...)
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  • General terms as designators : a defence of the view.Genoveva Martí & José Martínez-Fernández - 2010 - In Helen Beebee & Nigel Sabbarton-Leary (eds.), The Semantics and Metaphysics of Natural Kinds. New York: Routledge. pp. 46--63.
    We argue that the view that kind terms designate universals does not fall prey to the trivialization problem. We also argue that the view can respond to other challenges, specifically, the claims that an adequate notion of rigidity for kind terms must: (a) classify natural kind terms as rigid and classify many other general terms as non-rigid and (b) account for the necessity of true theoretical identifications involving rigid terms.
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  • Realism, naturalism, and culturally generated kinds.Crawford L. Elder - 1989 - Philosophical Quarterly 39 (157):425-444.
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  • Nondescriptionality and natural kind terms.Barbara Abbott - 1989 - Linguistics and Philosophy 12 (3):269 - 291.
    The phrase "natural kind term" has come into the linguistic and philosophical literature in connection with well-known work of Kripke (1972) and Putnam (1970, 1975a). I use that phrase here in the sense it has acquired from those and subseqnent works on related topics. This is not the transparent sense of the phrase. That is, if I am right in what follows there are words for kinds of things existing in nature which are not natural kind terms in the current (...)
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  • Schwartz on reference.James A. Nelson - 1982 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 20 (3):359-365.
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  • Reply to Kornblith and Nelson.Stephen P. Schwartz - 1983 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 21 (3):475-479.
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  • Believe it or not: It is a puzzle. Rejoinder to Suppes.Joseph Almog - 1984 - Synthese 58 (1):51 - 61.
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