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Hilary Kornblith
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
  1.  75
    "What Does Logic Have to Do with Justified Belief? Why Doxastic Justification is Fundmanetal".Hilary Kornblith - forthcoming - In Luis R. G. Oliveira & Paul Silva Jr (eds.), Propositional and Doxastic Justification. Routledge.
    As George Boole saw it, the laws of logic are the laws of thought, and by this he meant, not that human thought is actually governed by the laws of logic, but, rather, that it should be. Boole’s view that the laws of logic have normative implications for how we ought to think is anything but an outlier. The idea that violating the laws of logic involves epistemic impropriety has seemed to many to be just obvious. It has seemed especially (...)
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  2. Testimony, Memory and the Limits of the a Priori.David Christensen & Hilary Kornblith - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 86 (1):1-20.
    A number of philosophers, from Thomas Reid1 through C. A. J. Coady2, have argued that one is justified in relying on the testimony of others, and furthermore, that this should be taken as a basic epistemic presumption. If such a general presumption were not ultimately dependent on evidence for the reliability of other people, the ground for this presumption would be a priori. Such a presumption would then have a status like that which Roderick Chisholm claims for the epistemic principle (...)
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  3.  65
    Epistemic Justification and Reflection. [REVIEW]Hilary Kornblith - forthcoming - Analysis.
    Smithies presents an account of justification that ties it to an idealized view of reflection. I argue that no such account can work. More than this, I argue that the kind of idealization which Smithies offers loses contact with the very phenomenon of reflection which he intends to illuminate. I also discuss how Smithies's view bears on the internalism/externalism controversy.
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  4.  50
    Where Does Moral Knowledge Come From? [REVIEW]Hilary Kornblith - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Sarah McGrath offers an account of moral knowledge which, she says, is "economical," that is, it draws on no subject-matter specific mental faculty. In order to defend such a claim, I argue, more attention needs to be paid to the available psychological literature. That literature is far from definitive on this question, but, I suggest, there is some real reason to think that an extravagant account of moral knowledge, one which posits a subject-matter specific moral faculty, may account for the (...)
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  5.  39
    Against Strawsonian Epistemology.Hilary Kornblith - forthcoming - In Reason, Bias, and Inquiry: New Perspectives from the Crossroads of Epistemology and Psychology. New York, NY, USA:
    A number of philosophers have found inspiration for a distinctive approach to a wide range of epistemological issues in P. F. Strawson’s classic essay, “Freedom and Resentment.” These Strawsonian epistemologists, as I call them, argue that the epistemology of testimony, self-knowledge, promising, and resolving is fundamentally different in kind from the epistemology of perception or inference. We should not see properly formed belief on these topics as evidence-based, for such an objective perspective, in such cases, results in a kind of (...)
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