Winner of the 1975 National Book Award, this brilliant and widely acclaimed book is a powerful philosophical challenge to the most widely held political and social positions of our age--liberal, socialist, and conservative.

This paper delves into the nature of intellectual property rights in aesthetic creations, particularly works of visual art and literary works. The discussion focuses on copyrights interests, but there are also implications for trademark and patent rights. The argument assumes a fairly conventional definition of "property," namely, the set of legal relations between the owner and all other persons relating to the use, enjoyment and disposition of a tangible thing. The problem with such a definition as applied to aesthetic creations (...) is that no ordinary tangible thing necessarily embodies a creation which can exist in multiple copies, so the paper takes the transcendent view that the tangible thing subject to legal relations is the entire terra firma or material universe being shaped in the image, sounds or words of the aesthetic creation. Therefore, the paradigm suggested for intellectual property is a monopoly on shaping the entire physical universe, thus the Worldmaking concept. It then follows that intellectual property in an aesthetic creation enables the owner to stop plagiarists from using any part of the material world to recreate in the audience the imaginative experiences first created by the protected work. (shrink)

t is a reality today that people die waiting in line for transplant organs. Something needs to be done to remedy this dire situation and alleviate the suffering. Broadly speaking, barring scientific progress that might make artificial organs and stem cell therapy viable alternatives, three options are available to us: increase voluntary donation, compel access to organs via government policy, or open up for a commercial market in organs. a.

Whereas previous discussions on ownership of biological material have been much informed by the natural rights tradition, insufficient attention has been paid to the strand in liberal political theory represented by Felix Cohen, Tony Honoré, and others, which treats property relations as socially constructed bundles of rights. In accordance with that tradition, we propose that the primary normative issue is what combination of rights a person should have to a particular item of biological material. Whether that bundle qualifies to be (...) called “property” or “ownership” is a secondary, terminological issue. We suggest five principles of bodily rights and show how they can be applied to the construction of ethically appropriate bundles of rights to biological material. (shrink)

In recent years, the free market position has been gaining strength. In this book, Radin provides a nuanced response to its sweeping generalization.

Creation of for-profit markets in organs for transplantation ignites in many deep moral repugnance. Proposals to broker organs have been denounced by the US Congress and professional groups alike. Financial incentives are believed to undermine consent, coercing the poor into selling their organs, violating human dignity, and improperly commodifying the human body; such concerns are held to trump the possibility of increasing life-sustaining transplants. While such views summarize the apparent global consensus which marks worldwide prohibition of the sale of human (...) organs, I argue that closer examination reveals significant grounds for concluding that markets would be more successful in preventing exploitation, preserving human dignity, and protecting against improper commodification than governmental bureaucratic procedures for procuring and allocating organs. (shrink)

This is a new revised version of Dr. Laslett's standard edition of Two Treatises. First published in 1960, and based on an analysis of the whole body of Locke's publications, writings, and papers. The Introduction and text have been revised to incorporate references to recent scholarship since the second edition and the bibliography has been updated.

Neither the George Washington University embryo splitting experiment nor the technique of embryo splitting itself has ethical flaws. The experiment harmed or wronged no one, and the investigators followed intramural review procedures for the experiment, although some might fault them for failing to seek extramural consultation or for not waiting until national guidelines for research on preembryos were developed. Ethical objections to such cloning on the basis of possible loss of individuality, possible lessening of individual worth, and concern about potential (...) harm to the resulting children are discussed and challenged, as are objections to the creation of embryos for the purpose of genetic diagnosis. Many of the ethical questions raised by the George Washington experiment are similar to those posed by existing reproductive technologies that allow the simultaneous production of several embryos. A multidisciplinary group should consider whether regulation of cloning is needed, and laws should be enacted to prohibit a commercial market for all frozen embryos. (shrink)

To whom do sperm and ova belong? Few tissues are produced by the human body with more waste than the germ cells. Yet dominion over the germ cells, and over the early embryo that results from their union in vitro, is behind much of the emotion that modern reproductive intervention can engender. The germ cells differ from other human tissues that can be donated or transplanted because they carry readily utilizable genetic information. Eventual expression of the germ cells' genetic potential (...) is the legitimate concern and responsibility of their donors, although in the right circumstances the responsibility can by agreement be entrusted to institutions administering gamete or embryo donor programmes; these institutions, in turn, may need to assume responsibility for decisions if, in the case of embryo storage, the wishes of the two donors conflict. The fact of sperm and ovum ownership (and the genetic potential that goes with it) before individuals part with these tissues is beyond dispute. Some contentious issues may be clarified if this area of human dominion, namely control over genetic expression among offspring, is acknowledged to be the legitimate persisting concern of those who have produced sperm and ova after storage commences. (shrink)

While people’s lives continue to be put at risk by the dearth of organs available for transplantation, we must give urgent consideration to any option that may make up the shortfall. A market in organs from living donors is one such option. The market should be ethically supportable, and have built into it, for example, safeguards against wrongful exploitation. This can be accomplished by establishing a single purchaser system within a confined marketplace.Statistics can be dehumanising. The following numbers, however, have (...) more impact than most: as of 24th November, during 2002 in the United Kingdom, 667 people have donated organs, 2055 people have received transplants, and 5615 people are still awaiting transplants.1 It is difficult to estimate how many people die prematurely for want of donor organs. “In the world as a whole there are an estimated 700 000 patients on dialysis . . . . In India alone 100 000 new patients present with kidney failure each year”2 . Almost “three million Americans suffer from congestive heart failure . . . deaths related to this condition are estimated at 250 000 each year . . . …. (shrink)

: he commercialization of biotechnology, especially research and development by transnational pharmaceutical companies, is already excessive and is increasingly dangerous to distributive justice, human rights, and access of marginal populations to basic human goods. Focusing on gene patenting, this article employs the work of Margaret Jane Radin and others to argue that gene patenting ought to be more highly regulated and that it ought to be regulated with international participation and in view of concerns about solidarity and the common good. (...) The mode of argument called for on this issue is more pragmatic than logical, emphasizing persuasion based on evidence about the reality and effects of control of genetic research by profit-driven biotech companies. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The late Richard Titmuss made a persuasive case against allowing the sale of human blood in his book, The Gift Relationship. His arguments have been developed further by Peter Singer in recent articles. While the issues of quantity and quality of blood under market and non‐market systems have received much attention, the moral and political aspects of the Titmuss‐Singer case have gone relatively unexamined. First, I question their claim that a donation‐only system promotes greater freedom, which rests on a (...) confusion of liberty and opportunity. Next, I consider reasons for doubting their view that altruism is fostered significantly more under the non‐market approach. Finally, I survey recent developments in the quantity‐quality debate and possible implications of the blood controversy for national health care. (shrink)

In late August 2002, a general practitioner in London, Dr Bhagat Singh Makkar, 62, was struck off the medical register after he was discovered to have bragged to an undercover journalist about being able to obtain a kidney from a live donor in exchange for a fee. He told the journalist, who posed as the son of a patient with renal failure: “No problem, I can fix that for you. Do you want it done here, do you want it done (...) in Germany or do you want it done in India?” The price he quoted included payment to the donor and “my administration costs”. Dr Makkar said he regretted giving “stupid answers” to the journalist. He had been “tired, confused, and upset after a long day dealing with emotional patients”.1Deliberation about ethics is often muddied by the personalities involved in a particular issue. Many people are uninspired by Richard Seed or Jack Kevorkian. This contaminates their view about the much broader and important issues such as cloning or euthanasia that Seed and Kevorkian, whom some people might describe as mavericks, have shoved their finger in.Discussion of the sale of organs is …. (shrink)

Following an earlier paper in the journal in which Evans argued that it was commercial exploitation, not mere payment, that was morally objectionable about certain sorts of organ donation, this paper looks at the moral issues when commercial exploitation is eliminated from systems of paid organ donation. It argues that there are no conclusive moral arguments against such schemes for non-exploitative paid kidney donation.

The biotechnology industry's intellectual property claims contribute to a subtle but not insignificant encroachment of commodification within health care. Drawing on the conceptual framework of Margaret Jane Radin, I argue that patent claims on human biological materials may commodify that with which our personhood and individuality is intertwined but that such commodification is broad and incomplete. Patents on nonhuman biological organisms contribute to a more materialistic understanding of them but do not significantly change our relationship to them. The systemic effects (...) of biotechnology's commodification within health care are various and may compromise the goal of good health. The morally problematic aspects of patent claims entail certain obligations to inhibit commodification from becoming more egregious, but on balance, those aspects are currently insufficient to justify denying the benefits the patent system promotes. (shrink)

The preservationist duties that conservationists would lay upon landowners to protect the natural environment obviously interfere with what those people do with their land. That is often taken to be an equally obvious ? albeit possibly justifiable ? violation of their rights in that property. But to say that, as landowners often do, would be to imply that property rights somehow embrace a ?right to destroy?. Closer inspection suggests that they do not. That would be a further right, additional to (...) and independent of all the component rights standardly associated with the right to private property. A right to destroy is implicit neither in the concept nor in the justifications of property rights, as they are standardly conceived. Conservationist policies cannot, therefore, properly be opposed on the grounds that they would necessarily violate people's property rights. (shrink)

There is a world-wide shortage of kidneys for transplantation. Many people will have to endure lengthy and unpleasant dialysis treatments, or die before an organ becomes available. Given this chronic shortage, some doctors and health economists have proposed offering financial incentives to potential donors to increase the supply of transplantable organs. In this paper, I explore objections to the practice of buying and selling organs from the point of view 1) justice, 2) beneficence and 3) Commodification. Regarding objection to the (...) Commodification of transplant organs, I examine a number of possible justifications of this objection but conclude that each of these would, if true, rule out the donation of transplant organs or the selling of numerous accepted commodities, or is implausible for some other reason. (shrink)