In this volume Axel Honneth deepens and develops his highly influential theory of recognition, showing how it enables us both to rethink the concept of justice and to offer a compelling account of the relationship between social reproduction and individual identity formation. Drawing on his reassessment of Hegel’s practical philosophy, Honneth argues that our conception of social justice should be redirected from a preoccupation with the principles of distributing goods to a focus on the measures for creating symmetrical relations of (...) recognition. This theoretical reorientation has far-reaching implications for the theory of justice, as it obliges this theory to engage directly with problems concerning the organization of work and with the ideologies that stabilize relations of domination. In the final part of this volume Honneth shows how the theory of recognition provides a fruitful and illuminating way of exploring the relation between social reproduction and identity formation. Rather than seeing groups as regressive social forms that threaten the autonomy of the individual, Honneth argues that the ‘I’ is dependent on forms of social recognition embodied in groups, since neither self-respect nor self-esteem can be maintained without the supportive experience of practising shared values in the group. This important new book by one of the leading social philosophers of our time will be of great interest to students and scholars in philosophy, sociology, politics and the humanities and social sciences generally. (shrink)

This book investigates theories of interpretation and meaning in Renaissance jurisprudence.

While contemporary accounts understand esteem and self-esteem as essentially competitive phenomena, early modern natural law theorists developed a conception of justified esteem and self-esteem based on naturally good character traits. This article explores how such a normative conception of esteem and self-esteem is developed in the work of Christian Wolff. Two features make Wolff’s approach distinctive: He uses the analysis of common notions that are expressed in everyday language to provide a foundation for the aspects of natural law on which (...) his conception of natural duties of esteem depends. He develops a non-competitive conception of esteem and self-esteem into a cooperative conception, according to which enhancing the esteem in which others are held is seen as a tool for promoting self-perfection. Wolff’s ideas offer a solution to the well-known problems connected with competitive life-styles, and at the same time assign a central role in moral motivation to the desire of being esteemed and of having high self-esteem. Moreover, due to his emphasis on presenting a philosophical analysis based on common notions, he offers a solution that is meant to be persuasive from the perspective of everyday morality. (shrink)

This is the first detailed study in any language of the single most influential theory of the modern state: Samuel von Pufendorf's account of the state as a 'moral person'. Ben Holland reconstructs the theological and political contexts in and for which Pufendorf conceived of the state as being a person. Pufendorf took up an early Christian conception of personality and a medieval conception of freedom in order to fashion a theory of the state appropriate to continental Europe, and which (...) could head off some of the absolutist implications of a rival theory of state personality, that of Hobbes. The book traces the fate of the concept in the hands of others - international lawyers, moral philosophers and revolutionaries - until the early twentieth century. It will be essential reading for historians of political thought and for those interested in the development of key ideas in theology, international law and international relations. (shrink)

The article traces the origin of Kant's distinction between the right to a good name in the Doctrine of Right and the right to respect for human dignity in the Doctrine of Virtrue. The story begins with Pufendorf's distinction between existimatio simplex and existimatio intensiva. "Existimatio" for Pufendorf means "worth." Accordingly, existimatio simplex is plain human worth, whereas existimatio intensiva is the worth of dignitaries, meaning of persons who are ascribed special worth. For Thomasius and Barbeyrac "existimatio" becomes "respect." Existimatio (...) simplex then becomes, for example for Achenwall, simple respect, which the law requires everyone to give his fellow human beings. Existimatio intensiva becomes recognition, among other things, of another's probity. The latter existimatio intensiva is a part of ethics. Kant then looks for the existimatio simplex that can be contrasted to this existimatio intensiva. He finds it in the respect for the dignity of all of mankind.Der Beitrag sucht den Ursprung von Kants Unterscheidung zwischen dem Recht der Unbescholtenheit, das in die Rechtslehre, und dem Recht auf Achtung vor der Würde des Nebenmenschen, das in die Tugendlehre gehört. Die Geschichte beginnt mit Pufendorfs Unterscheidung von existimatio simplex und existimatio intensiva. "Existimatio" bedeutet bei Pufendorf "Würde". Existimatio simplex ist danach die schlichte Menschenwürde, existimatio intensiva die Würde von Würdenträgern , also von Personen, denen eine besondere Würde zukommt. Bei Thomasius und Barbeyrac wird "existimatio" zu "Achtung". Die existimatio simplex wird dadurch, etwa bei Achenwall, zu der schlichten Achtung, die dem Nebenmenschen entgegenzubringen das Recht fordert. Die existimatio intensiva wird zur Anerkennung unter anderem der Rechtschaffenheit eines Menschen. Die letztere existimatio intensiva gehört in die Ethik. Kant sucht die existimatio simplex zu dieser existimatio intensiva, die er in der Achtung vor der Menschenwürde des anderen findet. (shrink)

This contribution to the Common Knowledge symposium “Peace by Other Means” argues that the drive for self-esteem, achieved by gaining honor or standing, has been a root cause of violent conflict and war throughout history and that peace-making that does not take account of what the Greeks called thumos is bound to fail. Using an original data set of all wars since 1648 involving great or rising powers, the essay shows how wars associated with honor, standing, and revenge, all expressions (...) of thumos, far outnumber those caused by security or material concerns. At the same time, it is argued, diplomacy and the theory of international relations have turned increasingly toward belief that conflicts are resolved only by negotiation based on the rational consideration of material interests. The author concludes that conflict resolution needs to rethink its presumptions in comparison with those of Greco-Latin literature and philosophy. (shrink)