The relationship between William James and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951) has recently been the subject of intense scholarly research. We know for instance that the later Wittgenstein's reflections on the philosophy of psychology found in James a major source of inspiration. Not surprisingly therefore, the pragmatist nature of the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein is increasingly acknowledged, in spite of Wittgenstein’s adamant refusal of being labeled a “pragmatist”. In this brief paper I merely want to piece together some of the available (...) evidence of Wittgenstein’s high regard for William James, not only for his thoughts, but even more so for his character. (shrink)

For this 1897 publication, the American philosopher William James brought together ten essays, some of which were originally talks given to Ivy League societies. Accessible to a broader audience, these non-technical essays illustrate the author's pragmatic approach to belief and morality, arguing for faith and action in spite of uncertainty. James thought his audiences suffered 'paralysis of their native capacity for faith' while awaiting scientific grounds for belief. His response consisted in an attitude of 'radical empiricism', which deals practically rather (...) than ideologically with real-world phenomena. When facing a 'momentous' decision about belief, he says, we both can and must choose the best hypothesis. The first four essays apply this principle to religious faith, and the rest explore the pragmatic approach to such topics as determinism, ethics and individual achievement. James developed his ideas further in The Varieties of Religious Experience and Pragmatism, both of which are reissued in this series. (shrink)

So-called 'hinge propositions', Wittgenstein's version of our basic beliefs, are not propositions at all, but heuristic expressions of our bounds of sense which, as such, cannot meaningfully be said but only show themselves in what we say and do. Yet if our foundational certainty is necessarily an ineffable, enacted certainty, any challenge of it must also be enacted. Philosophical scepticism – being a mere mouthing of doubt – is impotent to unsettle a certainty whose salient conceptual feature is that it (...) is lived. I appeal to psychopathology to show that the lived refutation of a basic certainty is not a manifestation of uncertainty, but of madness. (shrink)

Ce texte se propose de revenir sur la manière dont les Principles of Psychology ont été compris et discutés par Husserl et par Wittgenstein. Pour ce faire, on se focalisera ici sur le sens et l’importance stratégique de la dénonciation effectuée par James de l’ erreur du psychologue dans le chapitre VII de l’ouvrage, antérieur au chapitre « The Stream of Thought » qui a retenu toute l’attention de Husserl et de Wittgenstein. Il est suggéré qu’une des sources permettant de (...) déterminer ce qui est en jeu dans les usages divergents des Principles par Husserl et Wittgenstein se situe crucialement dans la manière dont cette dénonciation de l’erreur du psychologue peut être comprise à partir des perspectives respectives des deux auteurs. Un rappel des tensions principales entre, d’une part, le travail de James dans les Principles et, d’autre part, les critiques husserliennes et wittgensteiniennes de la psychologie, permet de comprendre l’importance, la radicalité, mais aussi les insuffisances de cette dénonciation jamesienne de l’erreur du psychologue. (shrink)

This paper examines a number of river images which have been attributed to Heraclitus, the ways they are used by Plato and Wittgenstein, and the connection between these uses of imagery and the metaphilosophical issues about the nature and limits of philosophy which they lead to. After indicating some of the connections between Heraclitus’, Plato’s and Wittgenstein’s use of river images, I give a preliminary reading of three crucial fragments from the Heraclitean corpus, associating each with a different river image. (...) Each of these images implies an overall conception of the nature of change and continuity and of the relationship between language and world. I then turn to the use of these images by Plato and Wittgenstein, and explore the relationship between their uses of river imagery and their conceptions of philosophy. To put it slightly differently, this paper is about Plato’s and Wittgenstein’s use of certain Heraclitean ideas. (shrink)