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  1. A Metaethical Option for Theists.Kyle Swan - 2006 - Journal of Religious Ethics 34 (1):3-20.
    John Hare has proposed “prescriptive realism” in an attempt to stake out a middle-ground position in the twentieth century Anglo-American debates concerning metaethics between substantive moral realists and antirealist-expressivists. The account is supposed to preserve both the normativity and objectivity of moral judgments. Hare defends a version of divine command theory. The proposal succeeds in establishing the middle-ground position Hare intended. However, I argue that prescriptive realism can be strengthened in an interesting way.
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  • Expressivism and embedding.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):677-693.
    Expressivism faces four distinct problems when evaluative sentences are embedded in unassertive contexts like: If lying is wrong, getting someone to lie is wrong, Lying is wrong, so Getting someone to lie is wrong. The initial problem is to show that expressivism is compatible with - being valid. The basic problem is for expressivists to explain why evaluative instances of modus ponens are valid. The deeper problem is to explain why a particular argument like - is valid. The deepest problem (...)
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  • Ecumenical expressivism: Finessing Frege.Michael Ridge - 2006 - Ethics 116 (2):302-336.
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  • Imperative and deontic logic.Peter Geach - 1957 - Analysis 18 (3):49-56.
    The author contends that moral utterances and imperatives have different logical features. He discusses r m hare's "language of morals" in terms of his distinction between plain imperatives and deontic utterances. (staff).
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  • Ascriptivism.P. T. Geach - 1960 - Philosophical Review 69 (2):221-225.
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  • Assertion.Peter Geach - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (4):449-465.
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  • Internalism and speaker relativism.James Dreier - 1990 - Ethics 101 (1):6-26.
    In this article I set out a reason for believing in a form of metaethical relativism. In rough terms, the reason is this: a widely held thesis, internalism, tells us that to accept (sincerely assert, believe, etc.) a moral judgment logically requires having a motivating reason. Since the connection is logical, or conceptual, it must be explained by a theory of what it is to accept a moral claim. I argue that the internalist feature of moral expressions can best be (...)
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  • Attitudes and contents.Simon Blackburn - 1988 - Ethics 98 (3):501-517.
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  • Is value content a component of conventional implicature?Stephen J. Barker - 2000 - Analysis 60 (3):268-279.
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  • Thomistic natural law as Darwinian natural right.Larry Arnhart - 2001 - Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (1):1-33.
    The publication in 1975 of Edward O. Wilson's Sociobiology provoked a great controversy, for in that work Wilson claimed that ethics was rooted in human biology. On the first page of the book, he asserted that our deepest intuitions of right and wrong are guided by the emotional control centers of the brain, which evolved via natural selection to help the human animal exploit opportunities and avoid threats in the natural environment. In 1998, the publication of Wilson's Consilience renewed the (...)
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  • Value and implicature.Stephen Finlay - 2005 - Philosophers' Imprint 5:1-20.
    Moral assertions express attitudes, but it is unclear how. This paper examines proposals by David Copp, Stephen Barker, and myself that moral attitudes are expressed as implicature (Grice), and Copp's and Barker's claim that this supports expressivism about moral speech acts. I reject this claim on the ground that implicatures of attitude are more plausibly conversational than conventional. I argue that Copp's and my own relational theory of moral assertions is superior to the indexical theory offered by Barker and Jamie (...)
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