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Assertion and Rejection.Julian J. Schlöder - 2022 - In Daniel Altshuler (ed.), Linguistics Meets Philosophy. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.details
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Neo-Kantian constructivism and metaethics.Kirk Surgener - 2012 - Dissertation, University of Birminghamdetails
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Imperative change and obligation to do.Berislav Žarnić - 2003 - In Krister Segerberg & Ryszard Sliwinski (eds.), Logic, Law, Morality: Thirteen Essays in Practical Philosophy in Honour of Lennart Åqvist. Department of Philosophy, Uppsala University. pp. 79-95.details
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Geach and Ascriptivism: Beside the Point.Luís Duarte D'Almeida - 2016 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 4 (6).details
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Moral fictionalism, the Frege-Geach problem, and reasonable inference.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2008 - Analysis 68 (2):133-143.details
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Why Moral Error Theorists Should Become Revisionary Moral Expressivists.Toby Svoboda - 2015 - Journal of Moral Philosophy (1):1-25.details
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Imperative Statics and Dynamics.Nate Charlow - manuscriptdetails
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Logic and Semantics for Imperatives.Nate Charlow - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):617-664.details
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The problem with the Frege–Geach problem.Nate Charlow - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):635-665.details
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New Foundations for Imperative Logic Iii: A General Definition of Argument Validity.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2012 - Manuscript in Preparation.details
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The autonomy of evaluation.David Collingridge - 1980 - Journal of Value Inquiry 14 (2):119-127.details
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What is the Frege-Geach problem?Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (4):703-720.details
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Humean and anti-Humean internalism about moral judgements.Mark Van Roojen - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):26-49.details
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New foundations for imperative logic I: Logical connectives, consistency, and quantifiers.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2008 - Noûs 42 (4):529-572.details
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The Frege–Geach Problem, Modus Ponens, and Legal Language.Vitaly Ogleznev - 2018 - Problemos 93.details
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Moral fictionalism, the Frege-Geach problem, and reasonable inference.Markeli Kalderon - 2008 - Analysis 68 (2):133-143.details
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New foundations for imperative logic III: A general definition of argument validity.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2016 - Synthese 193 (6):1703-1753.details
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The open future, bivalence and assertion.Corine Besson & Anandi Hattiangadi - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):251-271.details
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Command and consequence.Josh Parsons - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):61-92.details
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Expressive-assertivism.By Daniel R. Boisvert - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):169–203.details
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Expressivism, supervenience and logic.Mark Van Roojen - 2005 - Ratio 18 (2):190–205.details
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(2 other versions)Przegląd Czasopism.J. F. Drewnowski - 1958 - Studia Logica 8 (1):335-342.details
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An empirical argument against moral non-cognitivism.Thomas Pölzler & Jennifer Cole Wright - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (6):1141-1169.details
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Rationalization and the Ross Paradox.Benj Hellie - 2016 - In Nate Charlow & Matthew Chrisman (eds.), Deontic Modality. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 283--323.details
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Why Moral Error Theorists Should Become Revisionary Moral Expressivists.Toby Svoboda - 2015 - New Content is Available for Journal of Moral Philosophy (1):48-72.details
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