The author states: "in a recent article searle has shown the odd irrelevance of russell's criticisms of frege in the famous paper 'on denoting'. I here offer an explanation of the oddity: russell had excusably, But wrongly, Conflated frege's distinction between sinn and bedeutung with his own distinction between what an expression 'means' and what it 'denotes'.".

This is identical with the first edition (see 21: 2716) except for the addition of a Supplement containing 5 previously published articles and the bringing of the bibliography (now 73 items) up to date. The 5 added articles present clarifications or modifications of views expressed in the first edition. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2009 APA, all rights reserved).

At first russell thought (p) that whatever a proposition is about must be a constituent of it. Then, Around 1900, He discovered denoting concepts and realized that a proposition could be about something and have only its denoting concept as constituent. However, A number of remarks that he made through the years can only be understood as inspired by (p). In particular, The arguments offered in "on denoting" against the doctrine of denotation of "principles" are grounded on (p).