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Strengthening Principles and Counterfactual Semantics

Proceedings of the 21st Amsterdam Colloquium (2017)

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  1. A Theory of Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory. Oxford,: Blackwell. pp. 98-112.
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  • Are there Counterexamples to the Closure Principle.Jonathan Vogel - 1990 - In Roth Michael & Ross Glenn (eds.), Doubting: Contemporary Perspetcives on Scepticism. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 13-29.
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  • Defending Conditional Excluded Middle.J. Robert G. Williams - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):650-668.
    Lewis (1973) gave a short argument against conditional excluded middle, based on his treatment of ‘might’ counterfactuals. Bennett (2003), with much of the recent literature, gives an alternative take on ‘might’ counterfactuals. But Bennett claims the might-argument against CEM still goes through. This turns on a specific claim I call Bennett’s Hypothesis. I argue that independently of issues to do with the proper analysis of might-counterfactuals, Bennett’s Hypothesis is inconsistent with CEM. But Bennett’s Hypothesis is independently objectionable, so we should (...)
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  • Logics for Conditionals.Frank Veltman - 1987 - Studia Logica 46 (2):206-207.
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  • Partition and revision: The semantics of counterfactuals.Angelika Kratzer - 1981 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 10 (2):201 - 216.
    The last section made it clear that an analysis which at first seems to fail is viable after all. It is viable if we let it depend on a partition function to be provided by the context of conversation. This analysis leaves certain traits of the partition function open. I have tried to show that this should be so. Specifying these traits as Pollock does leads to wrong predictions. And leaving them open endows counterfactuals with just the right amount of (...)
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