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Jonathan Vogel
Amherst College
  1. Cartesian Skepticism and Inference to the Best Explanation.Jonathan Vogel - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (11):658-666.
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  2. The New Relevant Alternatives Theory.Jonathan Vogel - 1999 - Noûs 33 (s13):155-180.
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  3. Dismissing skeptical possibilities.Jonathan Vogel - 1993 - Philosophical Studies 70 (3):235 - 250.
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  4.  11
    Accident, Evidence, and Knowledge.Jonathan Vogel - 2017 - In Peter Klein, Rodrigo Borges & Claudio Almeida (eds.), Explaining knowledge: new essays on the Gettier problem. Oxford UK: Oxford University Press. pp. 117-133.
    I explore and develop the idea that (NA) knowledge is non-accidentally true belief. The applicable notion of non-accidentality differs from that of ‘epistemic luck’ discussed by Pritchard. Safety theories may be seen as a refinement of, or substitute for, NA but they are subject to a fundamental difficulty. At the same time, NA needs to be adjusted in order to cope with two counterexamples. The Light Switch Case turns on the ‘directionof-fit’ between a belief and the facts, while the Meson (...)
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  5. The Problem of Self-Knowledge in Kant’s “Refutation of Idealism”: Two Recent Views.Jonathan Vogel - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):875-887.
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  6.  89
    Sklar on methodological conservatism.Jonathan Vogel - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):125-131.
    In an important study, Lawrence Sklar has defended a doctrine of methodological conservatism (very roughly, the principle that a proposition derives some sort of epistemic warrant from being believed). I argue that Sklar's careful formulation of methodological conservatism remains too strong, and that a yet weaker version of the doctrine cannot be successfully defended. I also criticize Sklar's argument that the rejection of methodological conservatism would result in total skepticism. Finally, I turn to a closely related issue, and try to (...)
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  7.  71
    Skepticism and Foundationalism: A Reply to Michael Williams.Jonathan Vogel - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Research 22:11-28.
    Michael WiIliams maintains that skepticism about the extemal worId is vitiated by a commitment to foundationalism and epistemological realism. (The latter is, approximately, the view that there is such a thing as knowledge of the extemal world in general, which the skeptic can take as a target). I argue that skepticism is not encumbered in the ways Williams supposes. What matters, first of all, is that we can’t perceive the difference between being in an ordinary environment and being in the (...)
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  8.  20
    Is Cartesian Skepticism Too Cartesian?Jonathan Vogel - 2018 - In Kevin Mc Cain & Ted Poston (eds.), The Mystery of Skepticism: New Explorations. Leiden, Netherlands: pp. 24-45.
    A prominent response is that Cartesian skepticism is too Cartesian. It arises from outmoded views in epistemology and the philosophy of mind that we now properly reject. We can and should move on to other things. §2 takes up three broadly Cartesian themes: the epistemic priority of experience, under-determination, and the representative theory of perception. I challenge some common assumptions about these, and their connection to skepticism. §3 shows how skeptical arguments that emphasize causal considerations can avoid some suspect Cartesian (...)
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  9.  13
    Counting Minds and Mental States.Jonathan Vogel - 2014 - In David J. Bennett & Christopher S. Hill (eds.), Sensory Integration and the Unity of Consciousness. Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press. pp. 393-400.
    Important conceptual and metaphysical issues arise when we try to understand the mental lives of “split-brain” subjects. How many distinct streams of consciousness do they have? According to Elizabeth Schechter’s partial unity model, the answer is one. A related question is whether co-consciouness, in general, is transitive. That is, if α and β are co-conscious experiences, and β and γ are co-conscious experiences, must α and γ be co-conscious? According to Schechter, the answer is no. The partial unity model faces (...)
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    The exorcist's nightmare: A reply to Crispin Wright.Thomas Tymoczko & Jonathan Vogel - 1992 - Mind 101 (403):543-552.
    Crispin Wright tried to refute classical 'Cartesian' skepticism contending that its core argument is extendible to a reductio ad absurdum (_Mind<D>, 100, 87-116, 1991). We show both that Wright is mistaken and that his mistakes are philosophically illuminating. Wright's 'best version' of skepticism turns on a concept of warranted belief. By his definition, many of our well-founded beliefs about the external world and mathematics would not be warranted. Wright's position worsens if we take 'warranted belief' to be implicitly defined by (...)
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