This collection of classic and contemporary readings in ethics presents sharp, competing views on a wide range of fundamentally important topics: moral relativism and objectivism, ethical egoism, value theory, utilitarianism, deontological ethics, virtue ethics, ethics and religion, and applied ethics. The Fourth Edition dramatically increases the volume’s utility by expanding and updating the selections and introductions while retaining the structure that has made previous editions so successful.

HUMAN CONDUCT strives to motivate and challenge ethics students through the use of realistic dialogues that bring ethical dilemmas to life. An engaging narrative style (including fiction) and an extensive series of examples illustrate theories of right and wrong as this introductory text describes and critiques traditional and contemporary moral problems.

Several years ago I came across a marvelous little paper in which Hector-Neri Castaneda shows that standard versions of act utilitarian l ism are formally incoherent. I was intrigued by his argument. It had long seemed to me that I had a firm grasp on act utilitarianism. Indeed, it had often seemed to me that it was the clearest and most attractive of normative theories. Yet here was a simple and relatively uncontrover sial argument that showed, with only some trivial (...) assumptions, that the doctrine is virtually unintelligible. The gist of Castaneda's argument is this: suppose we understand act utilitarianism to be the view that an act is obligatory if and only if its utility exceeds that of each alternative. Suppose it is obligatory for a certain person to perform an act with two parts - we can call it 'A & B'. Then, obviously enough, it is also obligatory for this person to perform the parts, A and B. If act utilitarianism were true, we appar ently could infer that the utility of A & B is higher than that of A, and higher than that of B (because A & B is obligatory, and the other acts are alternatives to A & B). (shrink)