An essay on Kant's theory of justification, where by “justification” is meant the evaluative concept that specifies conditions under which a propositional attitude is rationally acceptable with a moderate-to-high degree of confidence. Kant employs both epistemic and non-epistemic concepts of justification: an epistemic concept of justification sets out conditions under which a propositional attitude is rationally acceptable with a moderate-to-high degree of confidence and a candidate (if true and Gettier-immune) for knowledge. A non-epistemic concept of justification, by contrast, sets out (...) conditions under which attitudes are rationally acceptable with a moderate-to-high degree of confidence but not candidates for knowledge (even if true). The latter conditions will typically be “pragmatic” or “practical,” and thus license acceptance from a “practical” point of view. For Kant, only broadly-speaking practical reasons can provide adequate motivation for adopting a positive attitude towards a proposition (rather than suspending judgment) in the absence of sufficient epistemic grounds. -/- . (shrink)

Kant and the Claims of Taste, published here for the first time in paperback in a revised version, has become, since its initial publication in 1979, the standard commentary on Kant's aesthetic theory. The book offers a detailed account of Kant's views on judgments of taste, aesthetic pleasure, imagination and many other topics. For this new edition, Paul Guyer has provided a new foreword and has added a chapter on Kant's conception of fine art. This re-issue will complement the author's (...) companion volume, Kant and the Experience of Freedom, which places Kant's aesthetics in its historical context and examines the fundamental connection between Kant's aesthetics and his moral theory. (shrink)

This paper offers a new account of Kant`s metaphysical deduction of the categories in the Critique of Pure Reason. This is accomplished by way of a new interpretation of Kant`s notion of function and his theory of mental activity, which is presented in terms of a logic and theory of intentional reference. A detailed discussion of the definition and use of the notion of function in the “Leading Thread” leads to an interpretation of the notion of function as a complex, (...) triparted unity of intentional reference. Kant´s thesis that the unity of judgment and the unity of intuition rest on the very same function is thus explained as the thesis of the structural identity of analysis and synthesis. The presented interpretation of the notion of function and the corresponding theory of intentional reference make it possible to deduce the titles of quality, quantity, and relation of the tables of judgments and the categories, and to justify their necessity. The conception of a logic of reference to particulars then establishes the respective three moments of these titles. The title and the moments of modality finally are grounded in the cognitive constitution of finite beings. Thus Kant`s claim for completeness of the tables of judgments and the categories can be elucidated as well as justified. -- Die vorliegende Abhandlung bietet einen neuen Zugang zu Kants metaphysischer Deduktion der Kategorien in der Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Erreicht wird dieser vermittels einer Neuinterpretation von Kants Begriff der Funktion sowie seiner Theorie mentaler Aktivität, die als eine Logik und Theorie intentionalen Bezugs dargestellt wird. Eine detaillierte Untersuchung der Definition und Verwendung des Begriffs der Funktion im „Leitfaden“ führt zu einer Interpretation des Begriffs der Funktion als komplexe, dreiteilige Einheit intentionalen Bezugs. Kants These, dass die Einheit des Urteils und die Einheit der Anschauung auf derselben Funktion beruhen , wird auf diese Weise als die These der strukturellen Identität von Analysis und Synthesis verständlich gemacht. Die vorgelegte Interpretation des Funktionsbegriffs sowie die entsprechende Theorie intentionalen Bezugs ermöglichen es, die Titel der Qualität, Quantität und Relation der Urteils- und Kategorientafel herzuleiten und ihre Notwendigkeit zu rechtfertigen. Die Konzeption einer Logik des Bezugs auf Einzeldinge begründet dann die jeweils drei Momente dieser Titel. Der Titel und die Momente der Modalität schließlich haben ihren Grund in der kognitiven Verfasstheit endlicher Wesen. Auf diese Weise kann Kants Anspruch der Vollständigkeit der Urteils- und Kategorientafel sowohl verständlich gemacht als auch begründet werden. (shrink)

Of all the major philosophical works, Kant's Critique of Pure Reason is one of the most rewarding, yet one of the most difficult. Norman Kemp Smith's Commentary elucidates not only textural questions and minor issues, but also the central problems which arise, he contends, from the conflicting tendencies of Kant's own thinking. Kemp Smith's Commentary continues to be in demand with Kant scholars, and it is being reissued here with a new introduction by Sebastian Gardner to set it in its (...) contemporary context. (shrink)

This paper takes the form of a critical discussion of Crispin Wright’s notion of entitlement of cognitive project. I examine various strategies for defending the claim that entitlement can make acceptance of a proposition epistemically rational, including one which appeals to epistemic consequentialism. Ultimately, I argue, none of these strategies is successful, but the attempt to isolate points of disagreement with Wright issues in some positive proposals as to how an epistemic consequentialist should characterize epistemic rationality.

This major study of Kant provides a detailed examination of the development and function of the doctrine of transcendental illusion in his theoretical philosophy. The author shows that a theory of 'illusion' plays a central role in Kant's arguments about metaphysical speculation and scientific theory. Indeed, she argues that we cannot understand Kant unless we take seriously his claim that the mind inevitably acts in accordance with ideas and principles that are 'illusory'. Taking this claim seriously, we can make much (...) better sense of Kant's arguments and reach a deeper understanding of the role he allots human reason in science. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss two fundamental challenges concerning Crispin Wright's notion of entitlement of cognitive project: firstly, whether entitlement is an epistemic kind of warrant since, seemingly, it is not underwritten by epistemic reasons, and, secondly, whether, in the absence of such reasons, the kind of rationality associated with entitlement is epistemic in nature. The paper investigates three possible lines of response to these challenges. According to the first line of response, entitlement of cognitive project is underwritten by epistemic (...) reasons – and thus supports epistemic rationality – because, when P is an entitlement, trust in P is a dominant strategy with respect to promotion of epistemic value. The second line of response replaces dominance with maximization of expected utility. I argue that both of these proposals are flawed and develop an alternative line of response. (shrink)

So much for the Aesthetic. We can now proceed to the Analytic, the philosophical importance of which is much greater. Kant's main contentions in this part of his work can be summed up in; two propositions: human understanding contains certain a priori concepts, and on these are based certain non-empirical principles; these concepts are only general concepts of a phenomenal object, and therefore the principles in question are only prescriptive to sense-experience. As has already been said, interest in the first (...) proposition has distracted attention from the fact that the important thing Kant has to say is contained in the second. (shrink)