In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls defines a hypothetical contract situation and argues rational people will agree on reflection it is fair to contractors. He solves the rational choice problem it poses by deriving two lexically-ordered principles of justice and suggests the derivation justifies the principles. Its soundness aside, just what justificatory force does such a derivation have?On one view, there is no justificatory force because the contract is rigged specifically to yield principles which match our pre-contract moral judgments. (...) Rawls provides ammunition for this claim: “By going back and forth, sometimes altering the conditions of the contractual circumstances, at others withdrawing our judgments [about what is just] and conforming them to principle, I assume that eventually we shall find a description of the initial situation that both expresses reasonable conditions and yields principles which match our considered judgments duly pruned and adjusted.”. (shrink)

There is a hoary tradition in moral philosophy that assumes we cannot determine which moral theory is acceptable or correct unless we have available a correct theory of human nature, or, in its more modern form, of the person. With such a theory of the person, however, we could at least narrow down the choice among competing ethical theories. A more recent tradition, at least in one of its standard interpretations, agrees it would be necessary to have a correct theory (...) of the person before we could determine an acceptable moral theory, but it denies there is a determinate nature of the person to be captured in such a theory. The plasticity of the person, according to this strand of Marxist theory, rules out the possibility of there being universal moral theory at all. In this paper, I would like to explore a view that treads an intermediate path. It agrees with the Marxist denial that there is a determinate nature of the person, a deep fact of the matter, that can be abstracted from the social matrix and made the subject of a theory of the person. And, it agrees with both traditions that moral theory depends on and embodies a theory of the person. But, by making the problem of arriving at an acceptable view of the person itself something that depends on overall theoretical considerations, including moral ones, the intermediary, view may be able to avoid the type of moral relativism associated with the Marxist view. (shrink)

1. There is no dearth of objections to Rawls's A Theory of justice. Scores of articles and several books begin by praising the rigor and depth of Rawls's book — and end by concluding that it is thoroughly mistaken. In the present essay I will not add to the list of negative responses to A Theory of Justice. Instead I will attempt to reply to Rawls's critics in a way which makes a positive contribution to his theory.2. Among the many (...) objections that have been raised against Rawls's theory, two are of paramount importance. It is these two objections I shall attempt to meet. They may be formulated as follows. (shrink)

In his book A Theory of Justice, John Rawls introduces and employs the concept of “reflective equilibrium” as a method of testing which of rival moral theories is to be preferred. The introduction of this concept is plainly a significant event for moral philosophy. The criterion by which we decide to reject, say, utilitarianism in favour of a contractual theory of justice is, if anything, even more fundamental than the choice of theory itself, since our choice of moral theory may (...) well be determined by the criterion we use. (shrink)

Moral sceptics appear to be as common outside of philosophy as they are within philosophy. And moral scepticism, unlike some philosophical issues, is very widely felt to be important, troubling, and persistent. My aims in this paper are to draw together some ideas from the recent philosophical literature, and to use these ideas as the basis for one kind of response to the moral sceptic. For reasons that will soon become clear, some anti-sceptical moral philosophers may feel that this response (...) to the sceptic is nothing but a form of concession. Yet my position represents an attempt to defend a kind of moral objectivity, to demonstrate at least the possibility of a certain sort of moral universality, and most especially to do justice to the very central role of morality in our lives. Thus I expect that many sceptics, too, will regard my position as unsatisfactory. It might be thought foolhardy to advance a position that seems likely to alienate so many parties to the dispute it addresses. But popular solutions to the problem of moral scepticism are in short supply, and I hope to show that my position can capture what is compelling in the sceptical argument, while at the same time doing justice to the dignity and importance of morality. (shrink)

THE central idea of modern empiricism has been that, if there is to be such a thing as justification at all, empirical knowledge must be seen as resting on experiential "foundations." To claim that knowledge rests on foundations is to claim that there is a privileged class of beliefs the members of which are "intrinsically credible" or "directly evident" and which are able, therefore, to serve as ultimate terminating points for chains of justification. An important development in current epistemology has (...) been a revival of the debate between philosophers who favor this conception of knowledge and those who think that an adequate account of justification can be given in terms of "coherence." Thus Dummett, Pollock, and Quinton, in varying degrees, have based their recent defenses of traditional empiricist views on what they take to be the clear untenability of coherentist alternatives. Harman and Lehrer, on the other hand, have tried to show that defensible versions of the coherence theory can be developed. (shrink)